

Catholic Nonviolence: Transforming Military Institutions

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How do we build a robust, comprehensive future of nonviolence in the Catholic Church? First, I will explore how a Catholic commitment to nonviolence as a “style of politics for peace” could function to orient and transform military institutions as we begin to re-imagine protection mechanisms. Second, in this re-imagining I will draw on a Eucharistic orientation for an inquiry into actual and possible nonviolent protection mechanisms in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Third, in order to create more space for such nonviolence, I will respond briefly to some recent scholarship that critiques my thinking on the just war framework. My core argument is that if the Catholic Church commits to offering a sacramental imagination of nonviolence to the world, then we will more effectively transform military institutions toward trans-armament and offer more credible nonviolent forms of defense.

The recent trajectory of the Catholic Church has been steadily moving toward a more robust affirmation of active nonviolence. The power of active nonviolence in many or most conflict situations is often affirmed by scholars who argue for the continued use of just war thinking. Militaries themselves increasingly recognize their own limits and the need for more nonviolent strategies. Recognizing the good faith of conscientious and stringent just war thinkers, I want to begin here by building on some of what we have in common as we transform the Church together. My primary purpose in this essay, therefore, is to lay out a thought experiment imagining what it would look like for Catholics working to transform the world’s militaries according to a just peace ethic.

A quick summary of the just peace ethic I am referring to includes: (1) *developing virtues and skills to engage conflict constructively* through spiritual disciplines, key virtues,¹ nonviolent education and skills, participatory processes, and the formation of nonviolent peacemaking communities; (2) *breaking cycles of violence* via reflexivity (i.e., keeping means and ends consistent), re-humanization, conflict transformation and dialogue, nonviolent direct action, and integral disarmament, and the acknowledgement of responsibility for harm²; (3) *building*

sustainable peace through relationality and reconciliation, robust civil society and just governance, respect for human dignity and rights, ecological sustainability, as well as economic, racial, and gender justice.³

A Nonviolent Just Peace Ethic: Transforming the Military Institution

If the Catholic Church develops its official teaching on nonviolence, how would a just peace ethic enable Catholic advocates to impact and transform military institutions? The “nonviolent horizon,” grammar, or logic of this ethic includes the outlawing and ending of war.⁴ However, as we transition in ways consistent with and toward this horizon, this ethic can better enable military institutions to take key transformative steps.

This ethical orientation would draw the military community to increasingly speak out and directly advocate for growing investment, resources, and strategic commitments to nonviolent approaches. For example, this might include promoting a normative shift for governments to a “right to assist” nonviolent resistance campaigns as central for preventing mass atrocities.⁵ It is often said that the military community is the most reluctant to engage in war, so to the degree there is truth in that claim this ethic will better enable such tendencies.

In the area of strategic doctrine, the just peace ethic encourages the military community to change core strategic questions toward: how to engage conflict well, how to break cycles of violence, and how to cultivate the conditions for sustainable peace. Engaging conflict well, i.e., constructively rather than destructively, orients the military to help identify root causes and key needs of all actors, cultivate virtuous habits, as well as engage in intersectional, racial, and gender analysis of conflicts. Breaking cycles of violence rather than focusing on winning wars allows the military to re-humanize adversaries, to transform conflicts rather than merely end them, to better acknowledge responsibility for harm done, to turn adversaries into future partners, and to increasingly practice reflexivity, i.e., using means consistent with ends. Such reflexivity is crucial to considering how to contribute to rather than obstruct the conditions for sustainable peace. Rather than mere stability, this shift to a lens of sustainable peace enables the military to at least not obstruct environmental and structural justice, to step back and enable space for civil society, and to make clear commitments to outlaw and end war, not simply to avoid crimes during war.

The *U.S. Army Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies Field Manual* provides an example of how the seeds of some just peace norms are already present and ripe for further development.⁶ For

example, the authors use the term “generational engagement” and relations between the population and government to identify how peacebuilding, or the norms of dialogue and relationality, can be actualized at all stages of conflict, even in high threat situations.⁷ They also explicitly point to the norm of participation regarding youth and civil society. The manual identifies the norm of sustainability and attending to root causes as in its discussion of economic development plans as well as the importance of defections. In a more indirect way, it refers to the pillars of support, which are key to strategic nonviolent resistance. These include “land reform” and “debt” as examples of the material resources pillar.⁸

However, the authors of the *Field Manual* do not actualize the norm of participation because they exclude adversaries or “enemies” whom they intend to “isolate” or destroy.⁹ They also fail the norm of nonviolent skillsets by excluding a needs-based analysis. Instead of simply seeking to “isolate” the enemy or hope they lose “desire,” counterinsurgents could identify the enemy’s deeper needs and devise strategies that draw them toward these needs. Some of these needs might be respect for self and religion, livelihood, meaning, connection, effectiveness, inspiration, etc. This would also be essential to stimulating and sustaining adequate defections. Furthermore, the *Field Manual* does not actualize the norm of sustainability since counterinsurgents are not attending adequately to environmental damage of their military training and engagements. Their indirect references to strategic nonviolent action are insufficient since their present methodology is too saturated with cultural and direct violence. In turn, a nonviolent just peace ethic would identify and cultivate these seeds for potential growth, but would not signal moral legitimization of cultural, structural, or direct violence.

Building on this approach, this ethic would enable the military to construct new pilot programs. For example, drawing on their stated commitments to protection, this ethic invites and challenges them to pilot an unarmed protection unit. The proven practice of unarmed civilian protection (UCP) by international organizations, such as the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), Peace Brigades International, and Cure Violence, can serve as models and resources for such a pilot. For instance, in South Sudan, Nonviolent Peaceforce’s protection units, which engage all armed actors, has reduced sexual assaults and rape by armed actors from regularity to zero in the areas NP patrols and directly saved fourteen people from an armed militia attack. This attack was occurring in a U.N. protection site. As people were running and being shot, fourteen women and children rushed into a mud hut with two NP officers. Three different times, the armed militia came in demanding

that the NP officers leave, but each time they refused, saying they were unarmed, non-partisan, and humanitarian. Amazingly, the fourteen women and children survived the deadly attack. One of the NP officers said, “If we had a gun we would’ve been shot immediately; so without arms we can find other ways.”¹⁰ In addition, there are instructive examples from other militaries, such as the Australian Department of Defense.¹¹ Further, the U.N., including the Department of Peacekeeping, already has some unarmed elements in their deployments and is increasingly endorsing this methodology more formally and broadly, even at the U.N. Security Council.¹²

Some might wonder if this would make soldiers less secure and less capable of protecting others. This is an important concern. However, much of this dynamic depends on what else the government or other parts of their military is doing. For example, if the government of this unarmed protection unit is enacting crippling sanctions on the people, extracting resources, dehumanizing the leaders, and even bombing other parts of the country, then such a unit will be much less secure, and their protection impact will be impeded but not necessarily insignificant. A key characteristic of unarmed protection is being and working with credible messengers in the social context. Hence, civil society organizations are more often much better positioned to offer unarmed protection. Nevertheless, if the destructive actions mentioned above and other similar approaches are absent, such unarmed programs would enable persons in the military to build better trust with key stakeholders on the ground, to gather more credible intelligence to prevent violence, to better de-escalate destructive conflicts, to create more space for nonviolent civil society leaders and campaigns, to displace less communities and refugees, and, thus, to ultimately protect more people over the long-term.¹³ As lessons are learned from the pilot programs, potential shifting of military resources as well as expansion in partnerships and types of conflict situations can ensue.

Furthermore, drawing on the just peace norms and the military’s stated commitment to defense, advocates could promote a pilot program in nonviolent civilian-based defense (CBD) as some countries have done. Nonviolent CBD entails using nonviolent resistance to defend against military invasion, occupation, or coups d’état. For instance, the resisters do not necessarily physically prevent invading troops from entering their territory. At the same time, most people in some way participate in the resistance, taking more responsibility for their own defense rather than simply delegating it to an elite group.¹⁴ This primarily entails strategic noncooperation with some orders from the opponent and perhaps the creation of parallel institutions or government, to the point of making it inconvenient to nearly impossible for the occupying force to benefit or even

remain. When such a large-scale, coordinated nonviolent refusal to resource the opponent's governing ambitions is clearly demonstrated in advance, some opponents may even be deterred from an attack in the first place.¹⁵

Nonviolent CBD has taken different forms and been developed a number of times in the past century, and some governments recently incorporated it into their defense planning. Past examples include the 1923 resistance to Wolfgang Kapp's attempted coup d'état in Germany, the Norwegian and Danish resistance against German occupation during World War II, the Czechoslovakian resistance against Soviet occupation in 1968, the People Power Revolution in the Philippines in 1986, the drive for independence in the Baltic countries in 1990–1991, and Russians preventing the Soviet coup attempt in 1991.¹⁶ Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Lithuania have incorporated CBD into their defense planning by providing research and development funds to create nonviolent methods to prevent military occupation.¹⁷

Others have written about such a strategy from a Gandhian perspective, or more recently, as a way to counter Russian hybrid warfare.¹⁸ For instance, Robert J. Burrows, drawing on Gandhi, explains that any CBD approach must not rely too much on elites and limited system reform. Any form of “nonviolent defense” should assist civil society organizers and ordinary people in their struggle to satisfy human needs.¹⁹ Orienting such defense toward identification with *all* humans will decrease fear and create more space for the necessary courage for nonviolent defense.²⁰ Key tactical elements would include more dispersion than concentration, contingency plans, advance personal contact with opposing troops to reduce their fears and counter any de-humanization of the occupied population, the generation of resistance or defections in such troops, and the alteration of the will of key social groups in the domestic constituencies of the opponent's elite or those in allied countries. Nonviolent CBD is less likely to produce significant casualties in part because it can foster a more trusting political climate, less threatening physical circumstances, and a reduction in negative emotional states as well as increased humanization.²¹ Much more study and experimentation can and should be done in this area. A nonviolent just peace ethic will better explore and sustain such transformation of defense approaches.

However, the transformation of overall military strategy and structural programs can only go so far unless formation is significantly addressed. A just peace ethic would form people to enter more nonviolent institutions and careers; however, it could also considerably enhance the formation of all persons who otherwise end up in the military. One of the key issues in military

training is the de-humanization of adversaries in order to increase the willingness of soldiers to kill. Yet, this de-humanization of others also contributes to the de-humanization of the soldiers themselves, such as through displacement of responsibility and decreasing empathy.²² The just peace norm of re-humanization as well as the norm of dignity and human rights would challenge this intentional strategy to de-humanize others. It would also supplement this with formation in key just peace virtues such as compassion, humility, and empathy.²³ Will this make soldiers much less willing to kill? Yes. But it will also enhance critical thinking, emotional intelligence, and habits of creative, nonviolent actions to sustainably accomplish legitimate objectives that a defense institution may have.

This ethic will also help us recognize that killing itself distorts and violates our human dignity. The advancing scientific acknowledgement of trauma, perpetrator induced syndrome, moral injury, and brain damage from killing illustrate this reality.²⁴ Thus, the just peace ethic enables a deepening and clarifying of the virtue of courage to the practice of suffering out of reverence for the dignity of others (and self) by risking, perhaps even giving one's life, without killing. Although it may be a dilemma to refuse to kill in difficult, rare situations, human flourishing and just peace norms, especially virtues, dignity, and the ever-surprising, creative dynamics unleashed by nonviolent action, draw us to risk life rather than to take life, especially if we are Christian. Pope John Paul II called us "not to follow those who train us in how to kill," because "violence destroys our dignity."²⁵ Pope Francis said, "The commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill' has absolute value, and concerns both the innocent and the guilty, and even criminals maintain the inviolable right to life, the gift of God."²⁶

In turn, a just peace ethic can cultivate healthier action choices and tactics by military personnel when they operate in conflict zones. A just peace ethic can cultivate healthier action choices and tactics by military personnel when they operate in conflict zones. Several common military actions will not meet the just peace norms, but soldiers could strive towards these norms and, at a minimum, make much less harmful choices. Nonetheless, Catholics and other just peace advocates would maintain high standards. For instance, bombing a set of tanks or armed vehicles with military persons in them during a war might be less distance from the just peace norms than bombing a hospital. It may be "less harmful," but it would not satisfy the just peace norms, and thus would not be considered morally justified.²⁷ Just peace advocates would instead promote a broad set of creative, nonviolent actions. In contrast, a just war framework could describe such an

action as morally justified, and thus perpetuate supporting components (structural violence, cultural violence, cycles of direct violence, “collateral damage,” etc.) that normally attend such choices.

But, more importantly, Catholics would call persons in the military to actions during violent conflict which are in accord with the just peace norms. Soldiers have prior experiences with these alternatives and would be more inclined to pursue them. For example, some soldiers do talk with respect and empathy to the people they encounter, such as ordinary civilians, in a violent conflict zone. Some soldiers do include local people in some decision-making about how to proceed in a community. Some do help build schools, electric grids, bridges, houses, etc. Some do converse deeply with enemies or prisoners and develop some empathy. Some do try to avoid harming essential, life-giving infrastructure. Some do stay back and let local nonviolent resistance campaigns have social space. Some do advocate for governments to invest more in peacebuilding and diplomacy not only before but during violent conflict. Some do lay their weapons down when engaging with some individuals, families, or groups in order to build trust and lower the sense of threat. Some do transport internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees to safety. The just peace ethic would enable these actions to happen much more often and give more moral legitimation for them as we sustainably transform both the conflict and the military institution at the same time.

One might respond that such formation could be helpful, but soldiers still need to be trained and willing to kill in today’s militaries. Otherwise, how would militaries be an adequate threat to violent aggression? Or, how would they actually stop such violent aggression? There is solid empirical evidence to at least question if not considerably doubt the overall effectiveness of violent responses.²⁸ However, my point here is that the role of Catholics, if not all Christians, is not to morally justify, legitimate, or label such killing necessary. For militaries, there is a domestic and international legal system in place which claims to permit, manage, and limit armed conflict. As we work to solidify a commitment to nonviolence in the Catholic community, there must also be persistent efforts to mainstream just peace norms in the legal system.²⁹ This would include a clear commitment to outlaw and end war. Thus, as part of the transformation of military institutions, we can increasingly reduce and perhaps at some point root out their killing. However, the role of Catholics, and perhaps all Christians, would shift to a nonviolent just peace ethic to guide our actions and to gradually but steadily transform the military.³⁰

This transition process is oriented by a commitment to trans-armament, i.e., the process of preparing a society structurally and culturally to move from a military-based defense to a nonviolent civilian-based defense. Pope Francis uses the term “integral disarmament” to refer to the internal disarmament of our hearts, sensibilities, and habits as well as the external disarmament of weapons and militaries. While Catholics work to transform military institutions from within as one key line of effort, an essential complementary part will be for the Catholic Church to work outside military institutions to build on these nonviolent practices, such as unarmed civilian protection and nonviolent civilian-based defense, as their own models in our communities and countries. This will be necessary for militaries to “see” what is going on around them and the impact these practices can have to motivate their own internal transformations. The Catholic community has significant resources and institutions to do this work, especially in coalition with other religious or civil society organizations. There is a broad network of educational institutions that can do the research and consistently teach the upcoming generations. There is major convening power of the Vatican and other Catholic institutions to bring key stakeholders together. There are significant advocacy institutions in the Vatican’s diplomatic corps, national Bishops’ conferences, and religious/lay advocacy organizations. I sense that Catholics have an urgent call to scale-up local peace teams that offer unarmed civilian protection, as well as the international UCP organizations that deploy to conflict zones. These include especially the Nonviolent Peaceforce, Cure Violence, Peace Brigades International, Christian Peacemaker Teams, and Operation Dove. Catholics can support and pilot more nonviolent civilian-defense programs in towns, cities, countries, and internationally.

It is crucial for Catholics to attend to these creative, nonviolent practices of protection and national defense as we see similar trends in international relations scholarship. For instance, Richard Jackson explains that “it is more likely that in employing violence to protect a group of innocent people in the present, the long-term effects will be to reinforce the discourses and psychological mechanisms that encourage future resorts to violence and the entrenchment of an ongoing cycle of violence, thus perpetuating rather than relieving the suffering of the innocent.”³¹ As Catholics reflect on the more general need to protect all life in the context of salvation history, we might more clearly envision healthy protection mechanisms through the lens of the Eucharist. The Eucharist is God’s expression through Jesus of nonviolent love, risking and offering life for others without killing. Jesus risks his life to save and protect us from the ultimate death of being

disconnected from God, and thus models for us ultimate and sustainable protection. When we participate in the Eucharist, we are empowered and called to embody this kind of risking of life for others. This represents Jesus's saving work to the world and thus draws us all further into the way of salvation, which is the authentic protection of our lives and the illumination of our sacred dignity. "In the silence of the Cross, the uproar of weapons ceases and the language of reconciliation, forgiveness, dialogue and peace is spoken."³² With this focus on risking of life without killing, Catholics would promote the saving of every life as the constitutive orientation for *any* institutional mechanism focused on protection.³³

An Inquiry into the Rwandan Genocide

Such a Eucharistic orientation toward protection approaches would increase our attentiveness, open our imagination, and deepen our commitment to creative, nonviolent initiatives even in highly difficult situations. I will not provide a full analysis of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, but I will reflect briefly on this case with this Eucharistic orientation and a nonviolent just peace ethic to draw out a few reference points for further consideration.

One of the first steps in such an inquiry is to become adequately aware of the root causes of the horrible spike in violence that occurred in April 1994 in Rwanda. The just peace norms of nonviolent skills and conflict transformation includes such an analysis. Like many conflicts in Africa, this one has roots in the violent habits formed through colonialism. For example, Paul Kagame, the present President of Rwanda, grew up in nearby Uganda after his parents fled Hutu violence in 1959 during Rwanda's struggle for independence from colonial rule. Later, he joined an armed group in Uganda which deposed its president. Shortly afterwards, in the late 1980s he and other Tutsi leaders plotted the overthrow of the Hutu government in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the French had been the political, economic, and military supporters of the Hutu government, particularly in the early 1990s. In 1990, Kagame studied at the U.S. Army Command College in Kansas. After a failed attack by the Rwandan Patriotic Front on the Hutu government, Kagame soon became the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

These attacks continued on and off in the early 1990s, with various attempts at negotiations. The French support and presence of military forces empowered hardline Hutu elements to continue their violence (including the killing of civilians) and propaganda, and ultimately the intense spike in bloodshed known as the 1994 genocide. Meanwhile, U.S. and Ugandan support for the RPF and

Kagame perpetuated their ongoing campaign of violence, which stoked the fear of ordinary Hutus and enabled the success of their propaganda to attack Tutsis more broadly. Both France and the U.S. had many points along this violent conflict cycle when they could have pressured their proxies, withdrawn economic/political/military support, mitigated the violence, and ultimately prevented or defused the genocide. For instance, French banks were instead complicit in transferring funds for the Rwandan government during the genocide.³⁴ The citizens of these democratic countries also had opportunities to influence their governments to pursue more positive strategies. The just peace norms of reflexivity (consistency of means and ends) and just governance would be particularly helpful to stimulate such activity.

For example, both the Hutu political and military sectors as well as the Tutsi-dominated RPF were clearly starting to train and mobilize civilians to use arms against the civilians of the adversary. This began in late 1990 for the Hutus as a “self-defense” operation along with more formally trained militias. The RPF also did this, especially in early 1994 before the genocide. After the assassination of Rwanda’s Hutu president on April 6, 1994, which followed the October 1993 assassination of Burundi’s Hutu president, there was another clear moment for potential nonviolent intervention. Within the next twenty-four hours key moderate Hutu leaders, including the prime minister, were killed by the government’s armed forces. These figures were central levers for maintaining previous negotiations.³⁵

As the killing again escalated, France evacuated French citizens but also evacuated high-ranking Rwandan government officials from the regime involved in the killings while refusing to evacuate Tutsis, even those who worked at the French embassy.³⁶ Likewise, other Western countries, including the U.S., evacuated their own citizens and generally refused to evacuate Tutsis. However, if the just peace norm of human rights and human dignity was followed, hundreds if not thousands of Tutsis and others could have been saved.

Another key driver of the killing was the de-humanizing propaganda, which is common to all wars and violates the just peace norm of re-humanization. In this case, the Rwandan government, military, and other Hutus used the radio to condition and exacerbate the killing of Tutsis.³⁷ Another plausible and meaningful nonviolent intervention would have been to cut off that radio signal. The U.S. Department of Defense considered this but chose against it primarily due to respecting national “sovereignty.” This sort of propaganda and other types of rumor-spreading before and during the 1994 genocide was key to creating fear and the willingness to kill. Notable examples

are known of intentional rumor-spreading by officials leading to civilians killing other civilians even back in 1990.³⁸

A proven practice for dispelling rumors and preventing them from causing or escalating violence is the practice of unarmed civilian protection, which fits the just peace norm of nonviolent direct action. Organizations like Peace Brigades International and Nonviolent Peaceforce use UCP to generate trust and lines of communications with all actors. This practice could have been implemented to mitigate and prevent the spreading of deadly rumors before and during the 1994 genocide.³⁹ This would have been particularly pivotal after the assassination of the president. Furthermore, at times this practice can also offer direct protection, especially for civilians. As mentioned above, two Nonviolent Peaceforce officers directly protected fourteen women and children during an armed militia attack at a U.N. compound in South Sudan. We also know of this spontaneously happening in Rwanda, whether it was some courageous Hutus protecting Tutsis, such as Hutu Muslims using mosques⁴⁰ and the story of Hotel Rwanda, or the Catholic sisters of the Missionaries of Charity who protected many Tutsi children.⁴¹ These were the kinds of nonviolent actions that could have been better resourced, coordinated, and promoted by key governments like the U.S. and France but also by civil society leaders within and outside Rwanda. For instance, too many Catholic leaders in Rwanda who were credible messengers in their community failed to offer such unarmed protection, and even at times enabled and directly participated in the killing.⁴² A number of such key social groups could have been strategically engaged to join in nonviolent defense and noncooperation to reduce the violence.⁴³

Meanwhile, Kagame's RPF, which appeared to play a key role in ending this genocide, was still involved in massive human rights violations before, during, and after the 1994 genocide. *Foreign Policy* journalist James Traub describes, as a "typical episode," the RPF

kidnapped refugees, many of them women and children, and brought them to a camp, allegedly under the pretext of returning them to Rwanda. The refugees were then brought out in small groups. From the report: "They were bound and their throats were cut or they were killed by hammer blows to the head. Their bodies were then thrown into pits or doused with petrol and burned. The operation was carried out in a methodical manner and lasted at least one month."⁴⁴

Although the genocide of 1994 seemed to subside, the cycles of horrendous violence which predated the genocide were mostly simply displaced and continued afterwards, particularly moving into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the carnage continues even today. Of course, access to Congo's rich supply of minerals offers an economic boon to Western companies, especially from the U.S. Hence, most analysts recognize the connection between Kagame's military training in the U.S., his violent expansion into the DRC, and the economic interests of the U.S. in that region.⁴⁵ Protection of all life certainly has not been the primary, if even a significant driver in the responses to violence by this collection of armed actors.

This brief inquiry into the Rwandan genocide illuminates the critical contributions of a Eucharistic orientation to protection and a nonviolent just peace ethic. At minimum, it complexifies a situation that is often portrayed as a binary choice between violent intervention and being a bystander to genocide. Furthermore, it better illuminates that violence which appears "justified" or "humanitarian" to some still leads to indefensible, ongoing cycles of bloodshed. But, more importantly, the Eucharistic orientation and just peace ethic offers analytical methods, norms, and creative, nonviolent protection mechanisms that we may miss or under-value. For Catholic advocates and even those Catholics in government, this invites and challenges us to better commit and focus on these alternatives. The institutional Church and Catholic advocacy organizations have a critical opportunity to fully embody and offer to the world this sacramental imagination of nonviolence. In some rare situations of extreme difficulty, it may not be appropriate for Catholics to morally critique certain actors who may resort to violent protection, including "lethal force." But rather than being a voice of justification, legitimation, or endorsement of violence, this is a call to focus our formation, discernment, resources, advocacy, intervention, and bodies to accompany such persons toward creative, nonviolent approaches that prevent and defuse violent conflict even in such difficult situations.

Recent Discourse on Just War

In order to create more space for such nonviolence, I will respond briefly to some scholarship referencing my arguments related to a just war framework. I have discussed some of my concerns about the just war approach in a previous *Expositions* essay.⁴⁶ Here I would like to clarify some of this thinking and address some subsequent arguments on this topic in order to further shed light

on the need to move us closer to the Catholic Church fully embodying and offering to the world a sacramental imagination of nonviolence.

In my previous article, I identified the concern about how the just war criteria have mostly been used to justify rather than prevent or limit war. There appears to be considerable agreement about this, even from perspectives that still uphold the just war concept.⁴⁷ However, some of these same supporters have gone so far to claim that I and others fail to see how just war theory has been used to argue against war and to restrain war.⁴⁸ They further suggest that since it has been used in this way, then this legitimates the ongoing use and refinement of just war theories.

Yet, I and others have previously said that the just war criteria have “mostly” or “too often” been used, not *always* been used, to justify rather than prevent or limit war.⁴⁹ I recognize that some scholars, religious leaders, and political leaders have drawn on just war criteria to speak out against a particular war or actions in war.⁵⁰ However, even though this happens, it still primarily has functioned to create the social conditions for the likelihood of war and to endorse wars. Hence, I have quoted Bishop McElroy, who said the “just war principles have become only a little bit less than a green light” for war.⁵¹ Further, Gerald Schlabach has argued that “just war cannot be counted as useful if it only works consistently among specialists, and not to mobilize stringent scrutiny of warfare in pews and populace.” Just war theorists, he goes on, “must [...] recognize the theory’s failure to help the people of God scrutinize and resist unjust war.”⁵² He responds directly to scholars who argue that the *misuse of something is no argument against its proper use*:

[this] principle [...] is simply not convincing as applied to the just war theory. For in order to override both the plain words of Jesus and early Christian scruples against all bloodshed, and to justify exceptional recourse to violence in order to prevent more violence, the best and perhaps only argument has always been some claim of greater realism. But as I argued, the persistent manipulation of just war discourse is itself a data point concerning reality, a “hard fact” with which its advocates must grapple far more. To evade such grappling by insisting it could still work in theory is something of a bait-and-switch.⁵³

In other words, they argue that just war is a necessary concession to the reality of the human condition in a so-called fallen world, i.e., it would work better than the alternatives, but then they

appeal to its value as an ideal. This is a bait-and-switch: it is either realistic or it isn't.⁵⁴ The strong evidence of consistent abuse over time to the *ad bellum* and *in bello* criteria has led to enormous, ongoing, and unacceptable consequences for countless people and the earth.⁵⁵ In addition to the reality that the just peace ethic could better prevent and limit war, as some had hoped the just war tradition would adequately do,⁵⁶ these tragic realities significantly de-legitimize this moral framework as an official teaching in the Catholic Church, even if some specialists try to use it primarily to speak out against war.

In addition to a pattern of enabling direct violence, the just war approach too often functions to enable structural and cultural violence, as I alluded to briefly in my previous essay.⁵⁷ A moral framework focused on whether violence is morally legitimate, even in a restricted form, too often enables governments to expend significant energy on preparing to win a possible "just war" rather than invest in nonviolent resources or other basic human needs. This structural violence often includes the arms trade and a war system increasingly embedded in our economy and politics. Also, this ethic frequently enables cultural violence in the form of de-humanizing social habits generated by training for war, media propaganda to support preparation for war, and generational trauma from the experience of war. Further, such structural and cultural violence often exacerbates the root causes of violence and inhibits sustainable peace.

Others have suggested that I claim anyone who uses just war theories to assess war are trying to "prepare" for or "seek a just war."⁵⁸ This is not an accurate portrayal of my position. It is normally governments that directly prepare for "just wars." My position is that too often when we utilize just war theories to assess wars, we risk signaling to others the possibility of a just war whether we intend to or not, and whether we are arguing against a specific war or not. This provides cultural legitimization that functions in a society and a government to generate mental, emotional, material, and institutional resources to prepare for the possibility of a just war. For instance, international relations scholar Helen Dexter argues that this discourse of "just war theory" has "made it increasingly difficult to oppose war."⁵⁹

Whether we intend it or not, our collective moral imagination for nonviolence gets truncated through the cultural legitimization of war and the cultural violence mentioned above. Some scholars have responded to this by expanding their personal imagination and then using it to further develop a just war framework.⁶⁰ However, I am not saying that any imagination is limited by utilizing the just war approach. I am referring to the moral imagination for the adequate range of nonviolent

possibilities, and more precisely the collective moral imagination more so than the personal imagination.⁶¹

Rather than “providing no evidence,” as some have claimed,⁶² for how this limiting of nonviolence has been playing out in the Catholic community and beyond, I and others, such as Fr. Francisco de Roux, S.J., of Colombia, have offered several examples.⁶³ For instance, too many spend little if any time trying to imagine how to humanize or illuminate the dignity of our enemies, which is a Gospel mandate and essential to overcoming mass violence. We rarely hear religious and political leaders speak about or promote nonviolent resistance, especially boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience, etc., to injustice and violence. When Pope Francis said not to “bomb or make war” on ISIS, most U.S. Catholic press and many political/religious leaders left out this phrase. They fixated on his call “to stop the aggression” and claimed an openness from the Pope to some military action, focusing their discussion on how much. Instead, the Catholic community may have better faced the call to not “bomb or make war” by working together to identify creative, nonviolent responses. Another example is how the depth and range of education on nonviolent theory and practice is much better in most Mennonite or Quaker schools compared to most Catholic institutions.

We could look in recent history to see more evidence for how this framework has functioned to limit nonviolent potential by Catholic leaders. U.S. leaders, such as the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), limited nonviolent imagination and options by supporting the war in Vietnam as a “just war” during the 1960s.⁶⁴ In the Gulf War of 1991, U.S. Catholic leaders, including bishops, offered various positions despite the criticism of Pope John Paul II. For example, Cardinal Bernard Law expressed clear support for the war effort. The lack of a consistent message too often enabled the status quo and the subsequent cycles of violence that continued twenty-five years later through destructive economic sanctions and further war in Iraq. Additional examples also exist.⁶⁵

Although the turn to a just peace ethic would significantly enhance our nonviolent imagination, development, and commitment, some argue that this ethic simply increases the threshold for last resort and thus should simply fit within the broader just war framework. Yes, it would to some extent increase the space for nonviolent action; however, Cahill argues that attempts to incorporate just peace components into a just war framework in our present context of continued violence “opens the door to ‘just peace’ as a more adequate way to respond to military and societal violence

than the application of just war theory, both from a Christian and from a political or humanistic standpoint.”⁶⁶ Further, when placing a just peace ethic within the just war framework it would also get co-opted in a way that continues to perpetuate many of the other previously discussed social and political problems too often enabled by the just war framework. Not to mention that many of the just peace norms, such as reflexivity, virtues of mercy and empathy, conflict transformation, human dignity, etc., are inconsistent with just war logic. There are, of course, some positive elements in the just war tradition that should be and are incorporated and transformed in the process of shifting to a just peace ethic, such as right intention, just cause, accountability, and preventing and reducing violence.⁶⁷ Perhaps as a signal to the broader church, Lisa Cahill points out that the modern popes “clearly envision their role as Christian leaders and teachers, not as elaborating justifications of armed force, but as maximizing the visibility, appeal, uniting power, and effectiveness of nonviolence and just peace.”⁶⁸

Conclusion

In this essay, I offered an example of how a nonviolent just peace ethic could contribute to the transformation and trans-armament of military institutions. Reflecting on how such trans-armament relates to re-imagining protection mechanisms in the light of the Eucharist, I offered a brief inquiry into the case of the Rwandan civil war and the genocide of 1994. In light of this potential for nonviolence, I responded to some recent discourse around the just war framework to help create more space for the Church embodying a sacramental imagination of nonviolence. The central argument is that if the Catholic Church commits to offering a sacramental imagination of nonviolence to the world, then the Church will not only get closer to becoming a church of mercy and a sacrament of nonviolence,⁶⁸ but we will more effectively transform our military institutions toward trans-armament and offer more credible nonviolent protection mechanisms.

Notes

1. Such as mercy, empathy, humility, courage, nonviolence, solidarity, and compassion.
2. Including restorative justice and trauma-healing.
3. Eli S. McCarthy, “A Virtue-Based Just Peace Ethic,” *Journal of Moral Theology* 7.2 (June 2018): 92–101. For a fuller elaboration, see *A Just Peace Ethic Primer: Building*

Sustainable Peace and Breaking Cycles of Violence, ed. Eli S. McCarthy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming 2020). See also “Just Peace Ethic,” handout at Path of Nonviolence conference at the Vatican, April 4–5, 2019,

https://nonviolencejustpeacedotnet.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/jp-handout_cni_workshop_2019.pdf.

4. Pope Francis quoted in Gerald O’Connell, “Pope Francis to Theologians in Naples: One Cannot Do Theology without Freedom,” *America* June 21, 2019, <https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2019/06/21/pope-francis-theologians-naples-one-cannot-do-theology-without-freedom>.
5. Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman, “Preventing Mass Atrocities: From a Responsibility to Protect to a Right to Assist Campaigns of Civil Resistance,” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict Special Report, May 2019.
6. *The United States Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5* (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Army, 2014), <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>.
7. Ibid. 10–2.
8. Ibid. 10–61.
9. Ibid. 10–26.
10. “NP Workers Andres Gutierrez and Derek Oakley on Their Experience of the Violence in South Sudan,” YouTube, May 12, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WcFwpcIMcE>.
11. They endorsed this practice of soldiers being unarmed in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea in the late 1990s. They said, “relying on the people to ensure the safety of the peace monitors reinforces their responsibility for peace” and “although it caused some angst in the soldiers, there were a number of occasions when things could’ve been worse if they were armed and when the people assisted patrols in difficult circumstances,” quoted in Rolf Carrière, et al., *Civilian Peacekeeping: A Barely Tapped Resource*, ed. Christine Schweitzer (Belm-Vehrte: Sozio-Publishing, 2010), http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/images/publications/CP_A_Barely_Tapped_Resource.pdf.

12. United Nations, High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*, June 16, 2015, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf; U.N. Women, “Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325,” 2015, <http://wps.unwomen.org/en>; United Nations, General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/72/19 (2018), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1627951/files/A_72_19-EN.pdf. In addition, the concept was included for the first time in a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate in 2016, with unarmed civilian protection in the South Sudan mission mandate. In addition to advocating for investment in stand-alone unarmed civilian protection organizations, advocates have pushed for peacekeeping troops and U.N. civil affairs staff to be trained in and to utilize unarmed civilian protection (“Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protected Civilians: Unarmed Civilian Protection,” <https://www.unitar.org/event/full-catalog/strengthening-civilian-capacities-protect-civilians-unarmed-civilian-protection-0>).
13. Mel Duncan and John Ashworth, “Living Just Peace in South Sudan: Protecting People Nonviolently in Midst of War,” in *A Just Peace Ethic Primer*.
14. Michael Nagler, *Is There No Other Way? The Search for a Nonviolent Future* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Hills Books, 2001), 252–253.
15. Jack Salmon, “Can Nonviolence Be Combined with Military Means for National Defense?” *Journal of Peace Research* 25.1 (1988), 71.
16. Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005); and Nagler, *Is There No Other Way?*
17. Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle* 516; Sharp, *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 125; Gravina Miniotaite, “Lithuania: From Nonviolent Liberation towards Nonviolent Defence?” *Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace Studies* 28.4 (1996): 19–36.
18. Robert J. Burrows, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996); and Maciej Bartkowski, “Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter Russian Hybrid Warfare,” White Paper, International Center for Nonviolent Conflict, Johns Hopkins University, March 2015.

19. Burrows 161.
20. Burrows 205.
21. Burrows 240–243, 256–264.
22. Lt. Col. David Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1995); Jessica Wolfendale, “Developing Moral Character in the Military: Theory and Practice,” presented at International Symposium for Military Ethics, Springfield, VA, January 24–25, 2007, <http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME07/Wolfendale07.html>.
23. Another key virtue is mercy, which is especially relevant for Christians, as Leo Guardado argues in his essay in this volume. Jim Keenan, S.J., describes mercy as the willingness to enter into the chaos of another so as to answer them in their need; see his *Moral Wisdom: Lessons and Texts from the Catholic Tradition* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 124.
24. Rachel MacNair, *Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The Psychological Consequences of Killing* (Lincoln, NE: Praeger/Greenwood Publishing, 2005).
25. Pope John Paul II, quoted in Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of Social Doctrine of the Church* (London: Continuum, 2004), 496; and in “Holy Mass in Drogheda, Ireland,” The Holy See, September 29, 1979, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19790929_irlanda-dublino-drogheda.html. However, in a 1993 address to the diplomatic corps, he did affirm the international “duty to disarm the aggressor” in situations where populations face unjust aggressors. How the aggressor is disarmed becomes the challenge and what role the Catholic Church has in that situation is where a just peace ethic should come into play.
26. Quoted in “Pope Calls on International Leaders to Abolish Death Penalty,” *Catholic Herald* February 22, 2016, <https://catholicherald.co.uk/news/2016/02/22/pope-calls-on-international-leaders-to-abolish-death-penalty/>.
27. “The Gospels Draw Us Further: A Just Peace Ethic,” *Expositions* 12.1 (2018), 85–86, <https://expositions.journals.villanova.edu/article/view/2322>.
28. See David Cochran’s essay in this volume.

29. Part of this is happening with the Sustaining Peace agenda at the U.N. See Youssef Mahmoud and Anupah Makoond, “Sustaining Peace: What Does it Mean in Practice,” International Peace Institute, April 2017, <https://www.ipinst.org/2017/04/sustaining-peace-in-practice>.
30. Duane Friesen, “In Search of Security: A Theology and Ethic of Peace and Public Order,” in *At Peace and Unafraid: Public Order, Security, and the Wisdom of the Cross*, eds. Duane K. Friesen and Gerald W. Schlabach (Scottsdale, PA: Harald Press, 2005), 73.
31. Richard Jackson, “Pacifism and the Ethical Imagination in IR,” *International Politics* 56.2 (April 2019): 212–217.
32. Pope Francis, “Vigil of Prayer for Peace,” The Holy See, September 7, 2013, http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130907_veglia-pace.html.
33. This paragraph is largely drawn from the Catholic Nonviolence Initiative’s unpublished research document, “Advancing Nonviolence and Just Peace in the Church and the World: Biblical, Theological, Ethical, Pastoral and Strategic Dimensions of Nonviolence,” July 2019.
34. Fiona Cumberland, “France: Proud of her Role During the Rwandan Genocide?” *E-International Relations* June 4, 2012, <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/04/france-proud-of-her-role-during-the-rwandan-genocide/>; Tracy McNicoll, “French Bank Had Role in Rwandan Genocide,” *The Independent* July 10, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/rwanda-french-bank-role-rwandan-genocide/>.
35. “The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared,” Human Rights Watch 1, April 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/4.htm>.
36. Rene Lemarchand, “Reconsidering France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide,” *Africa Is a Country*, June 13, 2018, <https://africasacountry.com/2018/06/reconsidering-frances-role-in-the-rwandan-genocide>.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. For example, the killing of hundreds of Tutsi in the Kibilira commune.
39. Rolf Carrière, “Rwanda’s Genocide @ 21: A Reflection,” Nonviolence Peaceforce, April 13, 2015, <https://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/blog/420-rwanda-s-genocide-21-a-reflection>.

40. “Hutu Muslims Saved Tutsis during Rwandan Genocide,” *Al Jazeera* April 7, 2009, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOU5AZFsBrc>.
41. Carrière, “Rwanda’s Genocide.”
42. Conor Gaffey, “Catholic Church Apologizes for Role in Rwandan Genocide,” *Newsweek* November 21, 2016, <https://www.newsweek.com/catholic-church-apologizes-role-rwandan-genocide-523289>; “Rwanda Genocide: Catholic Church Sorry for Role of Priests and Nuns in Killings,” *Guardian* November 20, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/21/rwanda-genocide-catholic-church-sorry-for-role-of-priests-and-nuns-in-killings>.
43. Robert J. Burrows, “A Nonviolent Strategy to Defeat Genocide,” *Global Research* June 21, 2017, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/a-nonviolent-strategy-to-defeat-genocide/5595512>; and “Nonviolent Defense/Liberation Strategy: Strategic Aims,” June 4, 2016, www.nonviolentliberationstrategy.wordpress.com.
44. James Traub, “Foreign Policy: Holding Rwanda Accountable,” *NPR* September 7, 2010, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129696478>.
45. Juan Carrero, “U.S./U.N. Coverup of Kagame’s Genocide in Rwanda and Congo,” *Global Research* September 21, 2010, <http://whale.to/c/carrero.html>.
46. Eli S. McCarthy, “The Gospels Draw Us Further: A Just Peace Ethic.”
47. Gerald F. Powers interviewed by Gretchen Crowe, *Our Sunday Visitor*, April 20, 2016, <https://www.osv.com/Article/TabId/493/ArtMID/13569/ArticleID/19722/Powers-Catholic-social-doctrine-is-%E2%80%98just-peace%E2%80%99-.aspx>; Mark Allman and Tobias Winright, “Protect Thy Neighbor: Why Just-War Tradition Is Still Indispensable,” *Commonweal* June 2, 2016, <https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/protect-thy-neighbor>; response to Allman and Winright by Marie Dennis and Eli McCarthy, “Jesus and ‘Just War?’ Time to focus on Just Peace and Gospel Nonviolence,” *Huffington Post* October 1, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jesus-and-just-war-time-to-focus-on-just-peace-and b_57ec6282e4b0972364deab50.
48. Anna Floerke Scheid, “Christian Peace Ethics: Trends in the International (Anglophone) Debate,” *Jahrbuch fur Christliche Socialwissenschaften* 59 (2018): Peace and Justice, 272–273.

49. McCarthy, “The Gospels Draw Us Further: A Just Peace Ethic”; Gerald W. Schlabach, “Just War? Enough Already,” *Commonweal* May 31, 2017, <https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/just-war-0>; Schlabach, “Appeal to Catholic Church to Re-Commit to the Centrality of Gospel Nonviolence,” Catholic Nonviolence Initiative, April 11, 2016, <https://nonviolencejustpeace.net/final-statement-an-appeal-to-the-catholic-church-to-re-commit-to-the-centrality-of-gospel-nonviolence/>.
50. For example, some point to the restrictive use by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops to question the 2003 Iraq War. But they did not clearly resist it even when the Pope was against it and this enabled the conditions for ongoing abuse in Iraq including the rise of ISIS. Yet, the USCCB also legitimized the 2001 war in Afghanistan resulting in the ongoing war that continues eighteen years later.
51. McElroy quoted in Joshua J. McElwee, “Pope Condemns Possession of Nuclear Weapons in Shift from Church’s Acceptance of Deterrence,” *National Catholic Reporter* November 10, 2017, <https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/pope-condemns-possession-nuclear-weapons-shift-churchs-acceptance-deterrence>.
52. Schlabach, “Just War? Enough Already.”
53. Schlabach, “Letters: More Just War: Schlabach Replies,” *Commonweal* September 20, 2017, <https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/letters-more-just-war>.
54. Further explanation from Schlabach in email exchange with the author.
55. McCarthy, “Gospels Draw us Further” 86–87. In the early 1900s, about 10% of deaths in war were civilians but that climbed steadily to about 87% in wars since 2000; see Center for Systemic Peace, “Global Conflicts Trends,” 2017, especially figure 8, <http://systemicpeace.org/conflictrends.html>. These numbers don’t even include the enormous numbers of indirect deaths of civilians, at a rate of about 3–15x more than direct deaths, due to the lack of clean water, sewage, electricity, and medical supplies. See Todd Whitmore, “Peacebuilding and Its Challenging Partners,” in *Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis*, eds. Scott Appleby, Robert J. Schreiter, and Gerard Powers (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010), 163–167; Geneva Declaration, “Global Burden of Armed Violence,” 2008, <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf>. See also Robert J. Delahunty and John Yoo, “From Just

War to False Peace,” *Chicago Journal of International Law* 13.1 (2012): 1–45. Consistent abuse can be traced from Cicero and the Roman Empire (7–10), through medieval times with the popes and Crusades (12–13), the years of conquest in the “New World” (14–15), and the modern period with the “sovereign state” logic of war (16–17). Even Hugo Grotius acknowledged that “just war theory contributes to the likelihood and ferocity of war” (19). For other resources to look at this issue during the Twentieth Century, see Johan Verstraeten, “De Bellum Iustum Traditie en het Vredesdenken 1914–1964,” in *Van Rechtvaardige oorlog naar Rechtvaardige Vrede. Katholieken tussen Militarisme en Pacifisme in Historisch-Theologisch Perspectief*, eds. Roger Burggraave, et al. (Leuven: Universitaire Pers, 1993): 89–112.

56. McCarthy, “Gospels Draw us Further.”

57. McCarthy, “Gospels Draw us Further” 86, 88.

58. Scheid, “Christian Peace Ethics” 275, 278.

59. Helen Dexter, “Pacifism and the Problem of Protecting Others,” *International Politics* 56.3 (December 2017): 243–258.

60. Scheid, “Christian Peace Ethics” 273–274, referring to Winright.

61. Cardinal Peter Turkson said, “It [just war theory] can undermine efforts to develop alternative capacities and tools for conflict to be overcome and transformed.” Quoted in Christopher Lamb, “Pope Urged to Abolish Creed of ‘Just War,’” *Sunday Times* April 24, 2016,

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/pope-urged-to-abolish-creed-of-a-just-war-spm5jzjg8>.

62. Scheid, “Christian Peace Ethics” 273, referring to Winright’s argument.

63. Examples can be found in my earlier essay “Gospels Draw Us Further” 88, as well as on the Catholic Nonviolence Initiative website on the FAQ page. Another prominent example is Fr. Francisco de Roux, S.J., of Colombia, who explained, “In my Catholic country, our nuns and priests joined the guerrillas because of the just war paradigm [...]. The Catholic paramilitaries pray to the Virgin before slaughtering people because of the just war paradigm. This is awful. Help us to stop this paradigm and build up a new one” (Nonviolence and Just Peace Conference, the Vatican, April 11–13, 2016,

<https://nonviolencejustpeacedotnet.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/nonviolence-justpeace-session-3-transcript.pdf>).

64. Don Lattin, “‘The Vietnam Years’: How the Conflict Ripped the Nation’s Religious Fabric,” *Religion News Service*, Sept. 8, 2017, <https://religionnews.com/2017/09/08/the-vietnam-years-how-the-conflict-ripped-the-nations-religious-fabric/>.
65. More examples could be cited regarding Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003 (USCCB raised questions without clearly refuting and organizing against), and Libya in 2011.
66. Cahill, “Catholic Tradition on Peace, War, and Just Peace,” in *A Just Peace Ethic Primer*. Referring to similar refinements of a just war framework, such as *jus post bellum*, she suggests that “Even so, it might be better (or at least more consistent with the direction of recent papal thought) to understand such arguments, not as expanding ‘just war theory,’ but as applications of positive concepts of CST such as human dignity, the common good, and sustainable just peace” (Cahill, “The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal,” *Expositions*, 12.1 (2018): 26–27, <https://expositions.journals.villanova.edu/article/view/2318>).
67. “Advancing Nonviolence and Integral Peace in the Church and the World”; McCarthy, “A Virtue-Based Just Peace Ethic.” For more on key concerns about just war framework, see McCarthy, “The Gospels Draw Us Further” and Catholic Nonviolence Initiative, “Key Concerns about Just War Framework,” 2019, <https://nonviolencejustpeacedotnet.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/what-are-key-concerns-about-the-catholic-church-continuing-to-legitimate-the.pdf>.
68. Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Catholic Tradition on Peace, War, and Just Peace,” in *A Just Peace Ethic Primer*.
69. Leo Guardado, “Nonviolence: The Witness of a Church of Mercy,” in this volume.