United States Propaganda in Iran and the Cold War Paradigm

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History

During the Cold War, the United States engaged in numerous clandestine interventions to overturn democratic political regimes for rulers that supported American interests. The CIA, along with the British MI6 and Iranians loyal to the Shah, executed the inaugural intervention, “Operation AJAX,” in 1953. AJAX was a coup d’état that removed democratically elected Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq. Mossadeq represented Iranian nationalism, as he collectivized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that was widely viewed as exploitative by Iranians. The newly installed Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was supportive of Anglo-American interests. In the 1950s, the United States launched a propaganda program in Iran that attempted to foster a belief among Iranians in American goodwill toward the nation, and of the benefits of an alliance with the US.

The historiography pertaining to the 1953 coup d’état in Iran explores who was responsible for Mossadeq’s ouster, why the U.S. intervened, and whether the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran was a consequence of the coup. These works prominently use the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* volumes, CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt Jr.’s officially approved 1979 book *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*, the declassified internal CIA history *The Battle for Iran*, and numerous correspondences among the US, Britain, and Iran. Zachary Karabell’s 1999 book, *Architects of Intervention*, takes the position that the British were most instrumental in causing the coup by taking advantage of American fears that Iran would fall into the Soviet sphere, pushing the U.S. to act. Additionally, Karabell asserts that Iran was
divided in two camps, with one being the pro-Western and autocratic Shah and the other being Mossadeq’s nationalist, democratic, and reformist faction. This dichotomy validates arguments that the Islamic Revolution was connected to the legacy of Mossadeq, as it was the only alternative form of politics to the secular Shah.ii Mark Gasiorowski is one of the most prominent scholars in this field. In the 2004 compilation, *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran*, of which Gasiorowski was one of the editors and a contributor, he argues that the United States instigated the coup because of their fear of communism in the context of the Cold War.iii While Gasiorowski acknowledges British and Iranians as contributors, their capacity to effect change was limited.iv A different perspective is laid out in Darioush Bayandour’s 2010 book *Iran and the CIA*. This work maintains that Iran’s internal dynamics were a greater factor in the coup than the CIA or MI6, as both the Shah supporting military and clerics had abandoned Mossadeq.v Additionally, this work argues that the Islamic Revolution was not an effect of the coup as Iranians clerics had drifted to the Right and rejected much of Mossadeq’s program.vi One final historiographical work that warrants comment is Ervand Abrahamian’s 2013 book *The Coup*. Abrahamian argues that the coup was one of the primary forces behind the Islamic Revolution, and explicitly challenges Gasiorowski for perpetuating the framework that the coup was a typical Cold War incident where the U.S. intervened out of the fear that Communism would spread to Iran. This framework is flawed, according to Abrahamian, as the coup was connected to a battle between imperialism and nationalism, with the U.S. acting imperially to perpetuate the flow of oil.vii

In this essay, I use American correspondences about their propaganda in Iran, along with CIA intelligence, to show that the U.S. recognized that nationalism was distinct from Communism, and that the former was viewed as the true threat to Western interests in Iran. This
validates historian Ervand Abrahamian’s aforementioned argument that the Cold War paradigm is insufficient for interpreting U.S. and Iranian relations in the early 1950s. American propaganda in Iran was heavily discussed within the CIA, State Department, and U.S. Embassy in Iran. The sources prominently feature Secretary of State Dean Acheson and embassy ambassador Loy Henderson. Studying propaganda not only illuminates the shortcomings of the common policy critique that the U.S. conflated Communism with nationalism when applied to America’s approach to Iran, but also illuminates the role of Orientalism in the U.S. government. As a supplemental argument, I show that primary sources regarding the propaganda program reveals that government officials had a contradictory relationship with Orientalism. The U.S. clearly viewed Iran under an Orientalist framework, while simultaneously promoting propaganda that used historical knowledge of the connections between East and West to garner Iranian support, despite the fact that such knowledge subverted Orientalism.

Examining documents pertaining to propaganda from the State Department and CIA reveals that the United States recognized that Iranian nationalism was a tremendous threat to its national interests. United States propaganda in Iran was broad, using several different mediums to convince the population to have a more favorable view of America and Britain. Examples include anti-Soviet articles in Iranian magazines and anti-Soviet newsreels disseminated in Iranian theaters. The U.S. Information and Education Exchange Program (USIE) was one propaganda entity of the government, which published an anti-USSR cultural magazine in Farsi. Anti-Soviet propaganda was not intended solely to counter communism, but nationalism as well. This is because the USSR and pro-Soviet Tudeh party in Iran appealed to nationalism, i.e. beliefs in political economic independence and resistance to foreign influence, to provoke instability and gain support from those who were not communist partisans, respectively.
Therefore, anti-communist propaganda by the U.S. was not strictly intended to stop the spread of Communism, but rather to thwart Soviet propaganda that undermined U.S. interests by speaking to the concerns of Iranian nationalists.

Iranian nationalism threatened U.S. security interests in the context of the Cold War, as British access to Iranian oil was crucial in the event of total war with the USSR, as was the logistical advantage of having American military bases in the region. The U.S. embassy in Iran created libraries and reading rooms that sought to cultivate positive views of the West.\textsuperscript{x}

Additionally, the U.S. embassy disseminated books and pamphlets on contemporary history, politics, philosophy, and social science that presented the West favorably.\textsuperscript{xi} These American textual productions targeted both literate, urban professionals and the rural population through direct financial aid to improve their livelihood and thus create a positive image of the US.\textsuperscript{xii}

The U.S. recognized that Communism was not an imminent, and at times even a plausible threat, to take hold in Iran. CIA intelligence during the 1950s reveals that there was knowledge available to the U.S. government showing that the USSR was at most a limited threat to gain power. A 1950 CIA document that discussed the possibility of Soviet aggression in Iran concluded that the USSR was very unlikely to launch a ground invasion, but they were interested in subverting the Iranian government through propaganda and other means. The document maintained that for four years, Soviets had chosen to avoid invading Iran, despite border conflicts providing a pretense for war, which suggested they would maintain a focus on disrupting Iran’s internal stability.\textsuperscript{xiii} The following year, the CIA was even less concerned about the prospect of a powerful communist movement in Iran.

An intelligence report from the CIA in March of 1951 informed the U.S. government that the communist, pro-Soviet Tudeh party was illegal in Iran, and that the oil crisis would not
provide them with an opportunity to even disrupt the government, let alone gain control of it.\textsuperscript{xiv} In the event of a Tudeh uprising, the CIA was confident that the army would remain loyal to the Iranian government. In January of 1952, the CIA made it clear that Tudeh had both supported and attacked Prime Minister Mossadeq, which showed American officials that Mossadeq was not a puppet for Tudeh or the Soviets.\textsuperscript{xv} However, the CIA did acknowledge the “possibility” of Tudeh to seize power or of Soviet intervention, but only if the British prolonged the crisis by being “unyielding,” or if there was a sudden event like the Shah’s assassination.\textsuperscript{xvi} But such an occurrence was not an imminent threat, according to the CIA, and could have been avoided by the British finding a way to assuage the nationalist movement by coming to an agreement regarding the oil conflict. This shows that the U.S. did not mistake communism for nationalism, but believed the nationalist movement in Iran could create instability that opened opportunities for communism. Therefore, CIA intelligence emphasized countering Iranian nationalism through anti-communist propaganda. In March of 1952, the CIA warned that communist propaganda depicted “U.S. imperialism” by presenting the actions of the International Bank and NATO as exploitative.\textsuperscript{xvii} These documents reveal that anti-communist propaganda was central to the fight against a potent Iranian nationalism even more so than it was intended to undermine Soviet influence and the spread of Communism.

In January of 1952, ambassador Loy Henderson wrote a telegram from the embassy in Iran to the State Department informing that Muhammad Mossadeq was closing US, British, and Soviet cultural and informational offices.\textsuperscript{xviii} Since Soviet, Communist offices were not spared from being closed, Henderson showed the State Department that Mossadeq's regime should be understood as nationalist in opposing all foreign elements, including Communist ones. In a subsequent telegram from Henderson to Secretary of State Acheson, he cited Iranian minister
Kazemi who said that some foreign cultural centers “engaged in activities contrary to [the] interests [of] Iran.”\textsuperscript{xix} In these exchanges, Henderson recognized the threat of nationalism to American interests and communicated his recognition to the State Department.

An April 1952 report from the National Security Council warned that nationalism was rampant among urban radicals, and urged the U.S. to produce anti-communist propaganda to counter that of the Soviets, which undermined American influence by appealing to nationalism. The document stated that “urban political groups have a radical solution: the total elimination of visible foreign power.”\textsuperscript{xx} The document also noted that nationalism was solidified by the widespread recognition of U.S. ties to the UK, which was a contention supported by communist propaganda that presented the U.S. as exploitative.\textsuperscript{xxi} The observation that communist propaganda was detrimental to U.S. interests by stoking nationalist sentiments more so than by improving the position of Tudeh or the USSR is a recurring theme in sources pertaining to the propaganda battle.

Nationalism in Iran was not confined to the urban population, and propaganda efforts were directed at the countryside, as well. In 1951, ambassador Wells wrote to the State Department that anti-communist propaganda was ineffective with the rural population, as “The lot of the rural population is a miserable one and the people feel that their condition could not be any worse under any government. Therefore, they are not at all impressed or even interested in out and out anti-Soviet propaganda.”\textsuperscript{xxii} Instead, Wells promoted foreign aid to improve the daily lives of rural Iranians. It was crucial for the aid to be connected to the U.S. and seen as voluntarily accepted by the Iranian government.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Improving people’s welfare would serve as propaganda to show the benefits of a relationship with the US, contrary to nationalist views of the U.S. as exploitative, which Soviet propaganda disseminated. Also, promoting an
economically stable society could prevent rural people from seeking political alternatives like the Tudeh or nationalism.

Secretary of State Acheson and Ambassador Loy Henderson both argued that propaganda efforts were necessary to challenge Iranian nationalist critiques of the US. In July of 1952, Secretary Acheson wrote a telegram to Henderson in the American embassy in Iran that requested their media influence should emphasize that the U.S. had no interest in the outcome of the oil crisis, which would have contradicted communist propaganda that presented the U.S. as an imperial entity. In his returning telegram, Henderson noted that the U.S. would ramp up Voice of America airtime to compete with the Kremlin’s use of the radio as a means of propaganda. American propaganda, as Henderson prescribed, would speak to Iranian nationalist ideals by showing “U.S. interest in aspirations of Iranian common man towards a higher standard of living,” that ties with the West would be most profitable for Iran, and that the U.S. was interested in “Iranian security and independence.” This exchange demonstrates that the U.S. was not mistaking nationalism for communism, but recognized that communist propaganda spoke to Iranian nationalists and was a thorn for American national interests.

A March 3, 1953 commentary on Tudeh’s position in Iran is revealing of the complex relationship among nationalism, communism, and Mossadeq within the intelligence community. The document reveals that the Tudeh party was not interested in gaining power within the Iranian government, as it was previously believed in the CIA. The report stated, “Current Tudeh attempts to exploit the confused situation in Iran suggest that the Communists are not ready for an all-out assault on the government, but believe that Mossadeq’s continuation in power will best serve their interest in what they regard as a ‘maturing revolutionary situation.’” This conclusion that Tudeh would not attempt to take over the government because they saw
Mossadeq’s rule as conducive to their long-term interests was complemented by the position that, “The diverse nature and conflicting interest of the forces opposing Mossadeq would undermine any government brought to power by his defeat and would presumably present the Tudeh with a new chance to further its aim of obtaining control of the government.”xxvii This position of the CIA shows concerns that Mossadeq’s ouster could actually improve the position of Tudeh, and therefore the USSR, to gain control in Iran. Such a view undermines simplistic interpretations of the coup against Mossadeq as an effort to weaken communist influence.

United States propaganda in Iran was much more easily promulgated with the support of Shah Pahlavi and Prime Minister Zahedi after the successful coup d’état. In September of 1953, Theodore C. Streibert of the State Department wrote a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Iran stating that propaganda efforts with the newly installed Iranian government should focus on assuaging nationalist concerns about American imperialism. Streibert advised that Voice of America and other entities should emphasize “Allaying Iranian distrust of ‘outsiders’ (U.S. in this case) by repeating and reiterating sole interest U.S. in Iran is in free, independent, strengthened Iran capable taking her place in community free nations [sic].”xxviii Such an emphasis countered nationalist arguments that the U.S. sought domination like other Western imperialists. In the same telegram, Streibert recognized that the U.S. needed to present itself as supportive of the program advocated by Iranian nationalists. Towards this end, propaganda outlets released positive statements about Iran harnessing their own natural resources.xxix Additionally, Edward C. Wells wrote a cable from the U.S. embassy in Iran to the USIS in response to Streibert’s recommendations stating that they would also focus propaganda toward showing that Iranian leaders and the public voluntarily chose an alliance with the U.S. to meet their national interests.xxx Both of these documents reveal that American officials recognized the
enduring strength of Iranian nationalism after the coup, and attempted to present the U.S. as supportive of Iranians’ ideals for autonomy.

Post-coup U.S. propaganda that was anti-communist and anti-Soviet was intertwined with countering Iranian nationalism, as it was prior to the coup. In a memo from Edward C. Wells to the United States Information Agency, he noted that the U.S. needed to challenge Communist activities that labeled U.S. policies in Iran as “economic imperialism,” which resonated with Iranian nationalists due to the conflict with Britain. To counter Communist charges, Wells argued that local presses and radio stations should show that U.S. aid had numerous concrete accomplishments and therefore should not be misconstrued as economically imperialist. This example shows that anti-communist propaganda was tied to countering nationalism because the USSR promulgated nationalist sentiments to undermine the U.S. and the West. The arguments that Wells made were consistent with the National Security Council’s 1954 report on U.S. objectives and policies in the Near East. This document stated that anti-British and anti-French nationalism was a potent force, which threatened U.S. interests through American ties with Europe. Like Wells suggested, the NSC emphasized economic aid as a propaganda tool to counter anti-Americanism.

To summarize, the CIA, State Department, and Iranian Embassy records reveal that there was widespread recognition that the nationalist movement in Iran was the paramount concern for officials. Between 1950 and 1953, the risk of Soviet intervention or influence, or of Tudeh making a power grab, was not an imminent danger. According to documents pertaining to propaganda, the imminent danger in Iran was nationalist policies, not a Communist take over. Nationalist policies and beliefs undermined British access to petroleum, America’s ability to establish military bases, and made suspect foreign presence in Iran by the US, Western Europe,
and the USSR. CIA intelligence between 1950 and 1953 maintained that nationalism in Iran was a powerful force, and that Communist propaganda from the USSR was effective in critiquing Anglo-America as imperialists. These views were shared by the State Department and the U.S. embassy in Iran, and they advocated numerous forms of anti-communist propaganda to challenge its critique of Western exploitation that appealed to nationalists by articulating the benefits of a relationship with Anglo-America.

Another revealing aspect of propaganda documents is the complex relationship between the American government and ideas of Orientalism. The concept “Orientalism” has been prominent in scholarship in Middle East Studies since Edward Said’s 1979 book of the same name. In Said’s work, he defined Orientalism as a body of knowledge developed by European intellectuals that was conducive to colonizing the Middle East. This body of knowledge argued that people from the “East” were essentially different from Europeans of the “West.” East and West were defined as cohesive cultural entities in Orientalism, with their respective people possessing opposite qualities. Prominent Western qualities included rationality and the concomitant capacity for self-rule, while Eastern qualities included irrationality, emotionalism, and a backwards or traditional outlook that prevented their historical progress and self-rule. Therefore, the East’s inability to govern themselves with stability justified Western intervention. During the Cold War, Orientalist ideas pervaded American governmental documents discussing propaganda efforts to guide Iran toward a relationship with the U.S. and Britain. However, the primary sources reveal that the U.S. was aware of the limitations of Orientalist ideas in pursuing national interests through propaganda. American propaganda in Iran often presented the East and West as having shared values and historical connections that undermined the central Orientalist premise of essential differences between peoples.
United States government documents also have information pertaining to intellectual history and Orientalism. Many scholars, most notably Ervand Abrahamian have noted that American officials had an Orientalist view of Iran, like the rest of the Middle East, during the Cold War. Such an outlook considered people in the Middle East as inherently different from the West, due to qualities like irrationality and emotionalism. One prominent example of Orientalism in the American government is in Loy Henderson’s 1951 telegram to the State Department pertaining to Voice of America (VOA) propaganda. Henderson emphasized that VOA propaganda would present the U.S. as sympathetic to Iranian’s aspirations, but their actions during the oil crisis prevented Americans from offering aid because they were “sweped by emotions” and taking “somewhat rash actions and rather unreasoning attitude.” Another Orientalist perspective was prominently espoused in a 1952 State Department memo about useful propaganda measures in the Muslim world. It is important to note that the document often conflates “Arab” with Muslim, and does not delineate distinctions among Arabs, Iranians, and Turks, so many of the passages that discuss “Arabs” are applicable to Iranians.

This 1952 document encapsulated an Orientalist view in the passage, stating, “We should be careful to see, in tailoring our cultural program, that it fits the point of view of the Arabs and that it is suited to their outlook and susceptibility and not what we project upon them… The Arab thinks of himself as a member of a group, or as a whole as a religious or social group… and so we have to keep that in mind when we are sending our material out into the area and we don’t make the mistake of treating the Arab as if he were an American.” This passage presents people from the Middle East as different by having a “collective” mentality that prevents them from being receptive to arguments and propaganda that would appeal to Americans. Additionally, this State Department document feared that USSR propaganda was effective
because people from the Middle East are emotional, and do not reason with logic. xxxviii Loy Henderson prepared a dispatch for the State Department that discussed an editorial prepared for the New York Times, Time, and Newsweek about Mossadeq’s policies. This editorial article presented Mossadeq in Orientalist terms as “wily,” and reckless in destroying the Iranian economy through an embargo with the British. Similar distinctions between people from the East and West are apparent in CIA records.

American Orientalism is evident in the 1953 document, *The Battle for Iran*. This work was an internal history of, and for, the CIA, written by Dr. Donald Wilber and released three times (1981, 2011, 2014) to the public with varying excisions. One example of Orientalism in this CIA history is its discussion of Iranian people as tending to be “talkative” and its depiction of Mossadeq’s actions as “bizarre and irrational.” xxxix However, this work’s description of Mossadeq’s irrationality also pays such methods compliment as being “calculated” towards nationalist ends. xli This example is illustrative of the complex relationship between Orientalism and American policies in Iran. The U.S. was able to view Mossadeq as both irrational and calculating, and was similarly able to view Iranians as essentially different, all the while promulgating their sameness with America and the West in propaganda.

American propaganda in Iran presented connections between the Middle East, Islamic culture, and the West. Such propaganda is notable for historians because an emphasis on similarities among Iran, the US, and Britain contradicts the Orientalist view of essential differences between the East and West, prominent in official documents. One particular program promoted by the State Department in 1952 emphasized Avicenna as exemplifying the connections between the East and West. Aware that Iran was celebrating the one thousandth anniversary of Avicenna, the U.S. wanted to produce materials that showed how Avicenna
influenced European and Western intellectual history. This is noteworthy, because critiques of Orientalism during the Cold War, usually discoverable in Area Studies programs, deny the connections between Middle Eastern and European history. Denying historical interaction is conducive to the argument that military, economic, and political strength in the U.S. and Europe was a product of their inherent cultural ability, and therefore people from the Middle East were not contributors to Western growth and progress. So while U.S. sources do discuss Iranians, along with the rest of the Middle East, in Orientalist terms as irrational or different, the propaganda effort interestingly uses historical knowledge that subverts Orientalist views by showing past connections between the East and West. Additionally, the propaganda that made use of Avicenna was a challenge to Soviet attempts to emphasize Avicenna as an Uzbek, with ties to Russian history. This program was intended to depict Russian cultural affinity with Iran, much like the U.S. was doing. The State Department also helped publish an article in the “Times on Sunday” about the American Friends of the Middle East organization that was offering a fellowship to travel to the Holy Land for whomever wrote the best essay for the topic, “The Impact of Islam on Christianity.” This essay contest, like propaganda using the figure of Avicenna, showed that the East and West were not essentially different, but influenced each other, which contradicted the Orientalist perspectives found in internal government documents.

Another example of American propaganda that stressed Iran’s cultural affinity with the U.S. was the “Voices of God” brochure. Loy Henderson discussed the brochure in a 1953 dispatch to the State Department. The brochure had a mosque on its cover, and was filled with illustrative quotations from the Koran, the Persian poet Hafez, Jesus Christ, and Abraham Lincoln, among others. Such a juxtaposition presented figures central to Islamic and Iranian history as having a shared message with individuals who are at the core of U.S. and European
history. By including religious figures, the brochure also depicted the U.S. and Iran as connected through their difference from the USSR and their state atheism.

An Orientalist perspective of Iranians is evident when reading the CIA and State Department records. Government exchanges that discussed effective means of propaganda accepted Orientalist premises that Iranians were irrational and easily swayed by emotions. Defining Iranians in such a way suggested to Americans that the situation in Iran was exceptionally precarious, as the people were susceptible to Soviet propaganda that evoked nationalist passions, which would undermine U.S. interests. However, declassified documents also reveal that U.S. propaganda relied on arguments that actually undermined Orientalist ideas by showing commonalities between the West and Iran. American propaganda in Iran promulgated the historical knowledge that the Abbasid Caliphate shaped Western intellectual history as exemplified by the figure of Avicenna, highlighted shared values by religious and historical individuals as in the “Voices of God” brochure, and emphasized shared cultural incompatibility with state atheism.

In conclusion, a study of American propaganda in Iran provides valuable insights into government perceptions of the nation. One common critique of U.S. Cold War policies, and of its interventions in particular, is that the U.S. government conflated nationalist movements with doctrinaire Communist revolutions that were neither connected to the USSR or destined to result in a fruitful alliance with the Soviets. Examining propaganda documents pertaining to Iran between 1950-1954 reveals that such a critique of American policy does not always neatly apply. The CIA and State Department were fully aware of widespread Iranian hostility toward the USSR due to its past colonial presence. With this awareness, U.S. government officials like Loy Henderson noted a distinction between nationalism and Communism, most prominently
manifested in the Tudeh party. U.S. intelligence generally recognized that Tudeh and the Soviets had little chance of taking control over the government. However, Iranian nationalism represented a tremendous threat to the U.S. largely because oil collectivization would cut off Britain, making America’s key Cold War ally economically and militarily weaker. Despite Communism being less than an imminent threat, the U.S. was deeply concerned about Soviet propaganda that spoke to nationalists by critiquing Anglo-America as economically imperialist. Therefore, anti-Soviet propaganda by the U.S. was not aimed so much at thwarting Communism, but nationalism.

American propaganda in Iran constituted textual productions like brochures and pamphlets, radio, financial aid, and other means. Propaganda was broadly directed at both the urban and rural population, reflecting U.S. recognition of how widespread Iranian nationalism was. To challenge nationalism, which attacked the idea that a relationship with the U.S. and Britain could be equal and beneficial, the U.S. Embassy in Iran and State Department produced propaganda that asserted Western cultural affinities and historical connections with Iran. Such propaganda is particularly noteworthy because its underlying arguments undermined Orientalist ideas that premised perceptions of Iran within the U.S. government. State, embassy, and intelligence records show that Iranians and Mossadeq were viewed as lacking reason and being overly emotional in their actions, which was antithetical to Western and American qualities. Yet, American propaganda reveals that there must have been knowledge that such Orientalist ideas were flawed, because U.S. officials used evidence of historical commonalities and connections with Iran to further their national interests.

Analysis of American propaganda is a valuable lens through which scholars can discern U.S. perceptions of Iranians’ actions, recognition of the threat of nationalism, and means of
influencing a foreign population. The State Department, CIA, and American embassy all recognized that nationalism was distinct from Communism and was the primary threat to U.S. interests in Iran. An interesting question for future scholarship to explore is how pervasive was the view that nationalism was a greater threat than Communism in Iran within the Eisenhower administration and his inner circle? Also, were there comparable regions where the U.S. recognized that nationalism was not identical to Communism, contradicting the Cold War paradigm? Another topic that studying American propaganda raises is the influence and acceptance of Orientalism as a body of knowledge within the U.S. government. As shown in this essay, American officials held many Orientalist premises that were contradicted by the knowledge at the root of their propaganda efforts. This raises questions of how significant Orientalism was to U.S. policymakers, and whether or not “on the ground” realities altered Americans’ acceptance of Orientalist ideas in Iran and the greater Middle East.
Endnotes


ii Ibid., 62.


iv Ibid., 262.


vi Ibid., 175.


x Loy Henderson to the Department of State, 29 May 1953, *NSA, Document 96*, 4-5.


xii Loy Henderson to the Department of State, 6 September 1952, *NSA, Document 71*, 1.


Ibid., 2.


Loy Henderson to the Department of State, 3 February 1952, *NSA, Document 51*, 1.


Ibid., 14.

106, 3.

Ibid.


Loy Henderson to the Department of State, 6 September 1952, *NSA, Document 71*, 1.


Ibid.

Theodore C. Streibert to the United States Embassy in Iran, 11 September 1953, *NSA,
Document 107, 1.

xxix Ibid.

xxx Edward C. Wells to the United States Information Agency, 15 September 1953, NSA,


xxxi Edward C. Wells to the United States Information Agency, 19 September 1953, NSA,

Document 109, 1.

xxxii Ibid., 2.

xxxiii "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East," 23 July 1954, NSA,

Document 127, 1.

xxxiv Ibid., 8.


xxxvi Loy Henderson to the Department of State, 21 November 1951, NSA, Document 41, 1.


xxxviii Ibid., 26.

xxxix Ibid.

xl Ibid.

xli Ibid., 22.


xliii "Working Group on Special Materials for Arab and Other Moslem Countries," 1 April 1952,
NSA, Document 58, 22.

xlv Ibid., 27.

xlv Loy Henderson to the Department of State, 29 May 1953, NSA, Document 96, 5.
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