Matthew Baird
Archie
Brown,
Professor of Politics at
Before
examining
the role of parties in the democratization of
For
Dahl, one of
the leading democratization theorists, there are three necessary
conditions for
democracy which include the unimpaired opportunities for citizens to
formulate
their preferences, to signify their preferences, and to have their
preferences
weighed equally in the conduct of government. (Dahl, 1971, p2) Dahl also
describes a number of institutional guarantees which promote these three
conditions. These have been modified by Brown to include; freedom to
form and
join political organizations, freedom of expression and access to
alternative
sources of information, the right to vote in free and fair elections,
the right
to compete for public office, political accountability and the rule of
law.
(Brown, 2001, p546) For Dahl democratization can be measured on a two
dimension
scale which takes into account public contestation and participation. He
argues
that because no large real-world system is fully democratized, it is
more
useful to focus on the term polyarchy. Dahl defines polyarchy as a
‘regime that
has been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly
inclusive
and extensively open to public contestation.’
(Dahl,
1971, p8)
When
described
in these terms, political parties would appear to be central to
democracy, as
they can play an important role in the formulation and representation of
preferences. In fact, Gunther & Diamond have outlined a number of
functions
which political parties perform. (Gunther
&
Diamond, 2001, pp7-8) Primarily they identify the role of parties in
elections,
carrying out the important tasks of candidate nomination and electoral
mobilization. Parties help to structure the issues which are prominent
in
society, representing different social bases. They engage in interest
aggregation which makes the formation of government easier, playing an
important role in sustaining the governmental process. Parties can also
play an
important role in social integration, facilitating citizen participation
in the
political process. This list is not meant to be exhaustive but it does
provide
a basis for understanding why parties are important to democracy.
However, this
list focuses on the role of parties in established democracies and it
may not
be as applicable to the role of parties in democratization. Fish builds
on this
argument by noting that if parties are defined in terms of their pursuit
of
placing representatives in government positions, or as groups that
nominate
candidates for election to a legislature, then the concept of parties in
Nevertheless,
the
role of political parties cannot be denied as
Throughout
the
Soviet period self-organized political associations had been suppressed
by the
central regime. The only political party was the Communist Party of the
Soviet
Union (CPSU), which dominated Soviet political life. In 1985 with the
introduction of policies such as glasnost
Gorbachev opened the way for the formation of groups which could
challenge the
old order. Initially reforms did not create overtly political
organizations,
but in the spring of 1987 the amendments to Articles 70 & 190 of the
criminal
code did allow for the formation of political associations. (McFaul
&
Markov, 1993, p2) In
Elections
were
held at a national level in 1989 and then at the republican and local
level in
1990, however the new political parties were not sufficiently developed
to
significantly influence either of these ballots. Democratic
This
CPSU
dominance was addressed with the amendment of the Soviet Constitution.
The guarantee
of CPSU monopoly power was rescinded by the Congress of Peoples Deputies
in
March 1990. (DeBardeleben, 1997, p101) By
October the
Soviet Law on Public Associations was passed, giving political parties
and
trade unions official legal standing. These events lead to party
proliferation,
with 457 political or politicized organizations operating in
Throughout
1991
Russian society began to polarize with traditional communists at one end
of the
spectrum and liberal democrats at the other. The election of the office
of
Russian President in June 1991 was largely non-partisan as the multitude
of
democratic parties decided that it was best to support the popular
candidacy of
Yeltsin, rather than risk splitting the reform vote by running their own
candidates. (DeBardeleben, 1997, p180)
As
the situation
in
In
1992
political organizations began to register with the Ministry of Justice,
with
estimates placing the number of parties at around 25 in April 1992. (Sakwa,
1996, p80)
Distinctive programs began to emerge in relation to the economy and
foreign
relations, with political groups dividing into four main blocs: liberals
and
democrats; centrists; national-patriotic movements; and neo-communist
and
revolutionary socialist organizations. (Sakwa,
1996,
p81)
Although
the
liberals and democrats appeared to be in the ascendancy they were prone
to
fragmentation. With the dissolution of Democratic Russia in November
1991 the
reformist tendency began to factionalize. It was not until 1993, with
the
prospects of election on the horizon that parties began to take shape.
Gaidar
led ‘
In
the centrist
bracket there were also a number of parties. One of the most prominent
was the
Democratic Party of Russia, founded by Travkin in the spring of 1990.
(McFaul
& Markov, 1993, p10) After a brief spell within the broader
coalition of
the Civic Union, the DPR emerged as the main centrist party contesting
the 1993
election. Also within the centrist bloc single issue parties
proliferated. They
appealed to sectional groups, including women (Women of Russia), young
people
(Future of Russia – New Names), veterans and the disabled (Dignity and
Charity), as well as interest groups who promoted causes such as the
environment (Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia). (Moser, 2001a,
p14; Sakwa, 1996, p82)
Within
the
nationalist-patriotic grouping the main influence was Zhirinovsky’s
misnamed
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Like the DPR it had been created
before the
break-up of the
The
final
electoral bloc which influenced the political system in the early years
of the
However,
throughout
this period none of these parties exacted any great influence on the
Russian system. They did not impact on the presidency or the formation
of
government, and without elections to contest they were largely
redundant. The
legacy of the Soviet period lead to general distrust for any group which
gave
itself the name ‘party’ and social conditions in Russia did not
facilitate
party formation. The cleavages which are associated with creation of
parties in
established democracies were lacking, in particular class divisions were
underdeveloped as the influence of capitalist market economics had not
been
firmly institutionalized. (McFaul, 2001, pp1169-1170)
In
this context
the election of 1993 was extremely significant as it provided the first
opportunity for parties to play a role in the development of democracy
in
For
Giovanni Sartori the electoral system is
‘the most specific
manipulative instrument in politics’. (Sartori,
in
Moser, 2001b, p195) There is a wide body of literature which describes
the
effects different electoral systems can have but for the most part it is
guided
by some underlying principles developed by Duverger.
(Duverger, 1954; Lijphart,
1994; Rae, 1971; Sartori 1994; Taagepera
& Shugart 1989) Despite some flaws in
the initial
theory, (Sartori, 1994) it is generally
assumed that
proportional representation (PR) systems will promote the development of
multiparty systems, while plurality elections will constrain party
development,
particularly at the district level. (Moser, 2001a, p2)
In
At
this time
there was increasing tension between the legislature and the executive
as both
organs vied for dominance in government. As a result Yeltsin and his
advisors
were preoccupied and could not devote their full attention to the design
of the
electoral system for the Duma. (McFaul,
1999, p41) In
any case, as I will outline below, the elections to the lower house of
the
state legislature, known as the Duma, were
of
secondary importance to Yeltsin as he envisaged a strong Presidential
system,
with the Duma a subordinate body.
Sheinis took this opportunity to promote a mixed
system as
he believed that PR would promote the development of national parties,
while
Single Member Districts (SMDs) elected in plurality elections would
foster the
creation of local party organizations. He also convinced Yeltsin that
this
mixed system would be beneficial to reform parties supportive of his
agenda, in
particular the ‘party of power’, Russia’s Choice. (McFaul, 1999, p41)
McFaul
argues
that this outcome must be seen in the context of the uncertainty which
characterized Russian politics at the time. (McFaul, 1999, pp30-31)The
pressure
on the elite to create a whole range of institutions, combined with the
nascent
party system and a lack of any democratic tradition made it difficult to
predict the effect that multiparty elections would have. Given more time
Yeltsin and his advisors may have adopted a different position, but in
the
midst of a constitutional crisis they needed to provide quick answers to
difficult problems.
On
The
elections
were held on December 12th and produced some surprising
results. Most
notably the success of the LDPR in winning 59 PR seats was unexpected.
Of the 8
parties who overcame the 5% legal threshold they were the most
successful. In
the SMDs a further four parties gained representation, however,
independents gained
the majority with victory in 141 seats. Overall the most successful
party was
A
number of
factors influenced the failure of the electoral system to produce the
expected
outcomes. In particular reformist parties were hurt by their inability
to
coordinate. In 92 SMDs there was more than one reform party candidate,
and in
22 of these seats the sum of the democratic vote was greater than the
share of
the opposition or centrist winner. Conversely there were only 39 SMDs
with more
than one opposition party candidate, and in only 9 of these did the sum
of the
opposition vote exceed the share of the democratic or centrist winner.
If the
democratic reform elite had consolidated they may have achieved greater
electoral success, instead of dividing their electoral base. (Smith
&
Remington, 2001, p105)
Another
unexpected
outcome was the failure of the SMD tier to constrain the number of
parties. Even at the district level there were often as many as a dozen
candidates,
contradicting the traditional consensus of the electoral systems
literature,
which states that even if plurality voting does not constrain the number
of
parties at a national level, it should at least have an impact within
each
individual district. (Moser, 2001a, p42)
Moser explains this anomaly through reference to
the weakly
institutionalized party system. He argues that plurality systems can
only have
a constraining effect when conditions allow for rational action. He
believes
that the lack of accurate polling information, and the general inability
of
parties to provide a coherent platform, prevented voters and elites from
making
strategic choices. The weakness of national parties to develop local
organizations allowed for more influential local elites to capitalize on
local
celebrity and personality factors. Due to the high number of candidates
the
winner of an SMD may only have needed 15-20% of the vote, creating great
opportunities for popular local personalities to achieve electoral
success.
(Moser, 2001a, p42
Moser
also
points out that the PR tier did not live up to expectations. He
describes how
it was less proportional than the plurality tier, with 9% of the votes
wasted
on electoral blocs which did not overcome the 5% threshold. It also did
not
encourage the development of national party organizations to the extent
that
was hoped, as often personality was used as a substitute for a
well-defined
social constituency. (Moser, 2001a, pp38-40)
When
these
election results were translated into the Duma, many of the independent
candidates aligned with party factions. Three factions were established
within
the first week, with 439 out of the 450 deputies affiliated with some
group by
April 1994. (Smith & Remington, 2001, pp99-101) Despite these
movements no
party or group held an overall majority. The largest of these factions,
the centrist
group known as New Regional Policy, sided with reformers, but other
centrists
groups took up conservative alignments and divided the Duma.
(Smith & Remington, 2001, p106)
In
the aftermath
of these results pressure began to mount for alterations to the
electoral
system. In particular Yeltsin and the reformist camp favored a shift
away from
PR, in order to undermine the successes of the opposition. The reformist
camp
lacked the electoral resources of a strong social base, and well
identified
popular leaders, which are necessary for PR success. (Moser, 2001a,
pp120-124) The
opposition was strong in these areas with the CPRF drawing great support
from
the elderly and rural voters, while the LDPR gained success through the
popularity of Zhirinovsky. It was hoped that by increasing the number of
SMDs
it would undermine the influence of these two parties who had gained
only 21
plurality deputies, compared to 91 from the PR tier.
However,
when
discussing the Yeltsin proposal for 300 SMD seats and 150 PR seats the
Duma did
not divide on the economic reform dimension that was common in other
issues. In
this instance party leaders and individual deputies became less
concerned with
the policy that would be of greatest benefit to their ideological base,
but
rather they focused on the policy that would provide them the best
opportunity
to influence power or at least gain reelection. (Smith & Remington,
2001,
pp107-108) For example, Yabloko deputies who fell into the reformist
camp had
benefited far more from the PR section of the vote gaining 20 list
seats,
compared to only 3 SMDs, while the opposition Agrarian party had
stronger local
organizations in the rural areas which made them more inclined to favor
the
introduction of a higher number of SMDs. Both these parties favored
electoral
systems which were contrary to the wishes of their ideological bloc.
There were
also those such as Sheinis who remained normatively committed to the
mixed
system because they believed it offered the best prospects for party
development and consolidation at a national level. (Current Digest Vol.
XLVII,
NO.46 (1995) pp6-8)
After
a long
period of debate it became clear that Yeltsin did not have the majority
to
effect change and as a result the final vote reflected a consensus which
would
maintain the status quo. This was perceived as a better outcome than the
instability of a protracted standoff, with Yeltsin deciding that on this
occasion it was not important enough to overrule by the power of decree.
Going
into the 1995 election the electoral system remained predominantly
unchanged,
except for minor alterations such as the increase in the number of
signatures
required for entry onto the party list. (McFaul, 1999, p43; McFaul 2001,
pp1180-1182; Smith & Remington, 2001, pp108-110)
This
failure on
the part of Yeltsin to alter the electoral system has been accounted for
by McFaul
who argues that it is difficult to alter institutions once they have
been
created. Although he does not adhere to the sociological perspective,
whereby
human actions are totally shaped by institutions, he also rejects a
blinkered
focus on rational choice. He does not believe actors are completely
unconstrained in their institutional design, stressing that once
decisions have
been made they become very hard to alter. This approach is described as
‘path
dependency’ and McFaul believes that without a stronger impetus for
change the
status quo will gradually become entrenched. (McFaul, 1999, pp28, 30-31)
In
the period
leading up to the 1995 election there was great fluctuation in the party
system. Parties were formed and disbanded, with the overall effect being
greater
fragmentation. 43 parties or blocs were registered on the PR ballot, all
benefiting
from government subsidy and free television airtime. (Moser, 2001a, p38)
An
attempt had been made to impose a two-party system from above but this
had been
unsuccessful. A new ‘party of power’ was created called ‘Our Home is
Once
more the
results of the election contradicted the established beliefs about
electoral
systems. 23 parties gained at least one seat in the plurality tier,
while in
the PR tier only 4 parties gained representation. These included 3
parties from
1993; Yabloko, the LDPR, the CPRF and one new party, Our Home is
The
reasons for
these unusual results remained largely the same as in 1993 with the
continued
weakness of the party system preventing rational action amongst voters.
When
parties are weak public opinion cannot be channeled effectively.
Transitory
parties prevent voters from developing party identification, with voting
preferences influenced by personality, rather than rational evaluations
of
party performance. (Moser, 2001a, p36)
In
the 1995
election the 5% legal threshold continued to have little psychological
effect
as a deterrence to small parties, however its
mechanical effect was significant. 49% of the votes cast were received
by
parties which failed to overcome the 5% legal threshold, with many
parties or
blocs receiving miniscule vote shares. Four parties did come within 1%
of
gaining representation, but for the most part the vote was extremely
fragmented
amongst the diverse range of parties. (Moser, 2001a, pp38-40)
The
largest electoral
bloc to emerge was the CPRF who gained 22.3% of the PR vote, and 99 PR
seats.
When added to their 58 SMD seats it gave them the status of the largest
party
in the Duma, with over three times the representation they had enjoyed 2
years
previously. The LDPR continued their strong PR showing, with 50 seats,
while
only picking up one additional SMD. Our Home is
These
results
lead to huge disproportionality in the PR tier, (Moser, 2001b, p200)
with the
share of seats almost double the share of votes for the four successful
parties. The only party which appeared to be consolidating its position
in
society was the CPRF. It combined success in both tiers due to its
strong
social base and its well developed grass-roots organizations. However,
the
overall picture was one of fragmentation, with party development still
not
taking on any coherent shape. The benefit of the PR system and its focus
on
parties continued to be undermined by independents who could gain
representation through the SMDs. National campaigning and national party
labels
meant little at the local level. Independents continued to gain success
based
on their standing in the local community and their promises to fight for
local
interests.
In
the period
between the 1995 and 1999 election there was further debate on reform of
the
electoral system, (Current Digest Vol. 50, NO.4 (1998) pp5-7) but once
more
nothing changed. As the campaign began for
the 1999
election the outlook for the party system remained bleak, however, there
were
some factors which appeared to point towards a
stabilization
in the role of parties. Feelings of partisanship appeared to be
increasing,
with the negative connotations of the word ‘party’ becoming a more
distant
memory. Voters began to structure their ideological preferences more,
leading
to stronger links with parties. (Whitefield, 2001)
There
also appeared
to be a consolidation of parties, with the Union of Right Forces
bringing together
previously divided reformist groups. Changes were also made in the
electoral law
which prevented leaders of list parties from using free airtime to
promote
their candidacy in the plurality tier. These factors combined helped to
reduce
the number of parties on the PR ballot to only 26. (Moser, 2001a, p151)
Another
development
was the emergence of parties dominated by regional governors.
(Slider, 2001) For the most part they were formed by regional elites who
sought
to block the growth of federal institutions. The three most prominent
were
Voice of Russia, All Russia, and Unity. Voice of
Unity,
however,
emerged as a strong electoral force. Formed through the cooperation of
39
regional leaders it became the new ‘party of power’. It aligned itself
with the
government but avoided any firm ideology, structure or organization.
(Slider,
2001, p232)
Elections
were
held in December and an interesting picture emerged. Once more Yabloko,
the
LDPR and the CPRF gained representation from the PR ballot,
demonstrating that
some form of continuity was emerging. Unity gained 23% of the vote, the
second
largest share, translating into 64 PR seats. The Union of Right Forces
was also
successful, showing that the elite consolidation had paid off, while
Fatherland-All Russia performed well in both tiers, operating as a rival
‘party
of power’. (Moser, 2001a, pp152-153)
The
electorate
also appeared to be learning as smaller parties, with no chance of
success,
received a smaller vote share. Less than 20% went to parties who failed
the 5%
threshold, making the PR tier more proportional than in 1995. (Moser,
2001a,
p154) However, more negatively the number of independents rose to 113,
with the
number of candidates in many districts remaining around 10. The CPRF
still
appeared to be the only truly national party, with grassroots
organization, as
it ran candidates in two thirds of the SMDs.
(Rose,
2001, pp217-218)
Around
60% of
the vote went to parties which had not contested the 1995 election,
however it
can be argued that if the Union of Right Forces is seen as a
consolidation of the
reformist bloc, and Unity is just classed as a ‘party of power’ then it
would
appear that of the six major parties emerging in 1999, five had a basis
in the
previous election. (Moser, 2001a, pp151-152; Rose, 2001, p217)
For
many people
the Russian party system would appear to be taking on a 3+1
characteristic.
With Yabloko, the LDPR and the CPRF emerging as stable parties, joined
by a
different ‘party of power’ in each election. (Stoner-Weiss, 2001, p390)
The
CPRF is undoubtedly the strongest electoral force, with 114 seats in the
Duma,
while support for Zhirinovsky appears to be waning as the LDPR has been
reduced
to only 17 PR seats.
Although
the
party system remains weak when compared with established democracies
In
The
new Russian
Constitution which was approved alongside the elections to the Duma in
December
1993 outlined the powers of the Presidency. Yeltsin enjoyed great
influence,
with extensive powers of patronage in government formation and the
ability to
dissolve the Duma. He also retained the power to rule by decree, with
little
effective check on his power. (DeBardeleben,
1997,
p152)
In
terms of the
implications for party formation the Presidency has had a greatly
detrimental
effect. Yeltsin refused to associate with any one party, as he claimed
to
represent all the people. The possible influence of the Presidency as a
constraint on the fragmentation and proliferation of parties was lost
due to
the highly personalized nature of Russian politics. In the election of
1996
candidates such as Yavlinski, Zhirnovsky and Zyuganov did have a party base, however, the Presidential campaign did not
focus on
party programs. (DeBardeleben, 1997, p184)
The
election of
2000 can also be seen in the same light. Parties such as Fatherland-All
Russia
were merely vehicles for Luzhkov and Primakov to promote their
Presidential
aspirations. Furthermore, although Putin was never a member of Unity, he
did
endorse it prior to the 1999 Duma election in a way that Yeltsin had
never done
with the previous parties of power. Due to the timing of Duma elections,
6
months prior to the Presidential elections, they take on the role of a
primary.
Evidence of this can be seen in the way Fatherland-All Russia
disintegrated
after Putin’s victory of 2000, despite their strong showing in the Duma
election. As long as the main goal in Russian politics remains the
office of
President the development of parties will be constrained. (Filipov,
Ordeshook & Shevtsova,
1999, p11; McFaul, 2001, pp1166-1167)
Indeed
the
Russian example would appear to fit the model of ‘delegative democracy’
outlined by O’Donnell. (O’Donnell, 1994) He states that ‘delegative
democracies
rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is
thereby
entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard
facts of
existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term in
office.’
(O’Donnell, 1994, p59) This form of democracy is characterized by
extremely
weak horizontal accountability and although parties may exist they will
not
exert any great power on the office of President. Delegative democracy
offers
strong government and swift decision making, however due to the weakness
of all
institutions except the Presidency implementation is often a problem.
Examining
delegative
democracy in
The
pattern of
Russian party formation throughout the 1990’s has been characterized by
instability and fragmentation. The office of President has undermined
the
creation of parties, and the weakness of Russian parties has meant that
the
expected effects of electoral engineering have not manifested. However,
Russian
society does appear to be evolving and some parties have begun to
consolidate.
The strong focus on personality politics still dominates, but party
labels are
beginning to become more salient. If the mixed electoral system is
allowed to
remain in place then it is hoped that parties will continue to seek a
national
impact, while also cultivating grass roots organizations. Despite
initial
problems the mixed electoral system offers the best prospect for
creating a
stable party system in the Duma. However, the real challenge will be to
integrate parties into the race for the Presidency, as it remains the
most
powerful institution in
Brown, Archie (ed)
(2001) Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (
Current Digest Vol.
47, NO.46
(1995) pp6-8
Current Digest Vol.
50, NO.4
(1998) pp5-7
Dahl, Robert A. (1971)
Polyarchy:
Participation and Opposition (
DeBardeleben, Joan
(1997) Russian
Politics in Transition 2nd ed. (Houghton Mifflin Company:
Duverger, Maurice
(1954) Political
Parties (
Filipov, Mikhail G.,
Peter C.
Ordeshook & Olga V.Shvetsova (1999) ‘Party Fragmentation and
Presidential
Elections in Post-Communist Democracies’ Constitutional Political
Economy
Vol. 10 pp3-26
Fish, M. Steven (1995)
Democracy
from scratch (
Gunther, Richard &
Larry
Diamond (2001) Political Parties and Democracy (
Kubicek, Paul (1994)
‘Delegative
Democracy in
Lewis, Paul G. (2001)
‘The ‘Third
Wave of Democracy in
Lijphart,
Arend (1994) Electoral Systems and Party
Systems:
A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990 (
McFaul, Michael (1999)
‘Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during
Transitions:
Cases from
McFaul, Michael (2001)
‘Explaining Party Formation and Nonformation in
McFaul, Michael &
Sergei
Markov (1993) The Troubled Birth of
Russian
Democracy (
Moser, Robert G.
(2001) Unexpected
Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in
Moser, Robert G.
(2001b) ‘The
Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in
O’Donnell, Guillermo
(1994)
‘Delegative Democracy’ Journal of Democracy Vol. 5 pp55-69
Rae,
Rose, Richard (2001)
‘How
Floating Parties Frustrate Democratic Accountability: A Supply-Side View
of
Russia’s Elections in Brown, Archie (ed) Contemporary
Russian
Politics: A Reader (
Sakwa, Richard (1996) Russian
Politics
and Society 2nd ed. (
Sartori, Giovanni, ‘The Influence of Electoral
Systems: Faulty Laws or
Faulty Method?’ in Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart (eds)
(1994) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (
Slider, Darrell (2001)
‘
Smith, Steven S. &
Thomas F.
Remington (2001) The Politics of
Institutional Choice: The Formation of the
Sorenson, Georg (1998)
Democracy
and Democratization 2nd ed. (
Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn
(2001) ‘The
Limited Reach of Russia’s Party System: Underinstitutionalization in
Dual
Transitions’ Politics & Society Vol. 29(3) pp385-414
Taagepera,
Rein & Matthew
Whitefield, Stephen, ‘Partisan and Party
Divisions in Post-Communist
Russia’ in Brown, Archie (ed) (2001) Contemporary
Russian
Politics: A Reader (