Philosophical Dimensions of
Feminist
Social Change
Antonia Marzulli
Department of Liberal Studies
Feminist philosophers
frequently construct new theories that seek to
eradicate long-standing oppression, which limits women’s freedom,
autonomy, and
existence. Two problems with most
feminist philosophical theories are their inability to reach the masses
and
their often contradictory and canceling relationship with other
philosophies
within feminist thought. True women’s
liberation is dependent upon the resolution of these problems.
This paper seeks to integrate a
multiplicity of feminist philosophy to better comprehend women’s
oppression and
to delineate a path toward liberation.
This synthesis rejects a single, narrow, and masculine-directed
philosophy
and instead generates a novel, diverse, and feminine-directed one. Synthesizing the works of Simone de Beauvoir,
Luce Irigaray, Kenneth Burke, and Herbert Marcuse,[1]
this paper will 1) clarify the situation of women’s oppression using a
survey
of feminist philosophy, 2) explore language as a tool for women’s
liberation,
and 3) reveal the steps necessary to establish a working model for
social
change.
Section One: Women’s Oppression as
Defined by
Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray
Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray,
two feminist philosophers, seek to understand women within patriarchy,
yet are
often at odds with one another. At
times, Beauvoir’s theories have been labeled “feminist, but
antifeminine”[2]
and Irigaray’s as “essentialist”[3]
towards the feminine. Despite these
negative descriptions and the differences between Beauvoir and Irigaray,
their
useful and convergent concepts can be used to better understand women’s
oppression and to formulate a possible solution.
Simone
de Beauvoir and Existentialism
In positing the question “What is a
woman?” Simone de Beauvoir seeks to understand the state of women’s
oppression
and subordination. Her answer blames the
system of patriarchy, which defines the male as the standard for all
normality,
locates women’s defectiveness as naturally occurring within her biology,
and
traps the female in the immanence of her facticity/biology.[4] Following Beauvoir’s existentialist
perspective, woman is not regarded as an autonomous individual but
rather as
the Other, in opposition to man, the Subject.
In Heidegger’s existentialist theory, Dasein/the
self, wrought with anxiety,
must continually choose between non-being and being.[5] Fearing nothingness, the self seeks to escape
from existence. “It does this by losing
itself in the bourgeois familiarity of the everyday world of
prefabricated
identity…drift[ing] along towards alienation.”[6] This rejection of freedom is a moral fault or
is done in bad faith. Therefore, the
female sex has a double burden: as humans, they are logically compelled
to
inertia, but as women, they are relegated by men to being an object.
Through myths, created by men and
understood as absolute truths, man/Subject seeks to “attain himself only
through that reality which he is not, which is something other than
himself.”[7] It follows that the myth of the feminine has
served man’s interests by justifying his dominance and privileges. A woman who does not accept herself as a
Subject creates no myths of her own, but rather accepts the myths
presented by
men. Kenneth Burke would label woman’s
inactivity and complacency as “trained incapacity [where the] very
authority
[i.e. patriarchal authority] of their earlier ways interferes with the
adoption
of new ones.”[8]
Nonetheless, Beauvoir holds women
accountable for their failure to transform from the inessential to the
essential because of their lack of solidarity with other women. In reality, both sexes are to blame because
men reject women’s quest for existential freedom and women forgo
transcendence
in exchange for an inauthentic life of material protection and a
male-created
state of being.[9]
Beauvoir also conceives women’s
oppression as functioning within the framework of binary opposition. However, she believes this duality has
existed since primitive society and was not originally correlated with
the
female and male sexes: pairs such as “Sun-Moon, Day-Night, and
Good-Evil”
involved no “feminine element.”[10] Women’s current submissive status within this
duality appears as natural or innate since no cataclysmic historical
event
brought it about. Therefore, Beauvoir
locates the source of woman’s oppression in her socially constructed
biology,
which is regarded as inherently and immutably defective.
Beauvoir rejects the idea that women are destined
by their biology and rejects a hierarchal distinction between binary
opposites. Women must accept the facticity
of their
bodies, and continue to establish a path of transcendence alongside men.[11]
Beauvoir
as Antifeminine?
The egalitarianism that Beauvoir seeks
through existentialist ethics is sometimes labeled “antifeminine”
because it
promotes an “abstract universal and repression of difference.”[12] Luce Irigaray respects Beauvoir’s “work for
social justice” and supports the “maintenance of the liberating horizons
which
[Beauvoir] opened up for many women and men;” however, she faults
Beauvoir for
failing to embrace difference and failing to “give back cultural values
to
female sexuality.[13] Beauvoir’s endorsement of existentialism as a
means for women’s liberation has been criticized for its masculine and
patriarchal origins. Women are forced to
emulate the masculine standard of transcendence, which is considered as
“antifeminine.”
Such an analysis overlooks Beauvoir’s
key statements on women, men, and existentialism. Beauvoir
anticipated such criticisms in The Second Sex. She explains that all of women’s goals,
including their attempts at transcendence, have been dismissed as
“masculine
protest,” or as efforts to imitate the male rather than as being solely
done
for women’s own sake.[14] This is circular reasoning: Beauvoir is
faulted with espousing masculine existentialism, but this accusation
also
operates under a male-as-normative belief system, which fails to view
women as
autonomous individuals.
Irigaray believes that “the
philosophical order has to be questioned, and disturbed, in as much as
it
covers over sexual difference.”[15] Beauvoir does exactly what Irigaray posits by
re-working masculine philosophy and making it belong to women. Drawing upon Sartre’s existentialist methods,
Beauvoir formulated her own existential philosophical model, which, when
applied to women, could blaze a path to liberation.
Concerning sexual difference, Beauvoir
explicitly acknowledges the difference between women and men in both
reproduction and sexuality:
There will always be certain
differences between man
and woman; her eroticism, and therefore her sexual world, have a special
form
of their own and therefore cannot fail to engender a sensuality, a
sensitivity,
of a special nature.[16]
Therefore, it is apparent that just as
Irigaray seeks to locate women’s self outside the patriarchal system
through
the creation of a new sexual identity, Beauvoir does the same: she
reshapes
women’s sexuality and reproduction outside of patriarchal myths.
Luce Irigaray and
Sexual Difference
Using
postmodernism instead of existentialism, Luce Irigaray believes there is
no way
to answer, “What is woman?” because the concept of woman does not exist
separate from that of man.[17] The feminine is enveloped within the
masculine, and is reduced to a “position of inferiority, of
exploitation, of
exclusion, [especially] with respect to language.”[18] In contrast to Beauvoir’s understanding of a
hierarchically defined dualism between woman and man, Irigaray maintains
that
women and men are both represented by only one sex: the male. “The feminine has never been defined, except
as the inverse [or] the underside of the masculine.”[19]
It
appears that Beauvoir and Irigaray’s understandings of women are more
similar
than different: both seem correct in their interpretations. “The Reign of the One [the reign of the male
standard] is built on a binarism.”[20] Therefore, the phallogocentric system tricks
women into believing that they occupy a place (albeit a subordinate one)
in the
binary opposition. This is an illusion,
because in reality, women’s place or identity is merely that which has
been
created for them by men. To believe in a
“concept of femininity…is to allow [women] to be caught up in a system
of
‘masculine’ representations which serves the auto-affection of the
[male]
subject.”[21] Although Beauvoir declares, “we must discard
the vague notions of superiority, inferiority, [and] equality,”[22]
she seeks women’s equality with men along a horizontal axis within a
binary
system. Irigaray would find this goal
impossible because for her, the binary system only serves the interests
of a
patriarchal system. Ultimately, the
elimination of patriarchy (a goal for both Beauvoir and Irigaray) would
align
their perspectives.
Irigaray
correlates the female identity with Matter in its capacity for
receptivity to
molding by the male world. Matter has no
reality; it aspires towards “Real-Being” but essentially is a “phantasm”
of
existence. Matter is without a soul,
intellect, or life: it is non-existence.[23] This recognition, applied to woman, is
similar to Beauvoir’s views of woman as inessential.
For both Beauvoir and Irigaray, the
phallogocentric world relegates women to passivity, receptivity, and
submissiveness. Elaine Miller takes the
concept of the feminine as Matter even further.[24] The feminine is not excluded or repressed
from Hegel’s dialectic, but rather is insidiously “domesticated and
incorporated as the one who provides for the impulsive progress of the
Spirit.”[25] Therefore, like Matter, woman “is eternally
present without ever truly entering into the realm of the community.”[26]
Woman/Matter
is “like a mirror, showing things as in itself when they are really
elsewhere,
filled in appearance but actually empty, containing nothing, pretending
everything.”[27] This is another parallel between Beauvoir and
Irigaray: they describe woman as a mirror reflecting man’s identity,
especially
the philosopher’s identity. Beauvoir
explains this as existentialist oppression where man seeks recognition
and
identification in making woman an Object.
For Irigaray, the female is compelled to mimicry because she can
mirror
“all impressions without appropriating them to [herself] and without
adding any.”[28] Women, like Matter, take on no particular
form or identity: this necessitates women to locate their nature and
experiences outside of the masculine-defined realm, the realm of
“Real-Being”. Otherwise, women will remain
mere “reservoirs
of matter and of speculation.”[29] Again, this applies to Beauvoir’s view that
women must find their identity through transcendence, which exists
outside of
their patriarchal-prescribed immanence.
Difference or
Equality
For
Irigaray, the liberation of women can only occur through recognition of
the
sexual difference, which “is probably the issue in our time [that] could
be our
salvation if we thought it through.”[30] Because the self has always been defined as
masculine, women must rethink their identity and create a female
subject. An ethics of alterity is desired
over an
ethics that combines the sexes into one universal self, which is based
on
masculine imaginary.[31] An ethics based on difference relates to
Beauvoir’s goals in existentialism. As
Subjects, women and men must both affirm their existence as non-being. This can only be accomplished through
freedom, which is dependent upon reciprocity, “by engaging itself in the
world.”[32] Reciprocity and alterity do not necessitate
conflict, but rather they accept difference.[33]
The
quest for equality presupposes that the male is the standard for
normalcy, a
standard that women must attain. Women
then strive to be like men, or to become men.
Through laws and social equality, women are more often treated as
men;
however, they are never treated explicitly as women.
Can women find their own standard of
normalcy, which would locate the concept within their own identity?
“To
demand equality as a woman is a mistaken expression of a real objective. The demand to be equal presupposes a point of
comparison.”[34] Actually, Christine Littleton argues that
equality is a mathematical impossibility because “only things that are
the same
can ever be equal.”[35] Why do women allow themselves to be measured
to any standard, which excludes a variety of individuals?
Patriarchal notions of power and control set
up the guidelines of binary opposition, which force women to strive for
equality or superiority to men. Regardless
of the fact that such a goal is futile within patriarchy, women’s innate
differences remain devalued instead of being recognized, celebrated, and
respected. “The human species is divided
into two genders which ensure its
production and reproduction. To wish to
get rid of sexual difference is to call for genocide.”[36]
Although
Beauvoir strives for a politics of equality, she also proposes an ethics
of
ambiguity and alterity. Debra Bergoffen
and Emily Zakin understand Beauvoir to project a “muted voice” in her
works
that “lends itself to an association with, and reclamation of feminine
sexual
difference than the more ascendant voice at times explicitly refuses.”[37] Does Beauvoir’s concept of equality mean
equal rights in uniformity? Or does her
notion of “differences in equality”[38]
correlate with Irigaray’s concept of multiplicity and sexual difference? Since Beauvoir writes that the emancipation
of woman must entail a release from her relations to man and an
independent
existence,[39]
it
seems appropriate to align her more closely with Irigaray.
Furthermore, “one can interpret Beauvoir,
like Irigaray, as understanding sexual difference to be indispensable to
a
theory of inter-subjectivity. The final
sentence of The Second Sex affirms
“fraternité” between women and men “by and through their natural
differentiation.”[40]
Sexual
difference also plays a major role in the transformation of language to
properly recognize the feminine.
Currently, language holds no self-representation for women
because man
has appropriated the feminine into his language. All
language, philosophy, and thought are
monopolized by men; therefore, “the creation of language – in all forms –
by
the maternal has been barred since the origins of our culture.”[41] The patriarchal culture has relegated women
to biological reproduction and has excluded the “maternal” from the
construction of language. If women are
denied time, place, and space to exert their existence as subjects, and
denied
language to speak the feminine, how can they begin to transform social
discourse? Irigaray explains that
“miming the mimes” is the most effective transformation of language and
communication that women can accomplish within a phallogocentric system.
Irigaray and the
“Miming of the Mimes”
In
deliberately assuming the feminine function of mimicry, women can thwart
the working
of patriarchal culture by converting their subordination into
affirmation.[42] Irigaray explains this concept as a way for
women to re-create themselves as Subjects through the alteration of
their
culturally (male) defined behaviors.
Women can “mime the mimes” by presenting themselves to society in
ways
that 1) reveal that which should remain concealed, and 2) can exaggerate
the
ridiculous notions of the feminine ideal as defined by the masculine.
A
perfect example of Irigaray’s radical prescription of “miming the mimes”
is the
unconventional work/creations of contemporary artist Kristina Sheryl
Wong. Through a fictional mail-order bride
website,
Wong turns the tables on the oppressor by miming the myth of Asian
female
sexuality.[43] The idea behind Wong’s site is “to catch the
oppressor in the act of oppression and use [her] personal sense of humor
as a
political force. [She] subverts the
expectations of a nasty guy in search of petite naked Asian bodies by
showing
him the full ugliness of ‘sweet Asian girls.’”[44] The women featured on this website are gross
and hilarious: anything but the stereotypical diminutive Asian woman. One photograph features an Asian woman in a
kimono wearing a Miss Chinatown pageant ribbon and crown.
She is also pimple-faced, biting a cigar
between her scowling lips, wearing glasses, giving the finger, and
holding a
bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey while sitting on a toilet.
As Kenneth Burke states, “humor tends to be
conservative, the grotesque tends to be revolutionary.”[45]
“Miming
the mimes” is a rebellious reaction to a patriarchal culture that
oppresses
women and limits their capacity for freedom.
Like hysterics who were subconsciously revolting against the
restrictions of Victorian society, women today must consciously reject
the
culturally prescribed ideals of femininity.
“Only through using its own techniques can patriarchy be
challenged and
displaced.”[46]
Section
Two: Language - Never Neutral, Always Weighted
Kenneth
Burke writes, “language is an implement of action, a device which takes
its
shape by the cooperative patterns of the group that uses it.”[47] The insight behind this statement reveals the
importance of the “cooperation” between the individuals who use, create,
experience, and manipulate language.
Language can be a helpful, communicative tool when people
understand and
respect each another. Language is a
social creation and it reflects social ideology. Since
“vocabularies” are greater than mere
words, they are powerful tools manipulated in many ways; under
oppressive
conditions, they are employed by “institutional structures” to maintain
control
and hegemony.[48] Given that a patriarchal system currently
dominates society, men monopolize all existing language, communication,
philosophy, and thought.[49] “A rupture with the continuum of domination
must also occur with a rupture with the vocabulary of domination.”[50] Therefore, language and societal norms must
be transformed for women’s liberation to materialize.
A transformed language of liberation would
locate women outside of the patriarchal system through the provision of
their
own space and the recognition of their different identities.
Women
and Language
Girls
are at a disadvantage because they are socialized by language in a
patriarchal
culture that idealizes the male sex.
Verbal and non-verbal communication expose a male bias:
male-associated
behaviors are valued over female-associated ones. Gender
stereotyping is reinforced by the use
of “he” as a generic pronoun which subsumes women under masculine
speech. [51] Man gives the universe his own gender, as he
gives his own name to his wife and children.[52] Only property or objects which men dominate,
control, possess, or conquer (i.e. boats, cars, cities, nations,
governments)
are referred to by the feminine pronoun “she.”
“Man feminizes the ideal he sets up before him as the essential
Other,
because woman is the material representation of alterity; almost all
allegories, in language and in pictorial representation, are women.”[53] Women fail to have an autonomous or
independent existence; they are denied sexual difference and are
objectified by
men through language.
Sigmund
Freud’s use of language, in his psychological theories, has perpetuated
male
supremacy and female dependency.
Psychiatrist Peter Breggin believes “psychoanalysis, like much
psychiatry was founded on the betrayal of women and children.”[54] Freud’s sexist beliefs were accepted as
scientific facts and served to label women as deficient by noting their
lack of
a penis. A new oppressive language arose
out of psychoanalysis that trapped women with adjectives like “passive”
and
“helpless.” These “typically female”
behaviors were now seen as biologically inherent: rebellious actions
were seen
to result from “penis envy.” Breggin
explains that women who resist patriarchal/male controls chance being
labeled
insane and risk institutionalization.[55]
Although
psychoanalysis has been detrimental to women, feminist philosophers Luce
Irigaray and Julie Kristeva use Freud and Lacan’s theories to overthrow
the
symbolic order and to create a novel approach towards understanding
sexual
difference. Irigaray challenges the
existing language of psychoanalysis and represents women in terms
outside of
the phallogocentric model. In turning
the philosopher’s/psychoanalyst’s theories upside-down, she “re- or
de-form[s]
language, discursive structures, and representational systems [and]
formulate[s] alternatives, discourses, and models that can re-occupy
[women’s]
space and accommodate women’s specificity.”[56] An example of this is Irigaray’s feminist
deconstruction of Freud’s psychoanalysis: she dismantles his oppressive
theories and reconstructs women outside of his phallogocentric model.[57]
Language
and speech provide an example of why equality can be a dangerous goal in
obtaining women’s liberation. A study
performed by Luce Irigaray resulted in the observation that women and
men’s
speech is sexed: similar attributes were found in women’s responses that
differed
from men’s.[58] An important difference is the usage of the
word I (je). Men frequently
use “I” to describe themselves
as subjects in various situations; however, women “erase” themselves by
using
the word “one” to explain themselves.[59] Ultimately, women have difficulty in
identifying themselves as subjects because of the “weight” of the
normative
usage of the masculine pronoun “he.”
Women “do not yet think in the feminine.”[60]
Women’s
speech is also understood to be polite and unassuming, rather than
straightforward and logical. Social
Psychologist Carol Tavris explains that women’s language is the language
of the
subordinate:
If you play a subordinate role
in society, you would
learn to persuade and influence, rather than assert and demand. You would anticipate others needs…and give
attention to others feelings. In short
you would develop a ‘woman’s language.’
But these characteristics develop from a power imbalance, not
from an
inherent deficiency.[61]
Linguist Robin Lakoff indicates that women
use “empty adjectives” (i.e. lovely),
qualifiers (i.e. kind of ), a
questioning inflection when speaking a statement, the word “so” with a
descriptive adjective (i.e. so much love),
and hypercorrect grammar when speaking.[62] These characteristics of women’s speech are
seen as subordinate to the commanding nature of men’s speech. This comparison between women and men implies
that men’s speech is the desired standard to which women’s speech must
be
measured. Therefore, women who seek
equality by imitating men’s speech support the phallogocentric notion
that
men’s speech is normative, superior, and the standard to uphold. This diminishes the potential for women to
embrace their own diversity and individuality.
Irigaray
would argue that women’s speech is not their own: it ultimately arises
from a phallogocentric
economy. Therefore, women cannot
articulate their own words or find their true identity until they can
situate
themselves outside of the masculine imaginary.
However, one must question the possibility of women’s independent
articulation of anything outside of the phallogocentric system when
everything
is a product of it. Even “the ethical
bent from which one approaches the universe is itself a part of the
universe.”[63] However, Irigaray does recognize that one
must be aware of existing language and traditions in order to transform
them. This is necessary to prevent
individuals from making the same mistakes: “to progress and not regress
on the
path of human civilization.”[64] The identification of our values, culture,
and society as “monosexist, monogendered, falsely universal, and
partially
imperialistic”[65]
is the
launching pad for women to create a unique subjectivity, respecting that
we are
all different from each other.
If
both women and language function as social mirrors, then what is the
connection
between women and language? Do
oppressors, in their quest for transcendence and power, use both women
and
language as objects and tools? If so, do
women have the power within themselves to use language to attain their
own
liberation and transcendence? If women’s
oppression is due to socially created customs and practices, then the
answer
lies in eradicating these customs and practices. Language
mirrors and reinforces social
values; however, a transformation of language designed to promote
desired
social values might be a catalyst for social change.
The
ambiguity described by Beauvoir is based upon the ubiquitous dependence
and
reciprocity between human beings: every Subject depends on the Other for
a
sense of self. Judith Butler underscores
this human concatenation through her explanation of the act of naming,
by which
individuals address others and are themselves addressed.[66] She explains, “one is dependent upon another
for one’s name;” therefore, as interpellated beings, we are subjected to
a
“linguistic vulnerability” essential to the creation of one’s identity. [67]
Oftentimes,
individuals are labeled with names that do not accurately reflect their
own
self-vision. Unfortunately, names define
the space in which one exists and they “construct a social
positionality.”[68] In addition, the “authority of the ‘voice’ of
interpellation,”[69]
makes
it a difficult task for individuals to ignore names that are forced upon
them. By understanding oneself outside
of a socially prescribed identity, one no longer is bound to it. The rejection of oppressive names or labels
is a response to the very act of being named in the first place. This rejection would result in a new or
different consciousness as well as innovative discourse, resulting in an
original
self-created space and pattern of communication between individuals.[70]
Irigaray
might reconfigure
I don’t take you as an object
of my love or
desire. I love you as irreducibly
other. I keep a “to” as an inalienable
space between us, as a guarantor of your freedom and mine.[72]
This would imply two autonomous subjects
who co-exist together without the need to make each other objects or
abandon
their own identities. In concurring with
Irigaray, Beauvoir posits a similar mutual recognition of one another as
Subject; ensuring that “the human couple [would] find its true form.”[73]
This
is an example of a new form of communication between women and men that
would
provide an acceptance of sexual difference and freedom.
Another condition in the recognition of one
another as subjects is shared silence.
Silence recognizes the sexual difference by providing space in
which
women and men can exist “each on one’s own and together.”[74] This correlates with the passion of wonder
that is capable of establishing
an ethics of sexual difference that would respect an individual’s
autonomy
while mutually recognizing one another as subject. Wonder
“never takes hold of the other as its
object. It does not try to seize,
possess, or reduce this object, but leaves it subjective, still free.”[75]
All
forms of communication have the potential to influence society either by
strengthening the status quo or by initiating liberation and social
change. Oppressive language confines an
individual to a subordinate or pejorative identity through the denial of
an
autonomous existence. However, it is
precisely
language’s subjugation that spawns the defiance and revolt of the
oppressed
individual. The transformation of
discourse must begin with the individual person and can only arise from
an
awareness of the existing language.
“When one attempts to criticize the structure, one must leave
some parts
of it intact in order to have a point of reference for criticism.”[76] Irigaray restructures the linguistic economy
of exchange between women and men by altering language patterns to give
women a
subjective identity. She does not
propose a total elimination of our current language, but rather a shift
in its
representation of women that provides for a mutual exchange between the
sexes
and welcomes difference. The crucial
factor in the transformation of language is “not waiting passively for
language
to progress,”[77]
but
rather to actively make changes in all forms of communication.
Section
Three: Actions for Social Change
Oppression
of any individual or group cannot be recognized as a social problem
until
society collectively defines it as such.
Sociologist Herbert Blumer postulates that regardless of its
objective
makeup, a malignant condition in society remains ignored until it is
defined by
and conceived in society as problematic.[78] Although it seems rational that a tangible
injustice would warrant immediate action, this “rationality” does not
apply. For example, domestic violence
occurred for centuries; yet, it was not seen as a social problem worth
addressing until the early 1970’s. The
question then becomes, how do we make society aware of oppression and
other
crises?
Piety,
more pervasive than typically assumed, is an obstacle that thwarts most
social
change.[79] “Piety is a schema of orientation”[80]
that exists throughout one’s lifetime.
It promotes stability by reflecting our concrete experiences. Individuals are “victims of a trained
incapacity” [81]
when
piety prevents them from breaking free from detrimental behaviors. Deep-rooted past experiences prevent the
acceptance of new values, understandings, and/or paths of action. The notion of change, including the adoption
of different beliefs, elicits fear in most people. Oftentimes,
an “obedience to reigning symbols
of authority [is] natural…[and] the rejection of them [is] painful.”[82] Marcuse writes, “impoverishment [or
oppression] does not necessarily provide the soil for revolution,
[rather] a
highly developed consciousness, and imagination generate[s] the need for
radical change.”[83] Therefore, the trappings of piety prevail
even under exploitive conditions.
Because people are an integral part of a social system, the
rejection of
the system is, to some extent, a rejection of themselves.
Liberation
and social change stand in direct opposition to the prevailing interests
of
both oppressors and the obliviously oppressed.[84] “Oppression is explained by the tendency of
the existent [Subject/man] to flee from himself by means of
identification with
the other [Object/woman], who he oppresses to that end.”[85] To liberate women would be terrifying because
men would lose dominance and absolute authority. In
making women objects, men seek
recognition, identity, and avoidance of his freedom.
Women’s state of inferiority is neither
innate nor mutually dependent upon man’s superiority: sovereignty can be
shared
by both sexes. The question remains,
‘Can we replace our piety with impiety and establish a path of
transcendence
for women alongside men’s?’[86]
Burke
assigns the poet the task of consciousness raising in challenging piety
with
impiety. This would necessitate a
“rejection of repressive instinctual needs and values.”[87] This would lead society to understand and
define oppression as a problem worth addressing. To
choose the “path of greater resistance”[88]
embraces impiety by acting out one’s role in the transformation of
language,
cultural norms, and society. Feminist
philosopher Catherine MacKinnon promotes consciousness raising as the
feminist
method necessary to create a collective understanding that women’s
experience
is universal.[89] In addition to Burke’s poets, however, there
must be other avenues to liberation and social change.
One
possible step towards the elimination of women’ oppression is the
dissemination
of feminist philosophy to the general public.
Philosophy is rewarding and insightful; however, it is practiced
infrequently because it fails to reach most individuals.
Without an audience, any written work remains
stagnant and immaterial. Although
intellectuals provide an audience for philosophy, they do not comprise a
large
enough number of people to bring forth social awareness en masse.
Philosophy
today is like a rain cloud: somewhat ethereal and difficult to reach,
yet
essential for growth, development, and change.
The earth depends on rain for growth and regeneration of life;
however,
it must wait for particular pressure systems to collide and create a
rain
cloud. Fortunately, individuals have
more control over the distribution of philosophy than they do over the
weather. Society needs feminist
philosophy to rain down and permeate our lives.
Otherwise, philosophy lacks practical application and fails to
live up
to its potential. Simone de Beauvoir
created a powerful feminist manifesto in The
Second Sex, but not many individuals have read it outside the
classroom. How many leaders incorporate
Catherine MacKinnon’s perspective in the creation of public policy? How many people actively re-oriented their
lives because of feminist philosophy?
The Age of Enlightenment was a
promising example of philosophy’s permeation into people’s lives, which
stimulated great social change. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the philosophy of John Locke, Jean
Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Hobbes promoted education, freedom, and
self-realization. It directly influenced
the general public and shaped many aspects of the American Revolution. This influence was mostly due to an increase
in overall literacy, especially among women.
The rise in literacy led to self-growth and the declaration of
rising
expectations. Many “commoners” read
philosophy
because the printed word was fashionable and easily accessible. Philosophical works reached a vast group of
readers and helped to create a previously unidentified consciousness. Both reading and writing facilitated women’s
independent pursuit of knowledge. Their
new autonomy led to the early development of feminist literature. Tantamount to the growth of women’s writing
was the growth of women’s consciousness.
Solidarity replaced isolation among women who previously lacked
the
‘means’ to communicate with one another.[90]
Inspired by Enlightenment philosophy,
thinkers like Mary Wollstonecraft and Judith Sargent Murray sought to
create a
place for women in post-American Revolution society.[91] Ultimately, proto-feminist philosophy,
coupled with the newly found acts of writing and reading, fostered
empowerment
and awareness in women heretofore unseen.
Although the Age of Enlightenment provided neither a cure-all nor
a
completely inclusive philosophy, it did challenge and revolutionize
assumptions
about women. Our current society needs a
new Age of Enlightenment that would engage everyone in intellectual
theories so
as to bring about women’s liberation through social awareness and
change.
Even the exclusive and misogynistic
philosophy of the Enlightenment resulted in subversive, rebellious, and
radical
action, which spawned the emergence of women’s written word and
proto-feminist
thought. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
ultimately believed that capitalist society would be the catalyst to its
own
eradication; capitalism would forge the weapons that would bring death
to
itself.[92]
They propose that although communism is the
absolute goal, it would be impossible to attain without the experience
of
capitalism. It appears that the
Enlightenment and its effects on women share a similar pattern. Although the Enlightenment produced both
negative and positive outcomes, it was vital to the creation of women’s
liberation philosophy.
Similarly, patriarchal society might
also be the catalyst for its own destruction.
Social systems are fluid: they undergo a “dynamic process of
creation and
re-creation from one moment to the next.”[93] Therefore, patriarchy will inevitably
change. Furthermore, patriarchy becomes
increasingly vulnerable because of the vast oppression it fosters. A system that produces instability and denies
human rights will eventually lead to its own demise.
Patriarchy will soon crumble. However,
every individual has the potential
to play a role in shortening the amount of time that patriarchy exists.[94]
Concrete
Steps for Social Change
Awareness and solidarity is crucial in
this quest. Currently, liberation is
stymied by the integration of women into the system of patriarchy.[95] This tactic cleverly convinces women that
patriarchy serves their needs.
Permitting a small number of women to occupy positions of
authority (i.e.
politicians, CEO’s, or Supreme Court justices) seems to demonstrate
intolerance
for discrimination; however, this is an illusion. Women
are kept pacified and ignorant of the
real need for social change because they are focused on small issues of
equality;
they close their eyes to the cultural misogyny that lurks within
patriarchy. [96] The struggle for equal rights has merit in
resolving short-term issues, but fails to address the over-riding
oppressive
system.[97]
Irigaray’s impious appeal to surpass
the goal of equality through embracing the sexual difference “attacks
the kinds
of linkages already established”[98]
by most branches of feminism. When
looking through a patriarchal perspective, women fearfully refrain from
measuring themselves to men and their accomplishments.
When focusing on the sexual difference, it is
imperative to avoid labeling these differences as deficiencies.[99] Women might feel marginalized in their
rejection of the phallogocentric system because it encompasses most of
their
realities. Therefore, a new space and
consciousness needs to be created for women, which acknowledges their
capacity
as unique, autonomous beings. “It is not
adequate to simply affirm women’s value and worth in a culture that
leaves no
space for value and worth other than the masculine.”[100]
A strategy for equality will never be
sufficient because it ignores the differences between individuals. [101] The qualities and values offered by both
sexes need to be respected.
Consequently, laws need to take into account the sexual
difference in
order to assure equivalent social status for women and men.[102]
Laws created in light of sexual
difference would give back what patriarchy has appropriated as men’s
possessions; including “women’s bodies, natural space, the economy of
signs and
images, and social and religious representation.”[103] Women’s bodies would no longer be used as
objects for commercial purposes, especially in advertising, which
infantilizes
and sexualizes women so as to sell products.
Rather, there would be realistic representations of women
throughout
society. Such representations would
promote sexual difference preventing a woman from losing herself in the
phallogocentric society and forgetting her own sex.[104] A practical application of this is the right
to identity, which would eradicate women and girls as “objects of
exchange
between men in our culture.”[105] Neither virginity, nor motherhood would be
reducible to financial exchange.
Motherhood must be recognized as a choice rather than a necessity
of
female identity; “enforced maternity brings into the world wretched
infants.”[106] Women must also be provided legal access to
contraception and abortion. The
mystification of maternity would be exposed as a male-created attempt to
imprison women by relegating their entire identity to reproductive
functions
within the category of Nature.[107]
Women would be granted space to have
their voices heard and to create an autonomous self.
This requires the female to renounce her
identity with Matter, which occupies no space.
She will become a subject: one who would be responsible for
promoting
change in the perception of the relation between matter and form. The facilitation of “women-among-themselves,
[in order] to learn to formulate their desires, in the absence of
immediate
pressures and oppressions,” [108]
might be accomplished through the promotion of single-sexed education. Another possibility would be MacKinnon’s
prescription for consciousness raising; both possibilities seek
separation from
male-oriented identification.
Consciousness-raising groups, without the presence of men, allow
women
to occupy social space often dominated by men.
In addition, women would be free to abandon their usual
competition for
men’s attention and approval, and would become free to reject “men’s
version of
reality.”[109] By recapturing this space and by
consciousness raising, women would begin to “become a sex for
themselves.”[110]
Conclusion
Indeed the time has come to
emphasize the multiplicity
of female expressions and preoccupations so that from the intersection
of these
differences there might arise a more precisely, less commercially and
more
truthfully, the real fundamental
difference between the two sexes.[111]
The material used
in articulating the
views expressed in this paper comes from a variety of feminist
theorists,
philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists.
It illustrates the possibility of uniting a variety of feminist
scholarship so as to better address the problem of women’s oppression. Each unique perspective seeks to improve the
relations between all humans and to provide people with liberation and
social
justice. Rejecting or ignoring the needs
and opinions of any one individual or group serves to further distance
individuals from one another. Therefore,
pitting feminists against one another serves to maintain the patriarchal
stronghold by diverting attention from women’s real oppression and
focusing it
instead on how feminists argue with one another. Although
an effective ploy used to degrade
the women’s movement, it must be recognized and stopped.
We must welcome our differences, embrace a
multiplicity of perspectives, and work towards guaranteeing individual
rights
for all individuals. Irigaray accurately
states, “there are multiple groups and tendencies in women’s struggles
today,
and to reduce them to a single movement involves a risk of introducing
phenomena of hierarchization [and] claims of orthodoxy.”[112]
Linguistic exchange needs to be
modified to provide parity between women and men.[113] Although not an all-encompassing tool,
language must be revised to accurately reflect both sexes.
This would trump patriarchy’s silencing of
women and would promote women as speaking subjects.
In addition to providing mutual recognition,
a facet of language must be kept “between women” or “parler-femme,”
which would rupture “masculine sameness in order to
express the plurality and mutuality of feminine difference.” [114] Speaking must be understood as having the
potential to reconstruct the conditions that we live in with one
another.[115] In this sense, all forms of communication can
direct social change. Repetition is the
key to gradually increasing one’s comfort level and awareness.
Ultimately, we must affirm women's
lack of being and choose existence: existence as non-beings. We are all subjects, not objects, and
subjectivity grants freedom. Freedom
entails reciprocity; one’s freedom is dependent upon another’s. We must accept this ambiguity and understand
ourselves as individuals and parts of a collective.
Oppression results from the denial of
ambiguity, which also becomes a denial of freedom.[116]
Freedom is chosen and must be achieved and maintained with every
decision.
A wonderful directive to choose
freedom comes from Irigaray:
Women, stop trying.
You have been taught that you were property, private or public,
belonging to one man or all. That
therein lay your pleasure. And that,
unless you gave in to man’s, or men’s desires, you would not know sexual
pleasure. If you disobeyed, you were the
cause of your own unhappiness. So ask
yourselves just what ‘nature’ is speaking along their theoretical or
practical
lines. And if you find yourselves
attracted by something other than what their
laws, rules, and rituals prescribe, realize that – perhaps- you have
come
across your ‘nature.’ Don’t
even go looking for that alibi. Do what
comes to mind, do what you like:
without ‘reasons,’ without ‘valid motives,’ without ‘justification.’ You have so many continents to explore that
if you set up borders for yourselves you won’t be able to ‘enjoy’ all of
your
own ‘nature.’[117]
By
following this advice, women will create their own true identities. They will no longer be the mere fabrications
of men.
[1] Other sources from various disciplines will
also be
used in this paper; however, the works of these four individuals will
comprise
the bulk of my argument.
[2] Emily Zakin, “Differences in Equality:
Beauvoir’s
Unsettling of the Universal,” The Journal
of Speculative Philosophy 14.2 (2000): 104.
[3] Judith Butler, Bodies
That Matter: On the Discourse of the Limits of Sex (New York, New
York:
Routledge, 1993), 47.
[4] Simone de Beauvoir, The Second
Sex (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxi.
Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (New
York, New York: Citadel Press, 1948),
102.
[5] Martin Heidegger, Being
and Time (New York, New York: Harper, 1962), 164-235, in Josephine
Donovan,
Feminist Theory (New York, New York:
Continuum, 1996), 118-119.
[6] Donovan, Feminist
Theory, 119.
[7] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 139.
[8] Kenneth Burke, Permanence
and Change (Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1954),
23.
[9] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, xxiii-xxvii.
[10] Ibid., xxiii.
Although Beauvoir states that there was no initial hierarchy
between
these polar opposites, I believe that there has been an established
hierarchy,
at least since Pythagoras and Aristotle.
Women have been associated with the lesser/inferior/negative side
of the
pair. For example, women have been
associated with night/moon/evil and man with day/sun/good.
Although in Asian religions, the yin-yang
functions as two equal partners in a complementary pair, this ideology
has not
been adopted by Western cultures.
Instead, “women were placed on a vertical hierarchy below men,
rather
than along a horizontal axis with masculinity and femininity as its two
polarities.” Quoted from Anthony
Fletcher, Gender, Sex and Subordination
in
[11] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 717.
[12] Zakin, 104.
[13] Luce Irigaray, je,
tu, nous Toward a Culture of Difference
(New York, New York: Routledge, 1993), 13.
[14] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 51.
[15] Luce Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1985),
159.
[16] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 731.
[17] Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One, 122.
[18] Ibid., 161.
[19] Ibid., 159.
[20] Luce Irigaray, to
speak is never neutral (
[21] Ibid., 122-123.
[22] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, xxxiii.
[23] Luce Irigaray, Speculum
of the Other Woman (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1985), 168.
[24] Elaine Miller is an Assistant Professor of
Philosophy
at
[25] Elaine P. Miller, “The ‘Paradoxical
Displacement:’
Beauvoir and Irigaray on Hegel’s Antigone,” The
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 14.2 (2000): 125.
Miller then states that “the masculine
utilization of the feminine is not merely oppressive or repressive; it
is productive.” (my
emphasis)
[26] Irigaray, Speculum
of the Other Woman, 125.
[27] Ibid., 169.
[28] Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One, 151.
[29] Ibid., 155.
[30] Luce Irigaray, An
Ethics of Sexual Difference (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press,
1993), 5.
[31] Ibid., 121.
[32] Beauvoir, The
Ethics of Ambiguity, 78.
[33] Neither Beauvoir nor Irigaray support
Sartre’s belief
that alterity results in conflict. In
contrast to the “Sartrean concept of the sexual encounter as a
sadomasochistic
overcoming of one subject by the other, in Levinas’ view [as well as
Irigaray
and Beauvoir] the sexual encounter implies a recognition and acceptance
of the
other’s alterity.” In Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists
(St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1989), 144.
[34] Irigaray, je,
tu, nous, 12.
[35] Christine Littleton, “Reconstructing Sexual
Equality,”
[36] Irigaray, je,
tu, nous, 12.
[37] Zakin., 105. Emily
Zakin
is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at
[38] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 731.
[39] Ibid., 731.
[40] Miller, 135.
Miller reads Beauvoir in that the “feminine can not simply be
understood
as assimilation into a preexisting, atomistic, purportedly neutral and
yet
implicitly masculine conception of subjectivity (122).”
I agree with her position.
[41] Irigaray, to
speak is never neutral, 257 and This
Sex Which is Not One, 165.
[42] Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One, 76.
[43] The following information is from Karen Eng,
“The
Princess and the Prankster: Two Women who Take on Art, Ethnicity, and
Sexuality,” Bitch magazine 18 (Fall
2002): 29-35.
[44] Kristina Sheryl Wong’s website www.bigbadchinesemama.com.
[45] Burke, Permanence
and Change, 112. Through the
reclamation of her own female sexuality, Wong reveals her anger towards
men who
fetishize about the culturally prescribed Asian ideal.
She recognizes that men commodify Asian
women, pornography, or objects, but on her website, “men cannot buy
these
women. They are not for sale!”
[46] Grosz, 133.
[47] Burke, Permanence
and Change, 173.
[48] Ibid., 182.
[49] Both Luce Irigaray and Herbert Marcuse
express this
view. The references are: Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, 165 and
Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation
(Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1969), 33.
[50] Marcuse, An
Essay on Liberation, 33.
[51] Although dated, Psychologist Donald G. MacKay
identifies the use of the masculine pronoun “he” as a “highly effective
propaganda technique: frequent
repetition, early age of acquisition (before age 6), covertness (“he” is
not
thought of as propaganda), use of high-prestige sources (including
university
texts and professors), and indirectness (presented as though it were a
matter
of common knowledge).” Donald G. MacKay,
“Prescriptive grammar and the pronoun problem,” Language,
gender, and society, eds. B. Thorne, C. Kramarae, and N.
Henley (Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House, 1983), 38-53. Found in Laurel Richardson, “Gender
Stereotyping in the English Language,” Feminist
Frontiers II, eds. Laurel Richardson and Verta Taylor (New York, New
York:
McGraw-Hill, 1989), 6.
[52] Irigaray, Je,
tu, nous, 31.
[53] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 179.
[54] Peter Breggin explains that Freud originally
believed
his female patients’ stories about the physical and sexual abuse in
their
childhood, and concluded that many adult women were suffering with
mental
problems due to the aftermath of sexual abuse as children.
However, when he presented these findings to
the medical community, he was met with overwhelming disapproval. His fellow colleagues did not want to accept
or address these “erroneous” findings.
Under social pressure, Freud quickly changed his theories and
betrayed
his patients with newfound disbelief. He
labeled their claims of abuse as delusions.
“Little girls weren’t being lusted after and abused by their
fathers and
older men. Little girls generated their
own sexual fantasies toward these men and then made up stories about
their
sexual contacts.” Jeffrey Masson, the
former director of the Sigmund Freud Archives, found Freud’s secret
letters,
which explained this. Peter Breggin, Toxic Psychiatry (New York, New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 336-338.
[55] Ibid., 341.
[56] Grosz, Sexual
Subversions, 110.
[57] Ibid., 109.
[58] Luce Irigaray, Je,
tu, nous, 29. She explains that in
the French language 1) “the masculine is always dominant in syntax. Ils
sont marriés (they are married) or ils
sont beaux (they are beautiful).”
Both of these sentences would be used to describe women even
though masculine pronouns and adjectives are
used in
both cases. To include women, these
sentences should be written elles sont
marriées or elles sont belles but
they are not. The traditional usage
“erases the feminine [and] impacts the way subjectivity is experienced
and
expressed in and by discourse.” 2) The
neutral or impersonal is also expressed by the masculine.
The phrases “it’s snowing” (il neige) or “it is
necessary” (il faut) is written using the masculine
form of it: il. It is never
written elle neige or elle faut. These statements appear to represent
something neutral; however, they are expressed by the masculine (30-31).
[59] Luce Irigaray, Why
Different (
[60] Ibid., 50.
[61] Carol Tavris, The
Mismeasure of Women (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992),
298.
[62] Mary Brown Parlee, “Conversational Politics, “Feminist Frontiers, eds. Laurel
Richardson and Verta Taylor (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley
Publishing
Company, 1983), 9.
[63] Burke, Permanence
and Change, 256.
[64] Irigaray, Why
Different, 74.
[65] Ibid., 75.
[66] Judith Butler, “Introduction: On Linguistic
Vulnerability,” in Excitable Speech: A
Politics of the Performative (New York, New York: Routledge, 1997),
28-38.
[67] Ibid., 26, 29-30
[68] Ibid., 33.
[69] Ibid., 31.
[70] This correlates with Marcuse who writes, “The
new
sensibility and the new consciousness…demand a new language to define
and
communicate new “values” (language…which includes words, images,
gestures,
tones).” An Essay on Liberation,
32-33.
[71]
[72] Irigaray, Why
Different, 81.
[73] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 731.
[74] Ibid., 107.
[75] Irigaray, An
Ethics of Sexual Difference, 13.
[76] Burke, Permanence
and Change, 169.
[77] Irigaray, Je,
tu, nous, 32.
[78] Herbert Blumer, “Social Problems as
Collective
Behavior,” Social Problems, 18
(1971), 300.
[79] Burke, Permanence
and Change, 69.
[80] Ibid., 76.
[81] Ibid., 23. “If
people persist longer than chickens in faulty orientation despite
punishment,
it is because the greater complexity of their problems, the vast network
of
mutually sustained values and judgments makes it more difficult for them
to
perceive the nature of the re-orientation required, and to select their
means
accordingly.”
[82] Kenneth Burke, Attitudes
Towards History (Los Angeles, California: University of California
Press,
1984), 226.
[83] Ibid., 15.
[84] Ibid., 17.
[85] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 719.
[86] Ibid., 717.
[87] Marcuse, 17.
[88] Allan G. Johnson, The
Gender Knot: Unraveling Our Patriarchal Legacy (Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania:
Temple University Press, 1997), 233.
[89] Catherine A. MacKinnon, Towards a
Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1989), 83-84.
[90] The word ‘means’ in this case represents
finances,
time, ability, and desire.
[91] Mary Wollstonecraft, A
Vindication of the Rights of Women, ed. Carol H. Poston (New
York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988) and Judith Sargent
Murray, A Brief Biography with Documents, ed.
Shelia Skemp (Boston, Massachusetts: Bedford Books, 1998).
[92] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of
the
Communist Party” in The Marx-Engels
Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1978),
478.
[93] Johnson, 233.
[94] Ibid., 235.
[95] Marcuse, 14.
This statement from Marcuse has been reworded by replacing the
words
“capitalism and workers” with “patriarchy and women” respectively.
[96] Johnson, 13.
[97] Irigaray recognizes the need for
equality-based
pursuits but acknowledges that ultimately it is not enough. “Women’s liberation [must] go beyond a quest
for equality between the sexes…[but] that doesn’t stop me from joining
and
promoting public demonstrations for women to gain this or that right:
the right
to contraception, abortion, legal aid in cases of public or domestic
violence,
the right to freedom of expression – etc., demonstrations generally
supported
by feminists, even if they signify a right to difference.” Je,
tu, nous, 11.
[98] Burke, Permanence
and Change, 87.
[99] Tavris, 287.
[100] Grosz, 179.
[101] A good metaphor for the promotion of
difference over equality
relates to raising children. “Most
parents realize that loving their children equally doesn’t necessarily
require
treating them identically. One child may
need more help with homework. One may
have a gift for athletics or music that warrants special favors. One may have a disability that requires
attention. Most parents intuitively
operate on a notion of equality that encompasses the real differences
between
their children (Tavris, 123)."
[102] The following rights and laws are based on
Irigaray’s
proposal for laws created in light of sexual difference found in Je, tu, nous, 81-92.
[103] Ibid., 86.
[104] Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One, 152
[105] Irigaray, Je,
tu, nous, 87.
[106] Beauvoir, The
Second Sex, 485.
[107] Ibid., “Chapter XVII The Mother,” 484-527.
[108] Ibid., 127.
[109] MacKinnon, 86.
[110] Ibid., 105.
[111] Julia Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” Women,
Knowledge, and Reality, eds. Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall
(New York, New York: Routledge, 1996), 65.
[112] Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One, 164.
[113] Irigaray, Je,
tu, nous, 89.
[114] Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One, 222. To parler-femme or speak as women, is an
experimental process that reveals the connections between female
sexuality and
writing.
[115] Andrea Nye, “The Voice of the Serpent: French
Feminism and Philosophy of Language,” Women,
Knowledge, and Reality, eds. Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (New
York, New
York: Routledge, 1996), 334.
[116] Beauvoir, The
Ethics of Ambiguity, 96-102.
[117] Irigaray, This
Sex Which is Not One, 203-204.