2012 Graduate Research Prize Essay:

Duns Scotus at the Intersection of Christology and Consciousness

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Rowan Williams writes that the core doctrines of Christianity need to “be made more difficult before we can accurately grasp their simplicities,” and that this “making difficult […] is perhaps one of the most fundamental tasks for theology.”¹ If this is true, then contemporary consciousness studies have done a great service to Christology by making it more difficult than ever to contemplate the mind of a being who is both human and divine. Yet philosophers and psychologists have been so benevolent in their bestowal of new terms and concerns that, for someone studying Scholastic theology, it might seem difficult to find an entry point. This paper is an attempt to understand the points of intersection between consciousness studies and Christology, as well as to consider some modes of entry via the thought of Duns Scotus.

I. THE SCHOLASTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM

Though the Scholastic theologians were not explicitly thinking in the same terms as consciousness studies (by which I refer to the study of our mental states, i.e., their relations and what it is like to have them), they were thinking about the same cluster of data currently being further problematized by work in that field. For example, in the Garden of Gethsemane one finds Christ juxtaposing his distressed will with the divine will.² When one wills something, generally speaking, one consciously wills it, and so if Christ is both human and divine this situation has the odd result that he is consciously, simultaneously, willing opposite things. It will not do to simply chalk this up as a parallel to Paul’s mixed will in Romans 7, for a divine being ought to be less susceptible to such confusion. Further, as a divine being, Christ’s knowledge ought to have been perfect, yet the gospels tell of a Christ who not only “increased in wisdom,” but who was also ignorant of things like when the apocalypse would occur.³ It is common for ordinary humans to

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¹ Williams, Arians: Heresy and Tradition, 236.
³ Luke 2:52, Matthew 24:36
have difficulty calling to mind something we “know,” but it might seem absurd to think of a divine being having the same difficulty.

The Scholastics were alive to these concerns, and their solutions involved sets of metaphysical and logical distinctions. I will hold off on introducing the distinctions developed by consciousness studies until §II in order to first lay this project’s necessary background. Beginning with a look at the Scholastic’s distinctions will hopefully make evident their value (such that they are worth continuing to think about), but also their limits (such that consciousness studies pose major difficulties). Yet despite their respect for church authorities and shared technical vocabulary, no two Scholastics are quite the same, and for the purposes of this paper I will focus on Duns Scotus. There is some evidence that Scotus has the most sophisticated account of the intellect and will in the Scholastic period, which would make him a desirable interlocutor for consciousness studies, but this paper cannot adjudicate on so broad a level.⁴

Thus, it must be stressed that, though this initial exposition moves from Thomas Aquinas to Scotus, it does not do so in order to prove Scotus as superior. Rather, since Scotus developed his beliefs largely in response to Aquinas, the progression helps show on what points Scotus was flexible, and what were his priorities — which will be important for speculating on any rapprochement between Scotus and consciousness studies. To that end, when I expost Scotus both in this section, and in §III, I will highlight when I think we have encountered a key thesis Scotus either would or would not compromise on in order to solve the issues raised by Christology and consciousness, labeling them CT (compromisable thesis) and UT (uncompromisable thesis), respectively.

Prior to Duns Scotus, Scholastics generally distinguished between the two natures in Christ and the one person, or suppositum, as seen in Thomas Aquinas: “But the divine and human natures, although as far apart as possible, nevertheless come together, by the mystery of the incarnation, in one suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally but both essentially.”⁵ It was standard fare for the Scholastics that natures always exist as individual natures, not as participations in various universal natures. Yet individual natures never exist apart from an individuating entity, namely, their suppositum. So while a given nature must always exist as an individual nature, it is only referred to as “this” individual nature on account of its suppositum. What the suppositum gets in return is all the properties of the nature it individuates, for properties come to a suppositum by way of its nature. In the case of humans, then, we call the suppositum that individuates human nature a person, and thus human persons are said to be rational, appetitive and more, on account of their human nature.

⁴ For a stronger argument in favor of Scotus, see Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 218 ff.
These distinctions allow the Aquinas to say that the second person of the Trinity is one divine suppositum that, on account of the powerful properties of the divine nature it individuates, is also able to individuate a second nature — a human one. Since properties come by way of natures, Aquinas distributes potentially contradictory properties between the distinct natures. All of the properties have to be said directly of the person, Christ, but because the natures on account of which the properties are said are distinct, there is some explanation as to how it is Christ may permissibly hold them. Put in more contemporary logical locution this means that “X qua P is R” and “X qua Q is not-R.” So with respect to the crucifixion, Christ qua divinity wills it, while Christ qua humanity does not will it. Or, with respect to knowledge of the end times, Christ qua divinity knows, while Christ qua humanity does not know. So it seems that the above biblical instances regarding Christ’s wills and knowledge actually do not pose any logical trouble.

Yet Marilyn Adams notes that when we probe what the qua phrase is actually supposed to do here, considerable ambiguity results. If taken as a strictly grammatical distinction, “X qua P is R” may simply be reduced to “X is R,” and since “X qua Q is not-R” likewise entails “X is not-R,” we again have a contradiction on our hands. If qua is meant to refer to a part of the whole, then the locution risks causing too much division in Christ, at least for soteriological purposes. Parts of a whole do not generally have their properties said of one another, for example, just because my stomach is upset does not mean that my foot is upset. Similarly, if we were to say Christ’s human part suffers, this would not have any bearing on the divine part. If the salvation story requires divinity to have borne suffering for the sake of humanity, this sense of qua will not work. A third, less obvious possibility, would be if qua is intended to qualify not the subject (X, in this case), but the predicate (R or not-R). So rather than Christ having knowledge and ignorance, Christ would have divine-knowledge and human-ignorance, which — being different sorts of properties — are not mere contradictories. But if this notion of “human-ignorance” is meaningful in any sense, it is only so by turning Christ’s ignorance into a kind of ignorance that is different in its mode of existence than the kind humans have, which just exists as ignorance, simpliciter, not qualified as human-ignorance. Without further qualification on the front end, it seems the person-nature distinction leaves too much ambiguity to be satisfactory.

Scotus makes some headway by relocating what the “this” refers to when it comes to natures and persons. In sum, Scotus distinguishes between individual natures as substances, such that “this” substance can be considered a bearer of properties, and restricts the role of personhood to be a marker of ontological independence. In the above scenario, natures have no “thisness” apart from their suppositum, and so there is no sense in which the nature conceived of as distinct from

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6 See Adams, Christ and Horrors, 130 for the original source of this formulation, albeit in a slightly different format.
7 Ibid., 130-134.
its suppositum could be a bearer of properties. As Aquinas says, it is the suppositum that “has existence” while it is the nature “by which” it has existence.\(^8\) So far, Scotus agrees:

   Every form, existing as a form in another, gives to that [other] thing that the thing is denominated by its [viz the form’s] action, just as [the form] gives existence (esse) to the thing. And although a form [existing] in a suppositum is denominated by its [viz. the form’s] action, nevertheless [it is not so] by final denomination, but the suppositum is more finally denominated by the same action [of the form].\(^9\)

So predication reaches its ontological limit when it reaches the suppositum. The key move he makes, though, is not to identify personhood simply with the “in which” of a human nature. Instead, as put in a recent study of Scotus’ concept of personhood,

   Scotus considers independence, not individuality, as the distinctive feature of personhood. Independence presupposes individuality, for only a individual nature can exist independently. The reverse is not true, however, since an individual nature can exist either independently or dependently.\(^10\)

Individual natures all can at least be conceived of as having had the possibility of depending on something else, though they may not in fact do so at present. A human person, then, is an individual human nature that no longer has the potential to depend on another individual. While Scotus sees this distinction as necessary for the case of the incarnation,\(^11\) it is not necessarily ad hoc, for it allows for more explanation of the relation between parts and wholes in other areas (where, say, an organ seems to be an individual substance in the human body, but depends on the heart for existence).

This view seems able to avoid the ambiguity of the qua statement. At the incarnation the divine second person of the Trinity assumes a second individual nature and binds both natures in a firm, metaphysical sense. The human nature is no less human for depending on another for its existence, because personhood is not what makes one human, it is only what makes one an

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\(^9\) Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.12.1, n. 51 (Vatican, v. 54) =ed. Cross, *Metaphysics*, 222. Also see Scotus, Ord., II, d. 3, no. 188 (Vat. 7, 483-84) =ed. Frank, *Duns Scotus*, 185: “This [individuating] entity, therefore, is not the matter or the form of the composite insofar as each of these is a “nature”; rather, it is the ultimate reality of the being that is the matter or that is the form or that is the composite...”
\(^10\) Bok, “More than Just an Individual,” 192.
\(^11\) Otherwise, in assuming an individual nature, the Word would have assumed a human person, which borders on Adoptionism. See: *Ibid.*, 178.
independent human. As in the previous formula, we have two natures and one person. But if one wants to ask, “to what do we attribute ignorance?” we can respond, “to this human nature.” There is no ambiguity, because the individual nature is a bearer of properties on its own. Christ now shares fully in human nature, but because of its “alien” status, we can say that Christ is omniscient, simpliciter, while he is ignorant qua his dependent human nature. In coming to this solution, Scotus clearly makes the concept of personhood amenable to the needs to the Christological situation, so I would suggest the following is a compromisable thesis for him:

CT1: Personhood =def. the independent existence of an individual, rational nature.

In evaluating this proposal, Richard Cross wonders whether this means that the essentially omniscient second person of the Trinity is “actually” ignorant. He voices no concerns about the conceptual distinctions that have been made, so I take this “actually” to mean more than a charge of logical inconsistency. It seems that Cross must have in mind concerns stemming from consciousness, because even if we have laid the right metaphysical framework, it still does not make sense to think of Christ as consciously aware of things in a simultaneously omniscient and ignorant way, at least not without further explanation — which leads us to the point where consciousness studies challenge these historical formulations.

II. BECOMING CONSCIOUS OF NEW CONCERNS

Medieval metaphysics understandably runs into trouble with consciousness, because it is only relatively recently that consciousness emerged as a definable, discreet area of study. For much of history, people did not think of themselves as “unified internal subjects of their thoughts and actions.” Instead, and this is especially evident in Greco-Roman culture, people thought of their identity in terms of interactions with their city, family, profession, or other social group. The notion that one has a personal, privileged center of thought developed roughly when Kant moved from contemplating the association of ideas to thinking about the self that experienced them. The move to study the coherence of the self that experiences ideas, and what it is “like” to experience them, was a significant development upon the established task of clarifying the processes that produce them.

12 Ibid., 136.
15 Ibid., 2.
There are a number of things one might intend by describing something as “conscious,” such that it is not difficult to imagine even a divine person being described as conscious. If all that is meant is “sentient,” “wakeful,” or “being the subject of conscious states,” then even plants and animals could count as conscious, though they might experience a limited range of conscious states compared to something that is “self-conscious.” Conscious states come in many varieties. Timothy Bayne broadly categorizes conscious states into two models: some states are conscious by playing a functional role in our minds, some are conscious simply by being phenomenal, or by there being “something it is like to have it.”

To tie several threads together, conscious states are conscious to conscious beings in a variety of ways of being conscious. That is, a human might have a certain phenomenological mental state (e.g., that of experiencing pain) which is present to one’s consciousness in a certain way at the moment of pain, and in a different way later on. In particular, a mental state is “phenomenal-conscious” if it is present to one by being experienced or willed. A mental state is “introspective-conscious” if it is present to oneself via introspection. Lastly, a mental state is “access-conscious” if its contents are “poised for rational use,” either in an act of reasoning, in controlling an action, or speaking. To illustrate again, one might be phenomenal-conscious of a delicious taste, and later on be introspective-conscious of this same state by reflecting on it and proceed to be access-conscious of the taste by describing it to a friend. These categories need to be at hand in any discussion about consciousness and Christ, though the divine consciousness may exceed or not be compatible with a portion of them.

On their own, though, it is not clear how the above categories are of particular interest to philosophers or theologians, seeming the sort of observable data that falls under the purview of the hard sciences. But logical troubles emerge when we start thinking about how all the above is unified in one person. A brief description of various kinds of “unity of consciousness” will clarify why conscious unity is so important for the proper functioning of an individual. We can ask about the unity of various activities of our consciousness, but unity of the contents of consciousness (our conscious states) seems most essential to a properly acting agent.

“Synchronic unity” of conscious states refers to the unity of one’s conscious states at a particular time. Synchronic unity is achieved when all of one’s conscious states are “co-conscious” with one another, which is typically taken to mean that they are bound together into one larger conscious experience. This could happen on the level of phenomena, introspection, introspection,

16 Ibid., 5.
18 For further explanation of these terms, see: Jedwab, “The Incarnation and Unity of Consciousness,” 170-171.
20 Jedwab, 172. See also: Brook, 5.
or access-consciousness. To take an example present to the author, the colors on my wall, the feel of my desk, and the music from my speakers are co-conscious parts of the same experience, whether I am focusing on one or the other. When introspecting or marshaling an argument, typically all the pieces are present to one’s mind, though utilized in different ways as the conscious act progresses. It is difficult to imagine what it would be like for one of these unities to be broken — for ourselves to be consciously, inwardly divided — in part because they are so necessary for routine functions.

The second relevant kind of unity is “diachronic unity,” which refers to the unity of one’s consciousness itself over the course of time. Without an account of how one experience grows coherently out of those that preceded it, it is hard to say how one’s consciousness now is it any sense the same as it was ten minutes ago. There might be a common store of memories to draw upon at each moment, but a description of diachronic unity is needed to establish how the thing accessing those memories is related in a succession of moments.

The centrality of these two kinds of unity to humans’ proper functioning and sense of identity, and the privileged access anyone has to their own conscious states, make it understandable why some have assumed consciousness is simply synonymous with personhood. In contemporary studies consciousness is not typically thought of as an entity, like an organ, but as a property we attribute to something if it has conscious states. It is easy to see how defining a person as, “[a particular set] of traits including agency, cognitive skills, etc.,” is quite different than Scotus’ metaphysical concept of “independent individual.”

Concerns about consciousness, then, change the questions being asked about Christology in three ways. Firstly, what we take consciousness to be, whether a property of a person or a person, simpliciter, will have some bearing on how many consciousnesses Christ has. If we must stick to the formula that Christ is one person, and consciousness means person, simpliciter, then Christ must have only one center of consciousness. This goes hand in hand with an account of what it takes for consciousness to be unified, and it is here that the charges of traditional Christology’s incoherence are strongest. If there is only one consciousness in Christ, and a properly functioning consciousness has all its conscious states in synchronic unity, then the mental state of “being ignorant about X” will be co-conscious with the mental state of “being knowledgeable

21 Van Gulick, 17.
22 Hanson, “Two Consciousnesses: The Modern Version of Chalcedon,” 471. See also: Loke, “On the Coherence of the Incarnation: The Divine Preconscious Model,” 59: “Surely the unity of a person should be understood as involving the unity of the self-consciousness either in timelessness or at any given time t.”
23 Van Gulick, 8-9.
24 Loke, 53.
25 Anderson, Paradox in Christian Theology, 94.
about X,” regardless of whether we say Christ is conscious of X simpliciter, and ignorant of X qua humanity. If we posit that Christ has two centers of consciousness, it is hard to see how this could result in a properly functioning person. Lastly, an awareness of the way phenomena inwardly effect conscious beings has increased a desire to understand how a supposedly impassible God experienced genuine human suffering. However, attempts have been made at squaring these concerns with the incarnation, and it is to those attempts that we now turn. After sketching them, I will return to Scotus, with the contemporary problem and possible solutions in hand, to see if his thought admits any conceptual overlap.

III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS SANS SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT

The views presented here all attempt to correlate consciousness with Chalcedonian Christology, and thus press for a solution that preserves an obvious sense of full humanity and full divinity in Christ. It is worth pointing out that this is the first point we have encountered that Scotus would certainly not compromise on, seeing himself as working within the major creeds of the Church:

UT1: Christ is one person who is both fully human and fully divine.

But the views presented here all recognize that there is considerable variance within this parameter on what the contents of Christ’s two natures must be. Likewise, scholars disagree on what in entailed by Constantinople III’s stipulation that “nature” has to include causal power and will — some say consciousness, others not. As I present views in this section I will also offer critique, for the sake of tying these views in with the preceding overview of consciousness, and also with an eye to the goal of comparing them to Scotus’ commitments at the end of the paper.

There are three variations on the view that Christ has two consciousnesses. First there is what Thomas Morris styles the “two-minds” view, wherein “the divine mind had full and direct access to the earthly, human experience resulting from the Incarnation, but the earthly consciousness did not have such full and direct access to the content of the overarching omniscience proper to the Logos [...]” Both consciousnesses have the full spectrum of mental states they are supposed to have, but the divine consciousness is able to access the human states and make them its own. The way that Morris describes the view led Timothy Bayne to rename this the “Inclusion” view, which is sensible given that Morris appeals to twentieth-century psychology’s description of

26 Van Gulick, 26.
27 For a discussion of other possibilities, see: Adams, 80-107, as well as Hanson, 473.
28 Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, 103.
levels of consciousness for explanatory power, wherein the “conscious” level is able to access, say, the “preconscious” level, but not vice versa.\(^9\) Yet since we are talking about two fully active consciousnesses, in order to not have two agents at cross-purposes, Morris appeals to the divine consciousness as Christ’s “ultimate doxastic state,” such that it is the state he acts out of.\(^{30}\) Indeed, there is only one set of “cognitive and causal powers” in Christ — the divine one — making human “consciousness” on Morris’ terms mostly the passive power to receive experiences.\(^{31}\) One might think that this makes Christ no longer fully human, since his causal powers are resultantly of a higher degree than a normal human’s. Morris here appeals to the distinction between what it is to be essentially human verses fully human. By having a body and the ability to undergo human conscious states, Christ has a full range of human existence, without being limited to normal human abilities of engaging the world. He is “fully” human in the relevant, essential sense, without being human in the same way the rest of us are human.\(^{32}\)

Morris’ view is one of the more developed views on the table, but is difficult to square with the need for synchronic unity. Even granting Morris’ attempt to separate causal powers from centers of consciousness, it is hard to imagine the human consciousness and the divine consciousness not turning the divine person into a case of split-personality disorder, assuming Christ’s human consciousness is just as self-conscious as any other human. Related to this, Bayne contemplates what it would mean for this Christ to say “I,” and assumes that if both of Christ’s consciousnesses were diachronically unified, they would both want to say “I” for themselves.\(^{33}\)

In response to Morris, Bayne suggests the “Restricted Inclusion” view, positing that Christ’s consciousness had two distinct modes of existence, and that Christ had the ability to turn the “switch” between the two.\(^{34}\) For soteriological reasons, Christ spent most of his earthly existence with the switch turned to human consciousness, but was still fully divine because at any time

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29 Morris, “Metaphysics of God Incarnate,” 123. At Sturch, “Inclusion and Incarnation: a Response to Bayne,” 104-105, Sturch criticizes this nomenclature, saying that the divine nature does not literally include the consciousness of the human nature, as if the divine nature were experiencing those states itself. Instead, the divine consciousness has access to the human nature's mind in just the way it has access to any other human consciousness, but with the added association that “these are my” states. But aside from the fact that Morris does not actually taking this line of thought, it puts the divine consciousness at too much of a distance from the human states to meaningfully call them “God's” states, which is a soteriological problem.
30 Morris, 125.
31 Morris, Logic of God Incarnate, 161.
33 Bayne, 136.
34 Ibid., 138-9.
could have chosen to switch back. As Bayne admits, though, while making sense of synchronic unity, it is hard to account for diachronic unity on this view.

The last two-consciousness view is developed by Richard Swinburne, whose view is based on a particular set of metaphysical assumptions, including non-reductive physicalism. He holds that soul and body are two distinct substances for humans, and all that soul does is provide “thisness” to the matter necessary for a body (as opposed to a soul being the seat of rational, causal activity). All the second person of the Trinity has to do, then, is provide “thisness” to a human body in order “to acquire a further range of contents — sensations, feelings, [human] beliefs and desires [...].”35 In order to ensure that the human existence is a full human existence, Swinburne distinguishes between “beliefs” and “inclinations to belief.”36 The divine consciousness knows that it is omniscient, and that the human consciousness thinks it is not, and it keeps the human consciousness ignorant of its omniscience, such that its bodily actions can authentically follow from a human belief system. But since the human belief system does not exhaust the one person’s beliefs, they are mere “inclinations to believe,” and not what we would ultimately say the divine person believes.

Bayne likewise charges Swinburne with a failure to account for synchronic unity, but for a different reason. Swinburne does not appeal to “accessing relationships” to unify the two streams of consciousness in Christ, he simply appeals to the fact that they both subsist in a single person. But even supposing that it is possible for one person to have two streams of consciousness this does not provide any explanation for in what sense they are unified.37 Bayne clearly has in mind the sort of unity which presupposes co-consciousness of conscience states for proper functioning — concerns Swinburne does not seem to interact with. This view also runs into trouble if an immaterial soul is an integral part of what it means to be human, since Swinburne says that a human body is all that is necessary to produce fully human conscious-states.

The two one-consciousness view do not need to explain how two consciousnesses can function in one person, only how one consciousness can have both divine and human characteristics. The most sophisticated view is that of Andrew Loke, who draws heavily upon the literal implications of contemporary psychology’s distinctions between levels of consciousness (as opposed to Morris, who used this as an analogy). The “conscious” level has been explained above, and the “subconscious” is the level a person does not have access to, but which still influences the conscious. Between these is the “preconscious” level, and it is here that conscious beliefs “submerge” to when they are not being accessed by the conscious. On Loke’s view, in becoming human the divine person submerged its omniscience in the preconscious, such that at

35 Adams, 119.
36 Cross, “The Incarnation,” 469.
37 Bayne, 134.
any time Christ could have accessed those beliefs, but chose not to. Christ still has these beliefs, and they are technically accessible, but since he does not access them, he operates as a full, fallible human. Loke’s view, however, seems to reduce “divine consciousness” to a set of beliefs which, having safely been deposited in the preconscious, can be left alone — which does not seem a rich enough picture of what a full divine consciousness would entail.

Related to this is the “bad faith” view, suggested very tentatively by Peter Drum. Without much technical sophistication, Drum suggests that Christ’s one consciousness really was aware of divine and human mental-states all the time, but in order to preserve a coherent sense of consciousness, he only lets himself believe partial truths about reality by “keeping from himself the fact that he is anything more than a man.” This seems a bit too quick, though, for if this means, “I am a man,” then Christ has not ruled out his divinity, while if it means “I am nothing more than a normal man,” then this is no partial truth, but rather an outright lie.

IV. HINTS FROM THE SUBTLE DOCTOR

It should be evident by now that consciousness, especially the unity of conscious states, is not something Scotus explicitly factored into his discussion of Christ’s two natures. Yet even though Scotus was not using the term “consciousness,” it should not be surprising, given his status as Doctor Subtilis, that his philosophy leaves hints to be built upon by consciousness studies. Even as it stands, I hope to show, it is possible to make an informed speculation as to which solution described above he would find most attractive.

At one point in an attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, Scotus marshals the argument that it is immaterial, and hence not corruptible in the same way matter is. To do so, he has to focus on all the acts of the mind which we “experience” in ourselves, yet have no way of accounting for in physical terms. Understood as things we might be conscious of, the list looks remarkably similar to a list of access-conscious and introspective-conscious states. To heavily abbreviate the passage, here are a few notable examples:

We experience in ourselves that we know the actual universal [...] that we distinguish the whole class of sensible objects from what is not such [...] that we know conceptual relations [...] that we know the very act whereby we know these things and we experience that this act exists within us [...] that we assent to propositions [...] that we learn the unknown from the known by means of discursive reasoning.40

38 Loke, 56.
40 Scotus, Opus oxoniense, IV, dist. XLIII, q. 11, =ed. Wolter, Philosophical Writings, 142 (emphasis
Since he is appealing to these acts for the sake of argument, I take it that by “experience” he is referring not just to something that humans do, nor to the ways we schematize after the fact to account for the reasoning process, but to states we are conscious of, such that someone on the other side of the argument would have the same data to acknowledge. Scotus says we experience is not just an idea, but the very knowing of the idea, which seems straightforwardly a description of introspective-consciousness. Phenomenal-conscious states perhaps have a parallel in Scotus’ account of how we receive internal, quasi-material impressions of external sense data. But he presents this process more like a schematization of something that must be the case, rather than as an account of a process he is conscious of as it occurs in himself. As far as I can tell, Scotus does not discuss the coherence of any of these conscious states, which is a crucial contemporary concern, but the fact that they are there somewhat lessens the gap between him and contemporary thought.

One might think that the immateriality of the soul itself, useful as the argument just was for showing us conscious-states in Scotus’ thought, runs counter to contemporary consciousness studies. After all, some scholars argue that consciousness can be totally accounted for in physical terms. Further, immateriality in the medieval context suggests indivisibility, and even on a dualist view the physical brain has something to do with our conscious states. If the soul for Scotus cannot be conceived of in meaningfully distinct aspects, his view will look hopelessly arcane. Fortunately, a similar debate was occurring in Scotus’ time, and he placed himself on the side of being able to distinctly conceive of different powers in the soul. The first view Scotus sets himself against is that the soul is really distinct from its powers, the second that the soul simply acts by being in various relations with extramental realities. The first view threatens to take away causal power from the soul itself, the second threatens the simplicity of the soul by adding a relation on top of it. In order to preserve both causal power and unity, Scotus argues that the powers of the soul are conceptually distinct from the definition of the soul, though in reality they are inseparable from it (this is Scotus’ famous formal distinction at work).

41 Pasnau, “Cognition,” 288 and King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content, 10.”
42 Cross, “Philosophy of Mind,” 268-269.
43 Scotus, In Metaph. 9, q. 5, nn. 17-18 = ed. Wolter, Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 142.“But if 'potency in the soul' refers to that perfection which naturally precedes the act as the causal ground for eliciting the act in question, or to the soul's receptive capacity to be moved by the object, then 'potency' designates something absolute. Now we can hold that the potencies are the same as the essence, or if they differ from it, it is either [a:] as diverse perfections contained unitively [or, b:] as conceptually distinct intentions.”
The benefit of this distinction is that the two things it preserves — unity and distinction — are two things necessary for a contemporary account of a properly functioning human, as well. Contemporary views of the mind, even ones of wholly physical parts, still consider unity of consciousness the thing lacking in cases of psychology disorder. The important aspect of Scotus’ formal distinction here seems to be that it unifies while preserving distinction, not that it excludes the possibility of physical components. On the surface, Scotus’ priorities with regard to the mind’s make-up seem like they could adjust to some contemporary physicalist tendencies. It seems that the discussion has yielded two key theses so far, one compromisable, one not:

UT2: There is an *immaterial* aspect of the human soul.

This premise seems uncompromisable because immateriality of *some* sort is essential to Scotus’ arguments for the immorality and unity of the soul, which Scotus would insist on. A change here would indeed be a drastic alteration of Scotus’ overall philosophical system. On the other hand, what exactly the immaterial parts of the soul are seems less essential to Scotus:

CT2: The immaterial human soul is *composed* of intellect and will.

Both Scotus’ distinctions between personhood and nature discussed in §1, along with the just mentioned method of accounting for the unity and distinction of the powers of the soul, leave considerable flexibility for further development.⁴⁴ Both Scotus and Aquinas separated personhood from nature, leaving room to tweak what counts as a full human nature. However, as we saw, Scotus went further to say that the independent divine person acts as a *suppositum* for an individual human nature, and the human nature depends on the divine person for existence. Since the human nature has a different mode of existence than the divine nature, there could be a distinction between the way the human and divine natures are conscious — as long as Christ experiences and utilizes a full range of human conscious-states. Further, since Scotus’ conception of unity of the powers of the soul is based on the formal distinction, not the specific powers and how they fit together, his view would accommodate updated evidence for what the components of a conscious human actually are.

There is one further point to make about the human nature of Christ that seems especially relevant for the possibility of merging contemporary consciousness with Christology. All of the

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⁴⁴ Jedwab, 180: “If we end up appealing to personhood as the ultimate explanation for how the two consciousnesses are unified, we have not really given an explanation for the palpable problem of having two parallel streams of consciousness, and Christ will, in fact, see very much like two distinct people.”
contemporary theories above are working with a sophisticated conception of what it means for a human to engage the world, the authenticity of which would be compromised if Christ’s human nature were, in a sense, controlled by the divine nature. Simply metaphysically separating the natures is not enough for Christ to experience free will \textit{qua} human. However impeccable his divine nature might be, Christ will not seem to being experiencing a full range of human existence if he does not at least have the possibility of sinning. Further, consciousness is now considered a prerequisite for something with free will. Since Scotus’ belief that Christ’s human nature had free will is as important today as it was to him, it is surely something he would not compromise on. Thus,

UT3: Christ’s human nature, in order to be fully human, must have free will.

The way Scotus explains how this is possible is, of course, more complicated that can be fully dealt with here, but essentially Scotus believes that the human nature is fully free to choose either good or evil, but that the divine nature fills Christ with overwhelmingly good desires, such that the human will and the divine will are never in conflict. In effect, this means Christ’s humanity will always act towards the good, since that is what it fully desires, and Scotus thinks that saying one has the ability to act on their desires is the same thing as to saying they have free will. All of Christ’s human access-conscious and introspective-conscious states could thus be in his full control, like any other human.

V. A PROPOSED TRAJECTORY FOR SCOTUS AND CONSCIOUSNESS

From all that has been said, it is now possible to make an informed, if brief, evaluation of the resonances between proposed solutions and Scotus’ thought. The following chart summarizes the salient aspects of each of the views in categories that might be helpful for the reader to reference throughout the evaluation:

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline

\textbf{Category} & \textbf{Proposed Solutions} & \textbf{Scotus’ Thought} \\
\hline


\end{tabular}
\end{table}

45 Van Gulick, 28.
46 “But it is, in virtue of an extrinsic cause, impossible for this power to be a proximate [power] for sinning, viz. By the will of God going ahead of the will such that it always continues its act of enjoyment...” Scotus, \textit{Ord.} 4.49.6, n. 11 (Wadding, X, 455) = \textit{ed.} Cross, “Vehicle Externalism and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” 200.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spheres of consciousness in Christ</th>
<th>Morris</th>
<th>Bayne</th>
<th>Swinburne</th>
<th>Loke</th>
<th>Drum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How Christ’s divinity is able to have human experiences</td>
<td>Divine sphere can access human sphere</td>
<td>Divine sphere not conscious when human sphere is</td>
<td>Acquires “inclinations to belief” through the human body</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human sphere not conscious when divine sphere is</td>
<td>Human sphere not conscious when divine sphere is</td>
<td>Human sphere kept from accessing the divine sphere by the divine nature</td>
<td>Preconscious level could be accessed, but normally is not</td>
<td>Self-deception</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of uniting the divine and human</td>
<td>One set of causal powers</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>One “thisness”</td>
<td>Divine beliefs are deposited into a standard level of the human conscious spectrum</td>
<td>One sphere of consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What makes something a person?</td>
<td>Causal powers</td>
<td>Synchronic unity of consciousness</td>
<td>Having “thisness”</td>
<td>Synchronic unity of consciousness</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What makes something a human?</td>
<td>Having human experiences and a set of causal powers</td>
<td>Having human experiences and a set of causal powers</td>
<td>Having a human body</td>
<td>Having a human sphere of consciousness</td>
<td>Having a human sphere of consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Christ’s human nature properly tied to personhood?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seems fully divine?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (divinity amounts to a set of beliefs)</td>
<td>No (divinity partakes in a falsehood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seems fully human?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (depending on your view of essential humanity)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seems to achieve synchronic unity?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seems to achieve diachronic unity?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, the following are the theses that I have tried to argue (in §I & §III) Scotus either would or would not compromise on in order to solve the problems raised for Christology by consciousness. Seen side by side with the summaries of the above views, it is hopefully evident why these particular theses were considered relevant enough to single out:

**UT1:** Christ is one person who is both fully human and fully divine.

**UT2:** There is an immaterial aspect of the human soul.

**UT3:** Christ’s human nature, in order to be fully human, must have free will.
CT1: Personhood $=_{\text{def.}}$ the independent existence of an individual, rational nature.
CT2: The immaterial human soul is composed of intellect and will.

To begin squaring Scotus’ theses with the above views, his thought does not seem like it could cohere with either of the one-consciousness views. Both of them take as a premise that personhood is defined in terms of consciousness, which leads them to make unjustified concessions as to the contents of Christ’s natures. Scotus is flexible on the definition of personhood (CT1), but not if it ends up compromising the fullness of Christ’s humanity or divinity (UT1). For example, as said above, Loke’s view has to reduce the divine consciousness to a set of beliefs in order to submerge it into the preconscious level of the mind, which strips the divine nature of its causal powers. Since causal powers are unified with natures for Scotus, Loke’s view ends up sacrificing the fullness of the divine nature. The grammar of the Drum’s “bad faith” view, if it is somehow not construed as an outright lie, would still cut against the grain of Scotus’ thought. For, even though on Scotus’ terms Christ’s human nature has a dependent existence on Christ’s personhood, the person of Christ is still considered fully divine and fully human. So if Christ is to have a truthful sense of self, it does not work for him to think of himself as “not anything more than a man.” Scotus is not necessarily opposed to Christ only having one consciousness, but he would be if it conflicted with UT1.

Scotus does have a place for two consciousnesses — in the two natures — so the question would be whether Scotus’ thought has any bearing on the supporting framework for the two-consciousness views. Morris’ Inclusion and Bayne’s Restricted-Inclusion perspectives immediately face a difficulty with respect to Christ’s human nature, for they ground both consciousnesses in one set of causal powers (the divine set), which John Hick points out takes away human freedom. Consciousness always involves agency, for in addition to phenomenal-conscious states, there are access-conscious and introspective-conscious states which, by definition, requires action, not just reception of phenomena. CT2 shows that Scotus is flexible in terms of what constitutes the consciousness of a human, but not to the point of outrightly stripping a human of their causal powers (due to the constraints of UT1 and UT3). Nor could we just modify their views to fit better with Scotus and posit two sets of causal powers for, as was shown, it is precisely in the one set of causal powers that Morris grounds the unity of the two consciousnesses. Double the causal powers, and it is very difficult to distinguish these two-consciousnesses views from two utterly distinct persons.

On the surface, Scotus might seem difficult to reconcile with Swinburne’s view, for Scotus thinks the soul (being an immaterial source of causal powers) is much more than the “thisness” that gives existence to a physically construed bundle of conscious matter. However, since

47 Hick, 422.
“thisness” at least provides some immaterial grounding for individual humans, and Swinburne does indeed acknowledge an immaterial divine soul in Christ, the view does not actually conflict with UT2. Further, it preserves the causal powers as required by UT1 and UT3, albeit in a way that is alien to the norms of Scotus’ thought. But since the norms which Swinburne’s view is alien to are only Scotus’ views of what constitutes persons and natures (CT1 and CT2), the possibility of rapprochement is still there.

The developments Swinburne makes use of are no small developments, but since his view seems the only one to merely differ from Scotus on the compromisable theses, rather than the uncompromisable ones, they are developments it would behoove Scotus, or someone who values Scotus’ broader theology, to entertain. Our initial discussion of persons and natures showed Scotus as being willing to innovate in this area once — for Christological purposes — so he could quite possibly be persuaded to accept Swinburne’s non-reductive physicalism. It seems, then, that focusing on the relation between Scotus and Swinburne’s views on consciousness and Christ would be a fruitful starting point for further inquiry.

VI. CONCLUSION

The possible solutions described and interacted within this paper all primarily respond to the issues raised by the problems of diachronic and synchronic unity. These problems seem most troublesome for a theology that includes a being who is both human and divine — but there are plenty of other areas of human consciousness currently being mapped, and potential disorders being catalogued, that would need to be accounted for in a plausible description of Christ’s humanness. Scotus’ philosophy of mind is likewise highly developed, and much work would be involved in capturing all the points relevant to this discussion. Shortcomings of this paper such as they are, I hope it is evident that, despite the problems consciousness studies pose to versions of Christology like that of Duns Scotus, there is not only space within his thought to dialogue with those concerns, but also a wealth of resources that can still be used to construct a response. As Rowan Williams hinted at the start of this paper, perhaps the best way to preserve these resources is to risk such a dialogue.
Bibliography


