On June 22, 1941 Operation Barbarossa shattered the façade of a German-Russian alliance when a 3.3 million-strong German invasion force flooded across the Soviet Union’s border. Immediately, the German Luftwaffe moved on key targets, raining explosives down on border defenses, bridges, command posts, power stations, and the like. With immediate successes, Operation Barbarossa appeared to be moving in the right direction for the Third Reich; however, the military operation was fraught with Hitler’s indecisive and erratic military planning. Hitler expected Operation Barbarossa to aid in his attempt to establish Germany as a great world power, and this was to be achieved through his policy of Lebensraum (living space). What resulted from this policy of “living space” was some of the bloodiest battles of the Second World War, and some of the greatest crimes of the war occurring in Hitler’s forces’ movement across the eastern front. Furthermore, Operation Barbarossa decisively assured Hitler and the Third Reich’s defeat early in the summer of 1941, and was a decisive turning point in World War II. Moreover, after Operation Barbarossa, scholars studying the military campaign, determined that the Third Reich’s defeat in the Second World War was inherently inevitable.

Consistently since the end of World War II, scholars focus on Operation Barbarossa in a variety of different sub-genres of history scholarship. From military histories to the burgeoning newer topic areas in cultural histories, scholars are confronting key questions and issues in their scholarship on the military campaign. What are the key questions and research trends defining
the field on Operation Barbarossa, and how is genocide studies effecting new scholarship on the military campaign? The historiography on Operation Barbarossa made a concerted shift over time. This paper argues that the shift in the historiography is from the first military histories of Operation Barbarossa, which were published in the first decades following the conclusion of World War II; moreover, these histories inaugurated an apologist narrative seeking to excuse the *Wehrmacht* from the German atrocities committed on the eastern front. Furthermore this paper maintains that the histories shifted to a marked focus on the genocide studies, where the historiography has moved to reevaluate the role of the *Wehrmacht* in the atrocities committed during Operation Barbarossa. Moreover, this shift in the historiography is quite significant, as it demonstrates a reevaluation of the depth of German guilt in Nazi war atrocities and demonstrates a move to reassess the perceived innocence and virtue of the German *Wehrmacht*.

Before one can begin an analysis on the state of the field, one first needs to understand the historiographical landscape that informed the present shift in the historiography towards ascertaining and analyzing the *Wehrmacht’s* role in the atrocities carried out during Operation Barbarossa. Scholars who published on Operation Barbarossa in the immediate decades following World War II largely fell into two categories, those of extreme communist interpretations of the military campaign, and German apologist interpretations that sought to alleviate the *Wehrmacht* of guilt in the atrocities committed during Operation Barbarossa on the eastern front.⁷ Moreover, these German apologist interpretations were largely written by former German *Wehrmacht* generals, and according to Stahel many bought into the preventative war theory, that espoused the idea that Germany was spurred to war because of Soviet expansionism in eastern Europe and was determined to attack Germany.⁸ Contradicting the German apologist stance, the communist theories blamed Hitler, according to Stahel, and was supported by the
Western capitalist powers that did not take seriously enough the need to contain Germany after World War I. Prominent in this early movement in the scholarship were A. J. P Taylor’s *The Origins of the Second World War* and Walter Hofer’s *War Premeditated, 1939*. According to scholars Stahel and Müller in their respective works, Taylor inaugurated the German apologist narrative, while Hofer inaugurated the communist apologist narrative. For instance, Müller puts forth that Hofer in *War Premeditated, 1939* maintained that the Third Reich’s invasion of the Soviet Union was premeditated and intentional, and built off the expansionary policies defining Germany at the time. A direct response to Hofer’s thesis was Taylor’s *The Origins of the Second World War*. Stahel puts forth that Taylor in his historical account of the World War II went directly against Hofer’s thesis by arguing that Hitler did not premeditate his attack on the Soviet Union. Rather, Taylor, according to Stahel, argued that Hitler was an opportunist that took opportunities as they arose, and as a result, Operation Barbarossa was simply a military opportunity. Moreover, Müller posits that Taylor in *The Origins of the Second World War* sought to portray Hitler as desiring a peaceful revision to the Treaty of Versailles, and blamed all of World War II on all countries that participated in the war.

These types of revisionist and apologist narratives extended well into the late 1960s, and the turn towards cultural histories that sought to reevaluate Operation Barbarossa in a critical way marked significant shift in the historiography. Seminal in this turn was Andreas Hillgruber’s *Hitlers Strategie, Politik und Kriegführung, 1940-194*, and it is important to discuss Hillgruber first in isolation from other scholars because of the sheer impact of his work. Critically, Hillgruber denotes that “an accurate evaluation…of Hitler’s political and strategic thoughts concerning… a military solution of the Eastern problem is possible only by considering both his ideological and political ‘program’…as they emerged in several stages,” and by separating
Hitler’s ideology and political program during the time span of planning for Operation Barbarossa would “lead to misinterpretation.” Furthermore in *Hitlers Strategie, Politik und Kriegführung*, Hillgruber’s methodology influenced the methodological approach that scholars continue to utilize throughout the studies on Operation Barbarossa. This method is embedded in a model of a combination of top-down and bottom-up history, which characterizes scholarship on Operation Barbarossa presently. Within this methodological approach, scholars seek to utilize a combination of governmental documents from top politicians and military figures, alongside personal papers of soldiers that participated in Operation Barbarossa such as letters, diaries, and the like. Through this, a wider view of the event and a better understanding of the political and ideological beliefs of all levels of military and political participants in the military campaign is achievable.

From this, emerged a wide array of scholars, that presently define the historiography, and contribute to the shift towards reevaluating the role of the *Wehrmacht* in the atrocities committed by the German during Operation Barbarossa and the concerted effort to discern the culture of the *Wehrmacht*. Scholars now assert confidently that Operation Barbarossa was embedded deeply into the Third Reich’s ideology, and as a key arm of the state, the *Wehrmacht* was firmly entrenched in that ideology as well. Through this, scholars hold that Operation Barbarossa was essentially a “war of ideologies” and a primary piece of evidence in this assertion is the Martial Jurisdiction Decree. Felix Römer in his chapter “The *Wehrmacht* in the War of Ideologies: The Army and Hitler’s Criminal Orders on the Eastern Front,” postulates that the Martial Jurisdiction Decree had advocates throughout the top ranks of the *Wehrmacht*. Furthermore, Römer expounds on this statement with the example of Generaloberst Georg von Küchler who “regarded the Soviet political commissars and party functionaries as criminals and hoped that the
policy of annihilation against them would also bring a military benefit.” 21 In viewing Operation Barbarossa as a war of ideology carried out by the Wehrmacht, Jürgen Förster echoed Römer’s assessment of the Wehrmacht. 22 Also focusing on the top military elite to ascertain the attitudes of the Wehrmacht towards Nazi ideology, Förster, like Römer looked to the behavior of Wehrmacht generals in determining the ideological leanings of the German army. 23 In doing so Förster stated “the attitude of the Wehrmacht to the indigenous population…was a mixture of racial arrogance, insecurity and naïve trust in the methods of force.” 24 Further exemplifying the attitude of the Wehrmacht, Förster argued that “military leaders…believed that the dangers of Russia and Bolshevism should be eliminated forever.” 25 In reassessing the complicity and guilt of the Wehrmacht in the historiography, this movement in the historiographical landscape is significant. Additionally, examples like Römer and Förster utilized, demonstrate a movement away from conceding to the virtuousness, and innocence, of the Wehrmacht in the atrocities committed by the Third Reich in World War II.

Moreover, scholars are beginning to reassess the guilt of the Wehrmacht by characterizing Operation Barbarossa, and the radicalization of the Wehrmacht’s actions on the eastern front, as “a test case of the Nazi racial policy.” 26 Emphasizing this conceptualization of the Wehrmacht’s actions are historians like Konrad Kwiet in his journal article “Rehearsing for Murder: The Beginning of the Final Solution in Lithuania,” who argue members of the Wehrmacht were radicalized during Operation Barbarossa as a result of the unchecked warfare. 27 For example, Kwiet points to when the Wehrmacht reached Lithuania as an example of the degree to which the Wehrmacht was willing to adhere to the extreme racial ideology prescribed by the Third Reich. 28 According to Kwiet, through the rhetoric instilled in reports of Soviet counter-attacks on the eastern front, the Wehrmacht became radicalized and more certain in
carrying out violence against their adversaries. Connecting to this view in the historiography, the radicalization of the lower echelons of the Wehrmacht, coincided with the radicalization of warfare on the eastern front. Differently, some scholars mark the Wehrmacht’s radicalization to Nazi ideology in the comparison between Operation Barbarossa and the invasion of Poland. In doing so, scholars posit that there was an assumption that wartime atrocities would be part of Operation Barbarossa, as soldiers and SS men were issued “pre-emptive amnesty for crimes” they were assumed to have to carry out on the eastern front; whereas in the case of the Poland invasion, soldiers and SS men were pardoned after the fact. Other scholars, like Aristotle Kallis in, “License,’ and Genocide in the East: Reflections on Localized Eliminationist Violence during the First Stages of ‘Operation Barbarossa’ (1941),” assert that the air of permissibility contributed to the radicalization of the Wehrmacht and their role in the mass killings that occurred during Operation Barbarossa. Moreover, scholars contend that as a test case for the Nazi racial ideology the Wehrmacht was not simply complicit in the mechanics of the Final Solution, but were facilitators of Nazi racial ideology and the atrocities that resulted from it.

Through viewing Operation Barbarossa as a test case for Nazi ideology, scholars are actively reframing the military campaign to connect it to Hitler’s Final Solution. These assertions are important, as they tie Operation Barbarossa directly to genocide studies, and marks another concerted shift in the historiography of Operation Barbarossa. Scholars who place Operation Barbarossa in the context of the final solution maintain that the operation was a steppingstone to the Final Solution, as the military campaign molded the mentality of Germans through fighting a barbarous war. Moreover, Omer Bartov in his chapter “Operation Barbarossa and the Origins of the Final Solution” asserts that scholarship has taken so long to clearly state the connection between Operation Barbarossa and the Final Solution because of the sheer political implications
of the statement. As argued by Bartov, “to admit that Hitler and Himmler would not have been able to carry out their genocidal plans without the active collaboration of the Wehrmacht’s command and the participation of the junior officer corps and the rank and file...meant that a much larger portion of the German population shared the responsibility for the regime’s crimes.”

In agreeance with Bartov’s assertion, Christian Streit in “Wehrmacht, Einsatzgruppen, Soviet POWS and Anti-Bolshevism in the Emergence of the Final Solution,” maintains that while an order to execute all the Jews did not occur during Operation Barbarossa, Operation Barbarossa created the barbarous conditions that allowed the idea of the Final Solution to form. However, differently from Bartov, Streit holds extreme anti-Bolshevism played a critical role in destroying the inhibiting factors and creating the right conditions that the idea of destroying all Jews in Europe could become a practical aim for the Third Reich. Further defining this point in the historiography, scholars postulate the Wehrmacht, was a weapon for the Third Reich that they could utilize alongside the SS.

Further, this shift in the historiography in connecting Operation Barbarossa to the Final Solution has made room for studies on the culture of the Wehrmacht to emerge. Scholars who study the culture of the Wehrmacht, argue that from the lowest ranks of the Wehrmacht there was support and a consensus around the genocidal Final Solution. In the most recent scholarship on Operation Barbarossa, scholars confront, what type of moral values and value systems were entrenched in the Wehrmacht’s culture. This turn is in line with the seminal work on the topic by Omer Bartov. Omer Bartov in The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare maintained that the barbarization of the Wehrmacht was from “the conditions at the front; the social and educational background of the junior soldiers; and the political indoctrination of the troops.” Most recently, David Harrisville in the monograph, The
Virtuous Wehrmacht: Crafting the Myth of the German Solider on the Eastern Front, 1941-1944, argued that the Wehrmacht was embedded in four key sets of values. According to Harrisville, the most potent of these values were those of the Nazi party, which were built on a “hierarchy of races in existential competition with each other and the Jewish ‘anti-race.’” As a whole, this is significant and connects to what older scholars in the field have long argued, that the Wehrmacht was not virtuous and disconnected from German atrocities on the eastern front. Rather, this brings the new scholarship in line with scholars who study Operation Barbarossa in connection to the genocidal Final Solution and scholars like Omer Bartov. Harrisville’s monograph is inherently connected to the work of Bartov. Bartov and Harrisville both analyze the regular soldier, rather than the elite ranks of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, Harrisville, like Bartov analyzed the question of guilt of the soldier in the Wehrmacht in the war atrocities committed during Operation Barbarossa. Furthermore, this marks a further shift away from absolving the German Wehrmacht of their guilt in wartime atrocities perpetrated on the eastern front. Rather, this shift in the historiography marks a concerted effort of historians to bring historical scholarship in line with the reality of the Wehrmacht’s role in German war crimes committed during Operation Barbarossa.

While the new scholarship defining the historiography is making contributions to the connection between Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht, and genocide studies; there remains gaps in the historiography that warrant investigation by historians. First, while English language scholarship has thoroughly analyzed the available Operation Barbarossa’s German primary source documents, English language scholarship has still not seriously engaged with the available primary source documents from the former-Soviet Union to the same degree. In connection to this, Stahel points out that secondary sources have often taken an uncritical
approach to analyzing the Red Army’s military skills. This hole in the historiography needs to be addressed, because, as the adversary to the Third Reich in Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet Union’s role needs to be seriously reconsidered. Further, the struggle over the control of the panzer division between the Oberkommando des Heeres and Hitler needs to be reevaluated in the scholarship, as this event is typically treated as just another part of a failing strategic plan in Operation Barbarossa. By readdressing this hole in the historiography, scholars would gain another dimension to the dispute between Hitler and the OKH, while perhaps developing a deeper narrative to the failure of Operation Barbarossa. Further gaps in the historiography on Operation Barbarossa that warrant attention include, additional studies on the culture of the Wehrmacht. Harrisville’s most recent contribution to the historiography, The Virtuous Wehrmacht, further challenged the traditional view of the Wehrmacht as absolved from guilt of wartime atrocities carried out on the eastern front. By further investigating the attempts to indoctrinate the Wehrmacht by the Third Reich’s high command, the historiography could develop further to ascertain how exactly pre-campaign indoctrination intersected with war time radicalization to result in the acceptance of the Final Solution’s values on the eastern front.

Operation Barbarossa initiated some of World War II’s bloodiest battles, and saw some of the most atrocious crimes committed by the Third Reich. Moreover, as Operation Barbarossa’s influence on the outcome of the Second World War II, but also the map of Europe was expansive. Not only did Operation Barbarossa cement Hitler’s defeat, it also enabled the process of Sovietization of eastern Europe to occur in the post-war landscape. Because of the sheer importance of Operation Barbarossa to the memory of the Wehrmacht following World War II, a German apologist narrative emerged in the historiography in the immediate aftermath of World War II. This paper argued that in the late 1960s a concerted shift away from German
apologist interpretations of Operation Barbarossa emerged in the historiography, and in its place a reevaluation of the role of the *Wehrmacht*’s role in the genocidal atrocities committed during Operation Barbarossa, and a general turn towards genocide studies emerged in the historiographical landscape.


2 Dimbleby, *Operation Barbarossa*, 141.


5 Ueberschär, “Introduction,” 73.

6 Stahel, *Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East*, 2; Dimbleby, *Operation Barbarossa*, xxxviii;


20 Römer, “The Wehrmacht in the War of Ideologies,” 79.

22 Förster, "Operation Barbarossa as an Ideological War of Extermination and the Final Solution," 88; Römer, “The Wehrmacht in the War of Ideologies,” 79.
24 Förster, "Operation Barbarossa as an Ideological War of Extermination and the Final Solution," 88.
32 Kwiet, “Rehearsing for Murder,” 5.
34 Dimbleby, *Operation Barbarossa*, xli.
38 Streit,” Wehrmacht, Einsatzgruppen, Soviet POWS and Anti-Bolshevism in the Emergence of the Final Solution,” 103.
39 Streit,” Wehrmacht, Einsatzgruppen, Soviet POWS and Anti-Bolshevism in the Emergence of the Final Solution,” 103.
42 Harrisville, *The Virtuous Wehrmacht*, 5.
52 Ueberschär, “Introduction,” 73.
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