From Tribe to Nation: Assessing the Influence of Political Exclusion and Access to Mobilization Resources on Kurdish Ethnonationalism

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Abstract: More than nine of every ten ballots dropped into ballot boxes scattered across Iraqi Kurdistan in late September affirmed a national desire for independence. The referendum was denounced by regional and global actors alike, and the central government in Baghdad quickly moved to weaken and silence the Kurdish separatist movement. How are we to understand the 2017 referendum, and how might this moment be contextualized within the broader trajectory of Kurdish ethnonationalism? Far from an outlier, the referendum was the most recent effort to create an independent homeland for Kurds – a singular point along a timeline dotted with ethnonational developments. Separatism has waxed and waned throughout the Kurdistan region, with state responses to Kurdish ethnonationalism varying in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Considering relationship dynamics between ethnonationalist groups, separatist groups, and central governments, I ask the following: how do state attempts at political inclusion or exclusion influence the form and goals of ethnonationalist mobilization? I find support for a correlation between political exclusion and both ethnonationalist identity salience and collective goal coherence. The internal variation evident in the cases I examine support a causal relationship: salience and coherence are reactions to state policies. In brief, ethnonationalism has been strengthened and prioritized by Kurds when politically excluded from state power structures. [End Abstract]
More than nine of every ten ballots dropped into ballot boxes scattered across Iraqi Kurdistan in late September affirmed a national desire for independence. Far from an outlier, the referendum was the most recent effort to create an independent homeland for Kurds – a singular point along a timeline dotted with ethnonational developments. Baghdad’s tanks have since rolled across strategic sites in northern Iraq and, less than two months after the historic referendum was held, the popular mandate has effectively been stripped of its potency. The borders of Iraq are under no immediate threat of redesign by an emergent Kurdish state. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the organization responsible for the timing and content of the referendum, faced predictable hostility from Baghdad, Ankara, and Tehran – the latter two concerned with political ripples stirring up ethnonational sentiment among Kurds within their own borders. Typically, the KDP was also undercut within its own territory by Kurdish political adversaries coordinating with Baghdad, reflecting an equally long history of state cooptation and intragroup division.

Many modern states comprise ethnically heterogenous populations and ethnonationalism is often a central element of separatist movements, but ethnic diversity is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for ethnonationalism or separatism. The salience of ethnic identities may fluctuate as a function of both intragroup relations and group-state relations. Heightened ethnic identity salience is a logical precursor to a strong ethnonationalist movement, though salience does not predict the form a movement may take. Though numbering roughly 25 million, the current international borders have divided Kurds and left them an ethnic minority wherever they are found: Kurds constitute roughly 23% of the populations of both Iraq and Turkey and 10% of the population in Iran. Ethnonationalist movements of varying character are present in each of these states; official state responses to ethnonationalism have varied temporally and geographically. While Kurds in northern Iraq have enjoyed relative autonomy at times, the Kurdish community in
Turkey has been consistently repressed and denied recognition. Movements in each state have at times taken up arms against central authorities, but violence is by no means the primary expression of Kurdayetî, or Kurdish national identity.\(^6\) Considering the diversity of state policies addressing ethnonationalism and the various forms Kurdish ethnonationalism has taken, I ask the following: how do state attempts at political inclusion or exclusion influence the form and goals of ethnonationalist mobilization?

Inclusion-moderation theorists suggest that incorporating previously excluded groups leads to moderation through the opening of effective, peaceful, political channels and alternatives.\(^7\) When Kurdish ethnonationalism is conceptualized as a reactive movement, constituted in response to political exclusion and repression,\(^8\) inclusion-moderation theory offers promise in elucidating the salience of group identity and the construction of collective goals. Inclusion may detract from the political relevance of an ethnonationalist identity and mitigate collective goals (e.g. autonomy or independence). Exclusion may encourage collective action along ethnonationalist lines, but exclusion alone may not predict whether the movement takes on a violent or peaceful form. Rather, mobilizing and sustaining a violent ethnonationalist movement requires access to resources. I argue that political exclusion heightens ethnonationalist identity salience and contributes to collective goal coherence. Furthermore, I argue that excluded groups turn to violence when sufficient mobilization resources are available. I examine the evolution of Kurdayetî within several states, tracking expressions of ethnonationalism as they relate to changes in political inclusion and access to mobilization resources to support my arguments.

I turn to three cases to address my research question: Kurdish ethnonationalism in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. These three states have rolled out policies that span the political inclusion spectrum and each case provides examples of peaceful and violent expressions of Kurdayetî while
the minority ethnic group, Kurds, remains a constant. My argument is structured along two axes – political inclusion/exclusion and mobilization resources – thus my hypotheses address both facets:

H1: Political exclusion heightens ethnonationalist identity salience;
H2: Political exclusion contributes to collective goal coherence;
H3: Greater access to resources increases the likelihood of violent ethnonationalism.

I find support for a correlation between political exclusion and both ethnonationalist identity salience and collective goal coherence. The internal variation evident in the cases I examine support a causal relationship: salience and coherence are reactions to state policies. While I do find a correlation between access to resources and the likelihood of violent ethnonationalism, I am not able to discern causality from the cases examined. Resources are a requisite condition for sustained violence, but it is unclear if violent intent precedes resource acquisition.

This research is important for governing elites concerned with ethnonationalist trajectories as well as academics considering the generalizability of inclusion-moderation theory. I discuss the current inclusion-moderation theory literature in the next section, followed by case selection, definition of terms, and methodology in the subsequent section. One potential confounding variable is selective political inclusion. Kurds have traditionally prioritized tribal affiliations over broader nationalist identities, creating vulnerability to strategic state cooptation of select tribal elites. I distinguish between cooptation and inclusion by examining the target of state policy: elites or groups. I then examine my three cases, provide analysis, and offer concluding remarks.

Ethnic Identity Salience and Political Inclusion

Discussion of ethnonationalism requires a preceding note on conceptualizations of ethnic and nationalist identities. Community is generally a fundamental component of any vision of the nation, but what defines this community varies immensely. A community may be bound by spiritual ties, language, shared values, or any number of concepts that draw distinctions between
What constitutes a nation and who may be a part of that nation varies by observer. Membership may be ascribed, as evidenced by kinship or ancestry-based concepts of the nation, but membership may also be gained or projected. I am concerned here with highlighting the amorphous and socially-constructed nature of ethnicity and nationalism. The direction of this construction is integral to my study. Current literature offers two relevant explanations of ethnic and national identity development: instrumentalism and constructivism.

Instrumentalists suggest that individuals form groups in order to align themselves with a community, strengthening social, political, and economic prospects through the actions available to the collective as a larger, cohesive entity. By extension, individuals within the collective share in these augmented prospects. Membership in ethnonational groups provides an advantage relative to those who are nonaligned or members of smaller groups, something that may prove vital when competing over access to limited resources, such as land, access to markets, education, and employment. Facets of instrumentalism are evident in tribal Kurdistan, for instance with land ownership practices. Land occupied by Kurdish tribes was conventionally only eligible to be sold to members of the same tribe, and pasturelands were a collective commodity that was available to members.

Conversely, constructivists posit that ethnic and national group consciousness is not a product of masses seeking collective group advancement, but rather a function of elite narratives. Elites may contextualize social, political, and economic developments within a communal, group-centric, or xenophobic framework. Transgressions between individuals of differing groups are reimagined as affronts to each community, deepening intercommunal divides and potentially contributing to intragroup cohesion. Institutional design may encourage elites to prioritize group-centric narratives as a means of consolidating power, for instance in a democracy where political
gains may be secured by activating a geographically concentrated ethnic base. Elite-constructed group identities and instrumentalist identity formation are not mutually exclusive, and it is plausible that Kurdish ethnonationalism is continually evolving through both constructivist and instrumentalist processes.

Shifting from group identity development, a second body of literature requiring attention is that of inclusion-moderation theory. Social, political, and economic inequalities at the group level of analysis provide substance for collective grievances. These grievances may then be articulated by group elites and translated into collective action. Political exclusion both exacerbates group disadvantages and limits the channels available for redressing group-based inequalities. Inequality forms the basis of collective action while political exclusion forces the expression of collective action to take extralegal or illegal forms. Collective action may also be influenced by unrelated tangibles: the likelihood of collective action taking on a separatist character increases when these politically-excluded groups are based in remote, rugged terrain far from the capitals of the states in which they operate, e.g. Kurds in Kurdistan.

Inclusion-moderation theorists suggest that altering the political dynamic to incorporate excluded groups mitigates separatist, revolutionary, or other paradigm-shifting demands. Two mechanisms for the moderation of demands exist: redressing inequality and the provision of alternatives. First, it is plausible that groups moderate their demands when political inclusion decreases inequalities between groups and eliminates institutionalized disadvantages. For instance, Sarigil finds that relative-deprivation is a driver of Kurdish ethnonationalism in Turkey. Increases in socioeconomic status correlate with decreases in Kurdish ethnonationalism. Second, political inclusion creates a new space for collective action, providing alternatives to separatism or revolution for groups seeking to redress inequality. Thus, where exclusion exacerbates
inequality and limits choices for collective action, inclusion may ameliorate inequality and provide alternatives where none previously existed.

Contrasting with a clean narrative of political inclusion, Tezcür creates an important distinction between ethnonationalist movements and the organizations associated with them. Though political inclusion may moderate the movement at large, it is possible that individual organizations may be threatened by the political competition that liberalization and inclusion may foster. These organizations may then prefer radicalization to the prospect of being subsumed. Additionally, partial political inclusion may siphon moderates from revolutionary movements, eliminating existential threats to regimes without necessitating the temperance of radicals. Coalitions eliminated by partial inclusion do not destroy or moderate radicals, yet the regime is able to mitigate the threats they pose. Finally, ideologically-driven groups may be unresponsive to political inclusion, instead retaining their platform regardless of incorporation. Organizational survival, partial inclusion, and ideology may all play roles in the various Kurdish assemblages spread throughout Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, complicating an analysis of political inclusion and moderation throughout the region.

**Cases, Terms, and Methodology**

Kurdish-state relations offer valuable insight when considering the guiding question: how do state attempts at political inclusion or exclusion influence the form and goals of ethnonationalist mobilization? Kurds are proportionately sizable minorities in Iran (23% of the population), Iraq (23%), and Turkey (10%). Each state has altered approaches to its relationship with Kurds, but traditionally Turkey has been the most repressive and politically-exclusive, while Iraq has been the most politically-inclusive. Iran has oscillated between the two.
I limit the scope of my case studies to the year modern iterations of each state come into being and ending at the close of the 1980’s. The starting year for each is 1932 (Iraq), 1925 (Iran), and 1923 (Turkey). There are three important reasons for choosing these dates: first, the temporal proximity forms a strong base for examining ethnonationalist development in comparative perspective; second, Kurdish ethnonationalism was incoherent and weak; third, it was during this time that elites within each state began directing domestic policy. Colonial, imperial, and dynastic powers determined the status and treatment of ethnic and nationalist groups prior to these years. I selected the end of the 1980’s as the upper limit because there was distinct, visible Kurdish ethnonationalism in each case by this time.

My argument centers around two independent variables, political exclusion and access to resources, and three dependent variables: ethnonationalist identity salience, goal coherence, and the form of collective action. These first two variables are not easily or accurately quantified. Furthermore, identity salience, ethnicity, and nationalism are not static qualities. Political exclusion is the barring of organized political activity as a Kurdish group. This is operationalized as the absence of political group recognition and the illegality of ethnonationalist political parties. Ethnonationalism refers to the delineation of a group promoting or protecting Kurdish languages, culture, ethnicity, rights, and territorial claims. Identity salience is measured by the outward expressions of Kurdish-specific culture, ethnicity, politics, or nationalism. The support for inherently Kurdish political groups or the emergence of Kurdish cultural products, such as novels or poetry, are indicators of identity salience. Goal coherence is closely related but addresses one facet of ethnonationalist expression. Coherence is measured by the presence and cohesiveness of Kurdish political goals as expressed by organized entities, which include political parties but are not limited to legalized channels. For instance, as Kurds shifted from non-aligned tribal networks
to the recognition of a broader group acting to perpetuate shared interests, this would reflect an increase in ethnonationalist goal coherence. Militant groups with political ends and underground parties are both incorporated into the measure of goal coherence. Resource access is measured by assessing resource networks, particularly whether groups are supported by other Kurdish groups or state actors. Finally, the form of collective action measure is a distinction between peaceful and violent movements. This is measured by documenting instances of two-sided violence, not simply violent state repression of Kurds. Violence is quantifiable, but reliable and consistent data on Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish non-state violence covering this time period is lacking.

**Kurdish Identity in the Early 20th Century**

Before addressing the evolution of Kurdayetî in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, it is important to establish a baseline by asking what it meant to be Kurdish when each of the modern states were constituted. Shared language, ethnicity, culture, religion, and territorial ties often define a nation. Territorial claims have consistently aligned with the mountainous regions overlaying the junction of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. However, the mountains that form a unifying element among Kurds have also inhibited them from constructing a coherent sociopolitical entity. Kurds speak different languages, adhere to different religions, and historically operated within tribal structures - not as members of a broader Kurdish community. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Kurds share a common ancestry, which – genuinely or putatively – often forms the foundation of a constructed nation. Socioeconomic cleavages have been pronounced against the backdrop of an incoherent national Kurdish identity. *Aghas* were the traditional leaders of tribes and confederations, performing both intragroup and intergroup functions: “they act as arbitrators of disputes and allocators of resources, benefits and duties. Beyond the tribal group, the chief acts as mediator either with his peers…or with the state.” *Aghas* exercised extensive control over their tribes,
fostering clientelism and, in some instances, feudalism. Furthermore, while Kurdish territorial claims have consistently centered around the same geographic region, in reality territorial claims were tied to tribes, not the nation writ large.

Thus, the baseline of Kurdayêtî is one that is more vacuous than substantial. Kurds were distinct from other groups, as indicated by identifiable tribalism and the use of Kurdish languages, but an intragroup sense of nationalism was absent. Kurdish social structures paralleled each other across Kurdistan, so the structures themselves indicate a shared sociopolitical culture, but a culture that enervated the evolution of a broader identity. The combination of the agha-peasant socioeconomic divide and tribal power structure presaged the divergent goals of the two socioeconomic poles of Kurdish society: aghas would seek a dynamic with emergent states that would imbue them with greater power and authority or, when threatened by governments consolidating power, would act to retain what influence they could. Meanwhile, peasants would become the object of tension between the state and the aghas, the target of identity politics.

Iraq: Oscillating Autonomy

Iraq gained increasing independence from Britain in managing domestic policy in 1932. Kurdish elites advanced a notion of autonomy within the framework of an Iraqi state during this initial period, meaning Kurds as autonomous but Iraqi first. However, this concept did not draw the support of the entire Iraqi Kurdish base; rather, the autonomy proposal competed with socialist ideas of Iraqi statehood. Similarly, Iraqi Arabs were split between leftist and Arab nationalist state-building prospects. Kurdish writers took an increasingly ethnonationalist tack during the 1930’s, addressing group origins and alluding to a fatherland, but Kurdayêtî remained incohesive through the 1940’s and the tribe continued to be the functioning unit within the Kurdish sphere. The durability and decentralization of the traditional tribal structure resulted in varied relationships
between different tribes and the central state. Kurdish nationalism was developing in the waning years of British control, but it was not widespread among Iraqi Kurds and was not a source of cohesion, either among Kurdish elites or between elites and masses. Interestingly, it was during this period that the Kurdish Democratic Party was established (1946), though the internal platform contradictions – such as reliance on traditional tribal elites to support progressive socioeconomic policies – and weak support from the Kurdish masses reflected division and disconnection.

An independent Iraqi state emerged from revolution in 1958. The immediate post-revolutionary period was characterized by political inclusion: President Qasim elevated the status of the ambiguous Kurdish nation through discourse. Qasim engaged Kurdish elites as representatives of a sociopolitical entity, not as individual Iraqis. Kurdish ethnonationalism was not manifestly salient and Kurds remained divided along socioeconomic lines. For instance, Kurds formed a significant portion of the membership for communist and socialist parties while the KDP sought to create cultural protections within a quasi-binational framework (Kurdish and Arab).

This cooperative environment was short-lived; Qasim altered his stance in response to pressures from Arab-nationalists. The state shifted to the offensive, attacking both the symbols and political structures of the nascent Kurdish nation. The KDP, led by the militant tribal leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, was forced underground and within this environment of repression. Tension between the KDP and the state turned violent in 1963 when the central government attacked the Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah. Hostilities persisted through the 1960’s, but unity through fighting a common enemy proved insufficient beyond the shared goal of survival: “While the KDP pledged to follow the ideological imperatives of national liberation struggles, Barzani’s forces relied on the conservative, religious, and tribal forces.” However, a watershed moment
arrived in 1970 when the Autonomy Agreement was reached between Barzani and the nascent Ba’ath regime, which came to power in 1968. The agreement re-legalized the KDP and stipulated the unification of Kurd-dominated areas into a self-governing unit. Thus we see a noteworthy trend: the initial political inclusion of the immediate post-revolutionary period correlated with fragmented and incoherent ethnonationalism while the politically repressive and violently hostile environment of the 1960’s led to greater cooperation among Kurds along explicitly ethnonational lines and the enunciation of concrete political goals. Succinctly, I find initial supporting evidence for H1 and H2.

History repeats itself, as it is wont to do: relations between the KDP and the central government deteriorated once the Ba’ath regime consolidated power in Iraq. The central government failed to adhere to the Autonomy Agreement, instead increasing the political repression of the Kurds, and the dynamic once again devolved into violence. Notably, while it is unclear what access to resources Barzani and the KDP had initially, it is evident that renewed violence in the 1970’s was supported by the US, Iran, and Israel, lending tentative support to H3.

Congruency between repression and ethnonational evolution is obfuscated following the collapse of the unified Barzani-KDP rebellion. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) initially exacerbated intragroup divisions and further toxified Kurd-state relations by shifting the regional paradigm: the KDP aligned with Tehran against the KDP Iran, the newly formed Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK, founded in 1975), and Baghdad. However, by 1986, Iraqi Kurds pivoted toward cooperation and unified against the Iraqi central government. Both the KDP and the PUK noted failing legitimacy: the KDP for targeting other Kurdish groups and the PUK for collaborating with the Iraqi central government. Shifting back to the hypotheses, by the late-1980’s Iraq had excluded Kurds from the political power structure. H1 and H2 predict that this
will heighten ethnonationalist identities and contribute to collective goal coherence. Indeed, by 1988, the previously fragmented Iraqi Kurdish elites had unified against the central government in pursuit of liberation (H2), and this unification came about because of broad support for combatting the central government along ethnonationalist lines (H1). Kurdish elites unified because KDP and PUK legitimacy became rooted in Kurdayetî. Furthermore, violent rebellion against the central government was enabled by Iranian support. Broad-based support for the PUK and KDP throughout Kurdistan also increased mobilization resources relative to the traditional tribal structure. Both of these developments lend more concrete supportive evidence for H3.

**Iran: Kurds Among Persians**

General Reza Khan consolidated power in the wake of the First World War, during a time when Iran was reeling from the collapse of the Qajar Empire. Iran was transformed into a constitutional monarchy with semi-colonial ties to Britain by 1925 and Reza took on the title of Shah. Initially, Reza Shah targeted traditional power structures that presented political challenges, such as Kurdish tribalism. Kurdish ethnicity was tolerated in the comparatively liberal cultural sphere. *Aghas* were integrated into a secularized and modernized economy while nomadic lifestyles were curtailed by the state, creating a more legible society disposed to effective centralized governance. Kurdish economic elites were well represented in the *Majlis*, the Iranian parliament, not because of their ethnic identity but because *aghas* formed a significant portion of the landowning class. The 1930’s were years of political inclusion along socioeconomic lines, while Kurdish culture was left largely unchallenged.

Reza Shah and the subsequent rulers of the Pahlavi dynasty embraced increasingly Persian-centric national narratives in the late-1930’s and 1940’s. For instance, the shah celebrated the region’s pre-Islamic history, forging a cultural connection between his regime and ancient Persia.
Persianized narratives were accompanied by language purification – the expungement of words of non-Persian roots – and the prioritization of Persian over Kurdish languages. The predecessor of the KDP-Iran (KDPI) was established in 1942 in Mahabad and Kurdish poetry adopted a clear ethnonationalist tone at this time. It was during this period of non-Persian cultural subversion and the political exclusion of Kurds as an ethnic entity that the Mahabad Republic was established (1946): “a miniscule territory which incorporated the market towns of Mahabad, Bukan, Naqada and Ushnaviya.” This was a clear, visible, and coherent expression of Kurdayetî, a development supportive of both $H_1$ and $H_2$. Furthermore, the small republic was backed by the Soviet Union, providing resources disproportionate to the size of the polity. The armed forces of the republic were involved in several skirmishes with Iranian-aligned troops. The experiment in independence collapsed when Soviet support diminished and tribal divides resurfaced. Violent resistance to Tehran ended as Soviet support evaporated, providing support for $H_3$.

Kurdish nationalists were forced underground or exiled during the period between the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1947 and the Iranian Revolution in 1978. The underground faction of the KDPI “clandestinely expressed a highly ethnicized nationalism tied to the liberation of all Kurdistan…Still, Kurdish nationalism was unable to develop openly and legitimately…” Meanwhile, the state moved to coopt the remaining Kurdish socioeconomic elite. Tehran introduced extensive agrarian reforms during this period that augmented the power and wealth of large landowners while inducing peasants, uncompetitive in the new arena, to abandon rural life and migrate to urban areas. These reforms weakened the resistance capabilities of the tribes. This was a period of political exclusion with limited observable evidence of Kurdayetî.
The state transitioned from a constitutional monarchy to the Islamic Republic of Iran through revolution in 1978-1979. Mirroring the initial overtures of first Qasim and later the Ba’athists in Iraq, spiritual leader and instrumental revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini prioritized power consolidation, placating Kurds and other potential rival groups through fostering a less repressive political and cultural environment. For instance, he released Kurds imprisoned by the shah, met with ethnonationalist Kurdish elite – an arguably legitimizing action, as it had been between Qasim and Kurds – and, in contrast to the Persianized narratives of the previous regime, sought to construct an inclusive pan-Islamic Iranian nation.

Proceeding from this initial comity, the state strategically legalized some Kurdish political groups, such as the KDPI, while repressing leftist Kurdish groups. The regime promoted religious identity salience by prioritizing relationships with Muslim citizens, for instance by requiring local mosque approval for government appointments. Significantly, the state “tolerated Kurdish cultural organizations, events, and certain publications.” Generally, in post-revolutionary Iran, socioeconomic and religious identities were useful in the political sphere, while ethnic identities were respected in the cultural realm. No coherent, cohesive expression of Kurdayeti surfaced in Iran after the fall of Mahabad, yet the political sphere was not tolerant of Kurdish ethnonationalism. In contrast to Iraqi Kurds, disunity among Iranian Kurds was pronounced during the Iran-Iraq War: the KDPI was largely pro-Tehran, while smaller Kurdish groups and a faction within the KDPI aligned against the regime.

How do developments in 1980’s post-revolutionary Iran impact the three hypotheses? Where Iraq and Pahlavi Iran created an explicitly anti-Kurdish social and political atmosphere, occasionally characterized by violence, the Islamic Republic positively constructed cross-cutting religious and socioeconomic identities while preserving Kurdish cultural spaces. Pertaining to H1,
ethnonationalism was apparently less salient in Iran during this period than in the preceding years, but political exclusion was not as extensive. Moderate Kurdish political groups were tolerated and Tehran intermittently negotiated with the KDPI. Kurdish elites were consistently divided between compromising and intransigent stances toward Tehran. This was illustrated by both the fractures in KDPI leadership and by the strengthening of competing, uncompromising Kurdish ethnonationalist groups (e.g. Komala, a revolutionary Kurdish political group founded in 1969). Thus, Iran created a predominantly exclusive ethnopolitical environment with limited inclusion for ethnonationalist Kurds, but promoted socioeconomic and religious identity salience among Kurds in tandem with protectionist policies for cultural Kurdish identities. Support for H1 and H2 is not manifestly evident, but the case of post-revolutionary Iran does not detract from either hypothesis. H3 remains intact, considering the minority of Kurds that did violently combat the state during the Iran-Iraq War were those that received support from the PUK, at the time itself supported by Baghdad.

Turkey: An Identity Denied

The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. Markedly different from the transition periods in Iraq and Iran, the new republic made no attempts to align Kurds with the new state on the basis of ethnicity. While Qasim, the Ba’athists, Reza Shah, and Khomeini each courted Kurdish elites during periods of power consolidation, President Mustafa Kemal sought to create a secular, modern, and centralized single-party state rooted in Turkish nationalism. Distinct from Arab nationalism in Iraq, which claimed the state for Arabs and framed Kurds as a minority in an Arab homeland, Kemal constructed an ethnonationalist narrative that framed Kurds as ethnic Turks. Kurdayetî was not repressed; it was overwritten by an emergent Turkish constructivism.
The subversion of Kurdish ethnicity was accompanied by the targeted assault on Kurdish nationalists. While notions of Kurdish nationalism were as of yet underdeveloped and not broadly supported, the Kemal regime arrested or executed ethnonationalist Kurds and banned Kurdish political parties, effectively inhibiting what coherence of Kurdayetî existed. Furthermore, Kemal supported economic policies that favored industrialization in western Turkey, disadvantaging the predominantly eastern rural Kurds.

Kemal courted the agha class as the Kurdish ethnonationalist elites were eliminated and Kurdish political expressions were illegalized. The regime engaged select tribal leaders, in some cases decentralizing state control and delegating power to aghas. By imbuing select aghas with state power, the regime was able to exacerbate both socioeconomic cleavages between tribal leader and peasantry as well as inter-tribal divisions. Powerful aghas could check each other and influence weaker tribes while Kurdish peasants, trapped between a repressive state and a coopted tribal leader, became immobile resources.

The centralized and ethnicized political environment in Turkey precluded legal expressions of Kurdayetî, so assessing ethnopolitical salience and goal coherence requires looking elsewhere. Kurdayetî became increasingly ethnicized and violent in this highly divisive and repressive atmosphere. Kurdish tribes initiated several violent revolts in the Kemal years, but by 1930 hostilities were distinctly between the state and Kurds as an ethnonational entity. This is evidenced by the increasingly transnational character of Kurdish resistance: Iranian Kurds aligned with Turkish Kurds, contributing troops and supplies. Armenians were a source of supplies as well. Violent rebellion continued through the 1930’s, concluding with overwhelming assaults by the Turkish military in Turkish Kurdistan. These offensives were followed by the creation of a permanent military presence in the area. Kurdish military strength was depleted and expressions
of Kurdish ethnonationalism were largely invisible through the mid-1940’s, the final years of the single-party era of Turkish politics.

Kemalist Turkey presents interesting data with which to assess the three hypotheses. First, it seems evident that political exclusion combined with cultural repression contributed to the salience and coherence of Kurdish ethnonationalism, albeit within a negative space, not through positive identity formation. Iraq and Iran both acknowledged Kurdish ethnicity, lending outward legitimacy. Ethnonationalism certainly developed in response to Iraqi and Iranian political exclusion, but it was not solely a reactive movement. Conversely, ethnonationalism in Turkey was survivalist in a very real sense. Intragroup identity development was not apparent. Nonetheless, I find support for H1 and H2, though with emphasis only on intergroup mechanisms. Political exclusion and the crucible of violence contributed to ethnonational identity salience and coherence, defined not by positive constructivism but in a distinctly negative space: Kurds are not Turks. Support for H3 is present as well: violent struggle increased in correlation with access to transnational Kurdish and Armenian resources. Tribal-level revolts were active without evidence of significant access, but these were not inherently ethnonationalist struggles.

The single-party system dominated by the Republican People’s Party fractured, and political opposition emerged in 1946. Administrations were largely consistent in coopting the agha class by promoting economic policies that strengthened the landowners. However, a period of limited sociocultural liberalization followed the advent of the Turkish multi-party system, creating openings for cultural expressions of Kurdishness. For instance, Ileri Yurt and other Kurdish publications were popularized. Salience and coherence of ethnonationalism increased during this period, illustrated by the founding of the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (KDPT) at some
point during the early 1960’s. The KDPT was an illegal, underground entity from its inception, unlike the KDP and KDPI.73

Political pluralism presented Kurds with additional options to increase their political efficacy. The Turkish Worker’s Party (TIP) offered a socialist political alternative for impoverished Kurds tied either to traditional tribal institutions or newly incorporated into the industrialized economy. Conversely, aghas continued to enjoy a beneficial relationship with the conservative regimes rotating through the state apparatus.74 This new reality threatened ethnonationalist development by exacerbating socioeconomic divides and continually empowering tribal institutions in rural Turkish Kurdistan. However, it was during this same period that Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths surfaced throughout the region – bastions of Kurdish nationalism. The Hearths were quickly targeted and eliminated by the state,75 but their significance lies in their existence as broad cultural expressions of Kurdayetî, not in their ability to resist the state.

Turkish Kurds witnessed a paradigm shift brought about by the newly-formed Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in the late 1970’s and 1980’s.76 The PKK injected militant Kurdish ethnonationalism into the repressive Turkish political sphere, galvanizing Kurds against the state as well as the coopted segments of the agha class. PKK tactics were typified by ruthless attacks on state forces and any Kurds that aligned with the state. The PKK developed relationships with the KDP and PUK, who provided aid and granted PKK militants asylum in northern Iraq.77 Resources were extracted domestically from tribal leaders – sometimes voluntarily and sometimes through coercion.78 Regionally, the PKK forged a network that incorporated supporters in Lebanon and Syria. The militant group turned to diaspora communities in Europe as well, constructing a flow of finances and personnel.79
The PKK’s manifesto called for a Kurdish revolution, with the first stage being a coherent national direction. Additional Kurdish groups, including the Turkish Kurdish Socialist Party and Rizgari, stressed the nationalist character of a needed Kurdish revolution as well. In the politically exclusive environment of 1980’s Turkey, we witness a clear, cohesive expression of Kurdish ethnonationalism. In terms of hypotheses, the advent of the PKK and similarly nationalistic organizations provides support for H1 and H2. The violent tactics of the PKK within the context of its expansive resource network – both domestically and internationally – provides additional support for H3.

**Analysis: Ethnonationalism Refined through Political Repression**

The three cases of Kurdish ethnonationalism in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey illustrate several trends supportive of the three hypotheses:

- **H1**: Political exclusion heightens ethnonationalist identity salience;
- **H2**: Political exclusion contributes to collective goal coherence;
- **H3**: Greater access to resources increases the likelihood of violent ethnonationalism.

From a macro lens, it is evident that Kurdish ethnonationalism was weak, incoherent, or nonexistent within each state at the dawn of the 20th century. Traditional tribal structures dominated Kurdish society, with loyalty and cohesion limited to tribal units or, at best, tribal confederations. By the close of the 1980’s, Kurdish identity salience was comparatively high, and organizations promoting coherent goals of either Kurdish autonomy or independence had been established in each state. Yet, the evolution of Kurdish ethnonationalism followed different trajectories before converging. The central government in Iraq oscillated between inclusive overtures and politically-exclusive Arab nationalism. Traditional socioeconomic divides were apparent during periods of comity between the central government and the Kurds, with the latter supporting political platforms based on socioeconomic classes. However, by the middle of the
Iran-Iraq War, KDP and PUK legitimacy among Kurds was rooted in Kurdayetî. This illustrates the salience of Kurdish identities among the masses while the cooperation between the KDP and PUK reflects broad cohesion and goal coherence.

Pahlavi Iran demonstrates similar support for H1 and H2: political exclusion and cultural repression marked 1930’s and 1940’s Iran, a period when Iranian Kurds shifted from weak ethnonationalism to a bold and precise endorsement of Kurdayetî – the establishment of the Mahabad Republic. Post-revolutionary Iran does not contribute to or detract from support for H1 and H2. Rather, this period signals the effectiveness of partial inclusion. By protecting the cultural space for Kurds, Iran was able to emphasize socioeconomic and religious identities in the political sphere.

The Turkish state was most consistent in repressing political and cultural expressions of Kurdish ethnonationalism, targeting nationalistic elites from the inception of the modern polity. Brutality on the part of the state was met with armed rebellion, first through tribal guerillas and then through a more cohesive Kurdish front. H1 and H2 are supported by the rise of the PKK: a purely Kurdish ethnonational organization, forged in an environment of violent political, social, and cultural repression. The PKK and other Kurdish ethnonationalist organizations that appeared on the scene in the 1970’s and 1980’s offer perhaps the most convincing evidence: the state continually repressed Kurdish ethnonationalism on every front, and while ubiquitous tribalism inhibited Kurdish ethnonational development in the early 20th century, a clear vision of national liberation drew broad domestic and transnational support, eclipsing challengers within the Kurdish sociopolitical sphere.81

The congruency between political exclusion and ethnonationalist development suggests causation. I root this claim in the variation evident between the three cases, not simply the
perception of Kurdayeti in 1920 versus 1980 – though this in itself does demonstrate correlation. Kurdish ethnonationalism has been reactive in each case, developing in response to external forces. An identity was ascribed to Kurds through state repression. Whereas Arab, Persian, and Turkish nationalism were constructed positively by elites, Kurdish nationalism was borne out of forces acting upon it, driving loose-knit tribes toward a broader identity. Furthermore, this process was not irreversible, as evidenced by post-revolution Iranian cultural inclusion mitigating the saliency of Kurdish identities in the political sphere. Plausibly, heightened ethnonationalism and state repression may be cyclical: exclusion contributes to ethnonationalism, while ethnonationalism may be perceived as a threat by the state and induce repressive reactions.

The causal chain pertaining to H3 is unclear from the evidence examined. Violent ethnonationalism generally correlated with access to resources – particularly international resources – and the cases offer support for H3. However, access to resources is a requisite condition for sustained hostilities, so it is logical for this correlation to exist. What is not clear is whether greater access to resources encourages movements to take on a violent character, or if violent movements seek out access to resources to sustain their methods. It is likely that both of these paths are taken, with the PUK aligning with the former and the PKK aligning with the latter. The PUK was supported by the central government in Iraq and turned violent once imbued with state resources. Alternatively, the PKK seems to have built their financial networks in order to support a violent agenda. Further research would be required to establish the causal chain (or chains).

Concluding Remarks

Tracing the evolution of Kurdish ethnonationalism has led to the juxtaposition of a primarily reactive identity cast upon a background of proactively constructed national narratives. Arab, Persian, and Turkish elites projected nationalism while Kurds adapted, shedding tribalism
for the protection and clout of a collective Kurdish nation. This creates a matrix of ethnonationalism, with constructivism and instrumentalism on one axis and reactive and positive identity formation on the other. Barzani-style mobilization would be an example of reactionary elite constructivism, while the PKK may most appropriately be situated in the reactionary instrumentalism quadrant (these are of course more fluid categories than a rigid matrix could convey). The grassroots iteration of Arab nationalism in Iraq most reflects positive instrumentalism, while Pahlavi Persianization serves as an example of positive constructivism. With this matrix in mind, is it plausible that political exclusion would have the same impact on ethnonationalism born from the positivist half? Does exclusion continue to strengthen ethnonationalism in a linear fashion, or would there be a point of diminishing influence? These inquiries may prove to be fruitful endeavors for future research.

Notes

10 For a variety of definitions of a nation, see John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 15-46.
21 Ibid., pp. 776, 785.
22 Ryan, “The Impact of Democratization on Revolutionary Movements,” pp. 31-34.
29 Ibid., p. 15.
33 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
34 Manafy, *The Kurdish Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey: A Critical Analysis*, p. 78
38 Ibid., p. 52.
40 Ibid., p. 84.
42 Natali, *The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran*, p. 60.
44 Ibid., pp. 92-95.
45 Ibid., p. 94.

50 Ibid., pp. 116-117.


55 Ibid., p. 244.


58 Ibid., p. 146.

59 Ibid., pp. 143-148.

60 Ibid., p. 152.


63 Ibid., p. 275.


66 Ibid., p. 82.

67 Ibid., p. 87.


69 Ibid., p. 209.


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